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A Sacred Trust
David T. Seamons
Association of Latter-day Saint Counselors and Psychotherapists
October 4, 2019

Being invited into the innermost intimate parts of a person’s life is a sacred trust. As such, it is one for
which we must be personally prepared. Having an understanding that those in our care are sons and
daughters of Heavenly Father must ground our approach to our clinical work, constantly guiding us as
we assist them through the healing process.

A

hat, and when you go to church, you put on your
church hat.” This did not feel right; it did not make
sense then, and it does not make sense now. I can only
wear one hat, and that hat includes both my religious
values and beliefs, and my professional orientation
and practice. It is with my one hat that I wish to visit
with you today.
For me, coming to this conference is more than receiving a few Continuing Education Units (CEU). I
come to learn how best to help Heavenly Father’s
children navigate through this challenging mortal
experience and return safely home. As I have visited
with many of you, I have become aware of the multiple gifts that you have been given as therapists: the
gift of understanding, the gift of compassion, the gift
of faith, and the gift of personal revelation, to name
a few. Such gifts do not come from textbooks or degrees, but from Heavenly Father, who has charged us
to use them to bless the lives of others—to give faith
to the faithless, hope to the hopeless, and courage to

s a young boy, I had a fascination with why people did what they did. This curiosity led me to
be an astute observer of human behavior, whether it
was at school, with friends, in a store, or in any other
public venue. Because of my interest in people and
their behaviors, I have always leaned towards the field
of psychology. My first introduction to emotional disorders came as a result of an assignment in my Abnormal Psychology class, for which I had to spend 20
hours volunteering at the Utah State Hospital. Wow!
What an experience. That “wow” experience has continued to fuel my passion through graduation and to
the present.
During my graduate program, I began to see a gap
between my religious beliefs and what I was learning
as a would-be psychologist. Unsure of how to close
this gap, I asked my instructor, “How do I bridge the
gap between my religious beliefs and my professional
learnings?” His answer sounded simple: “You have two
hats. When you go to work you wear your professional
1
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the downtrodden. This charge includes taking the
opportunity, when appropriate, to remind those with
whom we work who they are and whose they are. It
has been my privilege over the past 40+ years as a
therapist to be invited into the private lives of many of
Heavenly Father’s children. I have come to reverence
and cherish these experiences. They have provided
and continue to provide me with many priceless insights. Let me share just a few with you.
Being invited into the inner, most intimate parts of
a person’s life is a sacred trust, one for which I have a
personal responsibility to prepare. When people come
into my office, they do so at a time of great vulnerability. They are looking for a safe place—for someone
who will listen to their fears and concerns, and give
them direction, encouragement, and hope. Lori Gottlieb summarized it best when she said that during the
therapeutic process, patients share their “secrets and
fantasies, their fears, their shame and their failures,
invading the spaces they normally keep private” (Gottlieb, 2016).
It has been helpful for me to know that everyone
who comes to my office is a son or daughter of a
Heavenly Father who wants us to be successful in
our earthly experience and return safely home. As I
listen to their stories, I soon realize that they are stuck
and/or lost. Their world has become confusing and
frightening. They are overwhelmed with emotions
that cloud their judgement and their ability to apply
what they know.
Longtime Sesame Street writer Emily Perl Kingsley
(1987) wrote a story in the hope of providing comfort
and inspiration to those with a Down syndrome child.
I believe this story can also apply to others:

hours later, the plane lands. The stewardess comes
in and says, “Welcome to Holland.” “Holland?!?”
you say. “What do you mean Holland?? I signed up
for Italy! I’m supposed to be in Italy. All my life I’ve
dreamed of going to Italy.”
But there’s been a change in the flight plan. They’ve
landed in Holland and there you must stay. The important thing is they haven’t taken you to a horrible,
disgusting, filthy place full of pestilence, famine and
disease. It’s just a different place.
So you must go out and buy new guidebooks. And
you must learn a whole new language. And you will
meet a whole new group of people you never would
have met. It’s just a different place. It’s slower-paced
than Italy, less flashy than Italy. But after you’ve
been there for a while and you catch your breath,
you look around . . . and you begin to notice Holland
has windmills . . . and Holland has tulips. Holland
even has Rembrandts.
But everyone you know is busy coming and going
from Italy . . . and they’re all bragging about what a
wonderful time they had there. And for the rest of
your life, you will say, “Yes, that’s where I was supposed to go. That’s what I had planned.”
And the pain of that will never, ever, ever, ever go
away . . . because the loss of that dream is a very,
very significant loss.
But . . . if you spend your life mourning the fact that
you didn’t get to go to Italy, you may never be free
to enjoy the very special, the very lovely things . . .
about Holland.

This is a familiar scenario for many that I see. Their
trust is that I can assist them in adapting to “Holland.”
Because of this sacred trust, I begin each day petitioning the Lord for guidance and inspiration as I work
with His children.
I love being a clinician! I believe in people and their
ability to be happy and successful. I am of little value
as a therapist if I come to a session struggling physically, emotionally, or spiritually. People expect me to
give my undivided attention and skills in their behalf.
For me, getting a good night’s rest and having most
of my home life “under control” are advantageous.
Joseph Smith found this to be true when, one morning, he became upset with Emma over something she
had done. Later, when he tried to translate, he found

I am often asked to describe the experience of raising a child with a disability – to try to help people
who have not shared that unique experience to understand it, to imagine how it would feel. It’s like
this . . .
When you’re going to have a baby, it’s like planning
a fabulous vacation trip – to Italy. You buy a bunch
of guidebooks and make wonderful plans. The
Coliseum. The Michelangelo David. The gondolas in
Venice. You may learn some handy phrases in Italian. It’s all very exciting.
After months of eager anticipation, the day finally
arrives. You pack your bags and off you go. Several
2
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that he could not. Joseph went out into the orchard
to pray and ask the Lord why he could not translate.
He soon realized that he needed the presence of the
Holy Ghost. He came back into the house and asked
Emma for forgiveness. He was then able to continue
with the translation. In addition to being a therapist,
I have several other roles: individual, husband, father,
grandfather, neighbor, and friend. Over the course of
these past many years, I have learned not to overlook
my role as a spouse and father. It is impossible for me
to be totally available for spiritual guidance if I am preoccupied with unresolved personal or familial issues.
Additionally, the perspective that I am serving
Heavenly Father’s children is a humbling thought that
motivates me to avail myself of His spirit in the work
I do. I have found that spiritual guidance comes in
many different ways. Perhaps the most common is the
occasional prompting to ask a specific question that
needs to be asked. I believe you can find out the truth
of an issue simply by asking the right question(s).
Another form of spiritual guidance is the power of
discernment, or the ability to hear and understand
what your patient is trying to communicate. Lastly, on
occasion, I have had the privilege to see my patients
through the eyes of the Savior. These revelatory experiences have helped me understand who they really
are and who they can become. I know that spiritual
promptings are not part of our training or covered in
textbooks, but they have become real and essential for
me in my work. I therefore constantly strive to be worthy of these spiritual interventions. Yes, I have a Ph.D.
and faithfully do my CEU’s every year for my profession, but I have come to understand that it is work of
a lifetime to obtain my “spiritual” CEU’s.
I have noticed that, oftentimes, when I am in social
gatherings and it comes out that I am a therapist, a
brief awkward silence ensues, followed by someone
either changing the subject, or asking a litany of
questions they have always wanted to ask a therapist.
Therapists deal with the daily challenges of living just
like everyone else. Our training has taught us theories,
tools, and techniques, but whirring beneath our hardearned expertise is the fact that we know just how
hard it is to be a person. We still come to work each
day as ourselves—with our own set of vulnerabilities, our own longings and insecurities, and our own

histories. Of all my credentials as a therapist, my
most significant is that I am a “card-carrying member
of the human race” (Gottlieb, 2016).
Everyone has demons and therapy helps us confront them. This is a very demanding profession! If
you find it difficult to separate your own struggles
from those who come to see you, I would suggest that
you seek help and/or consider a different profession.
A therapist holds up a mirror to their patients, but
patients can also hold up a mirror to their therapist.
It is my hope that my message today has reminded
each of us of the sacred trust we have as we work with
those who enter the doors of therapy. May we be prepared and honor this trust in everything we say and
do. When all is said and done, I am just a husband,
father, and grandfather with a particular education. I
witness this day that God lives and that Jesus Christ
is His Son. Through the grace of Jesus Christ and His
Atonement, we can make mistakes, stumble at times,
and repent to realign ourselves with the covenant path
back to our Heavenly Father. This knowledge gives me
faith and hope in all I do. May this be our perspective
and motivation as we labor to assist others along this
same sacred path.
References
Gottlieb, L. (2016). Maybe you should talk to someone: A therapist, her therapist, and our lives revealed. Houghton Mifflin
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Help Thou My Unbelief: Exploring the Secular Sources
of our Clients’ Doubts
Edwin E. Gantt
Madeline R. Christensen
Jacob D. Tubbs
Brigham Young University

Issues of faith and doubt are often at the heart of religious clients’ psychological and emotional suffering. As such, they are a topic of genuine therapeutic interest. Latter-day Saint therapists have a
unique responsibility to help our religious clients work through their psychological concerns, as well as
help them address their religious doubts when relevant in the therapeutic setting. We argue that many
of the concerns fueling client faith crises spring from taken-for-granted assumptions absorbed from
our larger secular culture. Further, these assumptions are radically different from – indeed, typically
antithetical to – the premises upon many of our fundamental beliefs as Latter-day Saints rest. Indeed,
these unacknowledged secular assumptions are often the source of our client’s religious doubts in the
first place because they are in fact toxic to sustaining a vibrant and coherent faith in the Restored Gospel of Jesus Christ. By helping clients more carefully and critically examine their secular assumptions,
Latter-day Saint therapists can do much to help their clients overcome or avoid otherwise fatal crises
of faith and, in so doing, alleviate a great deal of unnecessary suffering.

“. . . Doubt wisely; in strange way
To stand inquiring right, is not to stray;
To sleep, or run wrong, is. On a huge hill,
Cragged and steep, Truth stands, and he that will
Reach her, about must and about must go,
And what the hill’s suddenness resists, win so.”
( John Dunne, Satire III, lines 76-82)

faith – one that is active, growing, and bearing fruit . . .
a faith that never feels challenged is most likely dead”
(p. 106). Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to
first dispel a common misconception about faith and
the struggle for understanding. Some have assumed
that anyone experiencing a crisis of faith must only be
doing so because they have committed some sort of
sin. As Elder Uchtdorf (2013) teaches, however: “Actually, it is not that simple” (p. 22).
Over the years, we have seen many individuals, both
friends and family, experience periods of doubt – often intense – about the Church and its teachings.1

I

n the October General Conference of 2013, Elder
Dieter F. Uchtdorf (2013) observed: “There are few
members of the Church who, at one time or another,
have not wrestled with serious or sensitive questions”
(p. 23). Indeed, as Karen Swallow Prior (2018) noted
in her recent book, “scrutiny can be evidence of a living

1. Each of us has also at different times have wrestled with
certain questions for which there were no easy or quick answers

4
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Of course, in some instances, there were clear signs
that these individuals were living their lives in ways
that alienated them from the Spirit of God. In other
cases, they simply chose to take offense at something
a particular Church leader had said or done. Many
times, however, the seeds of their doubts were primarily intellectual in nature. Of course, that does not
mean that the seeds for those doubts were always the
result of good scholarship or the most careful thinking and analysis. It only means that their concerns and
questions were not intrinsically rooted in some moral
failing or rebellious and sinful desire.
We have had friends, for example, who found themselves questioning their faith when they discovered that
sacred temple rituals have changed (in some respects)
over the past 150 years. Others who questioned their
faith when they encountered statements made by early
Church leaders that seemed to contradict current
Church teachings. And yet others we know and love
began questioning their faith when they learned that
a particular teaching they thought was unchangeable
doctrine turned out to be nothing of the sort. We have
watched as some of our friends have called into question the spiritual authority of prophets and apostles
because of the Church’s teachings on sexuality, marriage, abortion, or other controversial political topics.
“How can prophets speak for God,” they asked, “and
yet get things so wrong? How can I believe in prophetic
authority when the Brethren seem to be enemies to
social progress and espouse ideas so clearly on the
wrong side of history?” We know of others who began
to question their faith because they could not reconcile the latest theories and findings of science with the
scriptural teachings they had grown up learning and
believing. Then there are those whose doubts manifest
a deep dissatisfaction with priesthood authority and
the hierarchical structure of the Church, things they
feel place unnecessary and burdensome constraints
on their individual freedom and agency. Sadly, these
few examples do not exhaust the issues and concerns
that we have witnessed family members, friends, colleagues, students, and fellow ward members struggling
with over the years – though we sincerely wish it did.

By virtue of their background, therapeutic focus,
and the nature of the population they typically serve,
Latter-day Saint therapists frequently work with clients who are struggling with issues and concerns similar to those just mentioned. Indeed, for some clients,
personal doubts about their religious beliefs and commitments, and even full-blown crises of faith, may be
their primary reason for seeking counseling in the first
place. For other clients, however, their doubts and suspicions may instead be a hidden or underlying source
of anguish, revealed over time only as we discover that
what initially seemed to be a psychological or emotional struggle is actually rooted in an even deeper
spiritual or religious struggle. In many cases, religion
might be so integral to a client’s life that fully teasing
apart psychological and emotional issues from religious issues is all but impossible. Whatever the case,
it is not uncommon for issues of faith and doubt to
be at the heart of our clients’ psychological and emotional struggles, and, consequently, a frequent topic of
therapeutic concern. In light of this, Latter-day Saint
therapists have a unique responsibility to not only
help their religious clients work through psychological
and emotional struggles, but also to shoulder the challenge of helping those same individuals address their
religious or spiritual doubts when those doubts arise
in the therapeutic setting. Like the distraught father
who pleaded “Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief ” (Mark 9:24), there are many good Latter-day
Saints who desire to remain faithful to the Restored
Gospel, but who are not able to resolve their intellectual and spiritual concerns without loving guidance and insight from a trusted source. As Latter-day
Saint therapists, professionals who – as Elder Neal A.
Maxwell (1974) taught – have our “citizenship in the
kingdom, but [carry a] passport into the professional
world” (p. 1), we have a responsibility to do all we can
to help such people navigate not only their psychological troubles, but their spiritual ones as well. It is
on this challenge, and how to most thoughtfully and
fruitfully meet it, that we wish to focus our analysis.
Thinking Differently

– a professional hazard, perhaps, of immersion in an academic
world where skepticism and critique are cardinal virtues of the
scholarly life.

We must begin by acknowledging that the pain and
frustration that accompanies faith crises is very real,
5
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that the bouts of mental and emotional anguish, the
gnawing doubts, and disappointments that fuel so
many sleepless nights are not mere affectations. Having said that, however, we also believe that in a great
many cases the struggles surrounding faith and religious commitment that so many of our clients undergo are in large measure unnecessary and avoidable
– though perhaps not easily, and certainly not without
serious effort being made. In short, we wish to argue
that many of the questions and doubts that constitute
the essential “stuff ” of so many of our clients’ contemporary faith crises often spring from common (though
often hidden) sources. We are convinced that many of
the questions that can so easily seem as though they
have no good answers – or seem only to have answers
that diminish faith or lead to the abandonment of religious commitments – seem so because they are in fact
grounded in questionable, typically secular, premises.
In other words, it is not so much the particular questions we have regarding our faith – or even the doubts
that may be generating those questions – that is the
most central problem to be faced here. Rather, what
we wish to argue here is that the real problem we face
(both as therapists and clients dealing with sincere
religious doubts) is the too-often taken-for-granted
secular assumptions at the root of so many of those
doubts, and which ultimately (and problematically)
frame how we are to think about such things as: God,
the Church, Priesthood Authority, Sexuality, Moral
Agency, Science, Reason, and the nature and meaning
of Faith and Truth.
While the struggles so many have as they try to
make sense of their faith, of scripture, and of prophetic
teachings are clearly both authentic and agonizing,
perhaps the real source of frustration and confusion
is that those who struggle are so often looking for the
corner of a round room. Perhaps, as Elder Dallin H.
Oaks (2014) has suggested, we have not been sufficiently attentive to the fact that:

different from many assumptions currently used in the
media and in other common discourse. (p. 3)

Consequently, it is all-too-often the case that we
have, both as a people and as individuals, however naively and innocently, mingled the philosophies (and
psychologies) of men with scripture, and in so doing,
create for ourselves much unnecessary confusion, frustration, doubt, and anger. As noted historian Patrick
Q. Mason (2016) has suggested:
One of the problems we have in Mormonism is that
we have loaded too much in the Truth Cart. And when
anything in the cart starts to rot a bit, or look unseemly
upon further inspection, some have a tendency to overturn the entire cart or seek a refund for the whole lot.
We have loaded so much into the Truth Cart largely
because we have wanted to have the same kind of
certainty about our religious claims – down to rather
obscure doctrinal issues – as we do about scientific
claims. . . . Many of the things which trouble people are
things that we probably should never have been all that
dogmatic about in the first place.

Professor Mason’s description of how some respond
to their doubts will strike some readers here as painfully familiar, having no doubt worked with any number of clients who were very much in the process of
“overturn[ing] the entire cart or seek[ing] a refund
for the whole lot” regarding their religious beliefs and
Church membership. Our hope here, however, is to
provide some helpful insights for addressing such situations and the concerns of such clients. Therefore, we
must now turn to a deeper exploration of just how
different Latter-day Saint assumptions are, how these
“different” assumptions can resolve some of the concerns our clients have, and how we might be able to
help our clients recognize and understand their own
assumptions (as well as the problematic implications
of those assumptions).
A central plank of our argument here is that many
of our clients’ most basic and most frequently professed beliefs as Latter-day Saints actually hinge on
very different premises than the ones they may have
unwittingly absorbed from the larger, secular world
because of their engagement with and immersion in it.
And, because this is so, the premises of their questions
about those beliefs, begetting as they often do deeply
painful crises of faith, matter a great deal. In short,

. . . on many important subjects involving religion,
Latter-day Saints think differently than many others.
When I say that Latter-day Saints ”think differently,” I
do not suggest that we have a different way of reasoning in the sense of how we think. I am referring to the
fact that on many important subjects our assumptions
– our starting points or major premises – are different
from many of our friends and associates. They are also
6
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if the premises upon which our client’s doubts are
based are in fact inadequate to the task of understanding the meaning of their religious beliefs and practices
in the first place, then perhaps we might help them
to resolve (or even avoid) a crisis in faith by guiding
them in recognizing the alien (often toxic) nature of
those premises. This would be especially important
given that in most cases the premises out of which our
client’s faith crises flow are typically unquestioned,
unexamined, and, thus, remain hidden from critical
notice, left to operate in profound and yet totally obscure ways. Perhaps, as Latter-day Saint therapists,
we might help our clients begin to take seriously Elder Uchtdorf ’s (2013) invitation to “first doubt your
doubts before you doubt your faith” by not only inviting them to more carefully and critically examining some of the unquestioned “secular certainties”
upon which so many of their doubts seem founded,
but also showing them concretely how such critical
examination can be done. And, if it should turn out
that those certainties are less than certain, less than
the solid and stable foundation we and our clients
sometimes take them to be, then it might just be that
there is a way out of what otherwise seem like the insoluble conundrums of fatal crises of faith.
In his essay “The Overlooked Bondage of Our Common Sense, James E. Faulconer (2014) trenchantly
observed:

absorbed and adopted is because they seem so
commonsensical, so ordinary and reasonable, simply
the way things really are. And, they can seem to be so
precisely because they are so seldom, if ever, seriously
questioned. Indeed, it is not uncommon for heretofore
faithful, believing Latter-day Saints to slowly (and
sometimes surprisingly) begin to realize that what
they actually believe is neither what they thought they
believed nor what they may have long professed
to believe. Many religious clients find the experience of burgeoning unbelief and “creeping doubt” to
be greatly distressing, especially when they do not
understand where their doubts are coming from or
what they can do with them. Simply being encouraged
to doubt their doubts, but not being provided with the
tools or skills or the alternative perspectives necessary
to successfully do so, can sometimes prove to be quite
frustrating and even more discouraging. Helping our
clients learn how to question their own assumptions
– particularly those masquerading as secular certainties – is one vital way in which we as faithful, believing
therapists can be of genuine service to clients struggling with unbelief and doubt.
Hidden Assumptions

In the opening paragraphs of his powerful essay
Men Without Chests, the famous writer and Christian
apologist C. S. Lewis provides an excellent example
of exactly how this sort of thing can happen. Lewis
begins his essay by discussing a subtle way in which
relativism (moral and otherwise) can be insinuated
into our thinking. He does this by examining a seemingly innocuous passage in a commonly used textbook
for high school students of his day, a book he dubs
The Green Book.2 The authors of the textbook, Lewis
notes, relate a story in which the famous poet Samuel
Taylor Coleridge overhears two tourists describing a
waterfall, one of them calling the waterfall “sublime”
and the other calling it “pretty.” The textbook authors
then write:

The tightest cords of bondage are those we are unaware of. The most willing slave does not recognize that she is a slave, thinking that what she does
is what she has chosen to do, though she has been
manipulated into doing it. We are most in danger of
this particular bondage when what we think or do
seems “perfectly natural” or “perfectly reasonable.” The
things that we think are beyond question are the very
things that can most easily deceive us to the point of
bondage.

In other words, while our clients’ may well be sincerely trying to live their lives in harmony with what
they take to be gospel teachings, they nonetheless may
have absorbed certain ways of thinking, certain commonly accepted ideas, certain values and perspectives,
that are actually quite toxic to a vibrant and coherent faith in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. One reason
that such ways of thinking are so easily and smoothly

When the man said This is sublime, he appeared to be
making a remark about the waterfall . . . Actually . . .
he was not making a remark about the waterfall, but
a remark about his own feelings. What he was saying
2. No connection whatsoever to the title or topic of the recent
Oscar-winning movie.
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was really I have feelings associated in my mind with the
word “Sublime,” or shortly, I have sublime feelings . . .
This confusion is continually present in language as we
use it. We appear to be saying something very important about something: and actually we are only saying
something about our own feelings. (Lewis, 2001, pp.
2-3)

but an assumption, which ten years hence, its origins
forgotten and its presence unconscious, will condition
him to take one side in a controversy which he has
never recognized as a controversy at all. (p. 5)

In short, without really recognizing what is happening, the students’ minds and values are subtly being
shaped here so that they will in time come to view the
world in particular ways, and consequently, assume
particular values. Indeed, this shaping process is so
subtle (and actually involves far more sources of influence than just one English grammar textbook) that its
fruit seldom ripens until many years have passed.
Lewis’s central worry, both in this particular essay
and many others, is the way in which the metaphysical
assumptions (and their attendant values) that undergird the passages that students read in this textbook
(and many similar others) exert a powerful though
unnoticed influence on the development of the students’ most basic understanding of themselves, of the
world, and of God. The influence of these hidden assumptions and values is so powerful precisely because
they are latent, things merely implied in passing, inscribed in a sort of invisible ink on the white space
between words and sentences on a page. Such indoctrination – and make no mistake this is a process of
indoctrination – takes place by means of a sort of educational and cultural osmosis through which an entire
worldview slowly accretes over time like sediment in
a river delta, both taking shape in and giving shape to
the student’s mind, desires, and aspirations. It is only
over time that this process manages to turn young, eager, trusting students, Lewis argues, into “men without
chests.” Indeed, as Lewis (1970a) elsewhere writes,
“the sources of unbelief among young people today
do not lie in those young people. The outlook which
they have . . . is a backwash from an earlier period. It
is nothing intrinsic to themselves which holds them
back from the Faith” (p. 116).
If Lewis’ example is both particularly illustrative
and generally applicable, as we believe it is, then it has
much to teach about how exactly it is our clients can
come to possess certain perspectives and assumptions,
taking them for granted as mere commonsense, as they
go about trying to make sense of themselves, God,
others, and the world. Additionally, Lewis provides us
with an important warning about the dangerous consequences that attend any attempt to understand

Lewis (2001) notes that, “The schoolboy who reads
this passage in The Green Book will believe two propositions: firstly, that all sentences containing a predicate
of value are statements about the emotional state of
the speaker, and secondly, that all such statements are
unimportant” (p. 3). In other words, in studying this
text students come not only learn the fundamentals
of English grammar and usage (as intended), but far
more subtly and insidiously they also come to learn
what Lewis calls moral subjectivism.
According to Lewis scholar Adam C. Pelser (2017),
“[Moral] Subjectivism is the view that value claims
such as ‘Murder is wrong,’ which might seem to be
claims about objective (mind independent) values,
are simply reports about the subjective emotions of
the speaker (e.g., ‘I have a disapproving feeling toward
murder’), which are no more about objective values
than statements such as ‘I have an itch’ or ‘I’m going
to be sick’” (p. 7). Now, Lewis is clear that the book’s
authors have said none of these things, at least not
explicitly. Rather, he notes, “The pupils are left to do
for themselves the work of extending the same treatment to all predicates of value: and no slightest obstacle to such extension is placed in their way” (2001,
p. 4). In the end, Lewis’ concern is not so much with
the authors’ intentions behind what they have written,
whether they are being nefarious or simply naïve and
sloppy, but “with the effect their book will certainly
have on the schoolboy’s mind” (p. 5). He continues:
Their words are that we ‘appear to be saying something
very important’ when in reality we are ‘only saying
something about our own feelings’. No schoolboy will
be able to resist the suggestion brought to bear upon
him by that word only. I do not mean, of course, that
he will make any conscious inference from what he
reads to a general philosophical theory that all values
are subjective and trivial. The very power of [the book’s
authors] depends on the fact that they are dealing with
a boy: a boy who thinks he is ‘doing’ his ‘English prep’
and has no notion that ethics, theology, and politics are
all at stake. It is not a theory they put into his mind,
8
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one’s religious commitments and faith in the context of questions that arise out of unrecognized
secular assumptions – assumptions masquerading as
confirmed certainties, received wisdom, and common
knowledge. After all, Lewis (1970a) contends, “a man
whose mind was formed in a period of cynicism and
disillusion, cannot teach of hope or fortitude” (p. 116).
In a related essay, Lewis tackles what he takes to be
the central challenge of Christian apologetics, or the
direct and explicit defense of the reasonableness and
coherence of the Christian faith. Lewis recognizes
that while it is a worthy endeavor in its own right, the
formal work of apologetics faces an immense challenge in its efforts to win hearts and minds, strengthen
the faith commitments of believers, and invite others
to “come unto Christ.” He writes:

educational researcher Kathy Hall (2003) reminds us,
“No knowledge is neutral, but rather is always based
on some . . . perception of reality and on some . . .
perspective of what is important to know” (p. 176).
Thus, Lewis cautions us to sup carefully as we learn
and study so that we do not consume a rival worldview, one hostile to our Christianity, one that seeks to
repudiate and replace it, without a clear awareness and
understanding of what exactly it is we are doing and
what its likely consequences might prove to be.
Secular Liturgies

In a spirit similar to that of Professor Lewis, Christian philosopher and cultural critic James K. A. Smith
(2016) has written extensively on what he identifies as
“secular liturgies” (see also, Smith, 2009, 2012, 2014).
Typically understood to refer to religious activities
and rituals, most often public in nature, by which
individuals worship together, liturgies constitute
“identity-forming practices” (Smith, 2012, p. 161) that
are meant to shape and refine the contours of one’s religious life and self-understanding in a very concrete
and embodied and social manner. “For those who
practice faith,” Smith (2016) writes, “faith takes practice. And such practice is embodied and material; it is
communal and liturgical; it involves eating and drinking, dancing and kneeling, painting and singing” (pp.
160-161). As such, liturgical practices ground and
guide and nurture our desires and imagination in ways
that define for us the meanings of our lives in subtle,
nuanced, and intimate ways because they are “loaded
with an ultimate Story about who we are and what
we’re for” (Smith, 2016, p. 46). Smith (2016) notes,
“they carry with them a kind of ultimate orientation”
(p. 46) that points us toward a deeper understanding
of our nature, purpose, the meaning of our lives, and
those moral and spiritual goods to which we ought to
aspire. One need only think of the ritual blessing and
passing of the Sacrament every Sunday, the daily observance of the Law of Chastity or the Word of Wisdom, or the immersive and embodied nature of LDS
temple worship to see how such things are liturgical
in nature. This is especially clear as one considers how
such ritual observances embody ways of conveying
truth and deepening personal understanding quite
different than we see in the systematic interpretation

We can make people (often) attend to the Christian
point of view for half an hour or so; but the moment
they have gone away from our lecture or laid down our
article, they are plunged back into a world where the
opposite position is taken for granted. As long as that
situation exists, widespread success is simply impossible . . . Our Faith is not very likely to be shaken by
any book on Hinduism. But if whenever we read an
elementary book on Geology, Botany, Politics, or Astronomy [and, as a psychologist, I would add Psychology],
we found that its implications were Hindu, that would
shake us. It is not the books written in direct defense
of Materialism [i.e., secularism] that make the modern
man a materialist; it is the materialistic assumptions in all
the other books. (Lewis, 1970b, p. 93; emphasis added)

Professor Lewis’s point here is that ideas, facts, findings, insights, arguments, or what have you, do not
come into the world, and are not communicated to
us, as isolated atoms of information, as bits of knowledge existing pristinely independent of context or
background suppositions. Rather, the information we
(and our clients) glean from the textbooks we read, the
podcasts we listen to, the Facebook posts we read, the
memes were share, the lectures we attend, the movies we stream and television shows we watch, is always
grounded in some worldview, some set of assumptions about the nature of the world and what about
it is worth knowing or saying. For example, despite
the pervasiveness of what has been termed “the myth
of neutrality” (Slife, Reber, & Lefevor, 2012), a very
popular modern myth about the nature of science,
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of sacred texts, or the study of abstract doctrines and
formal beliefs. Liturgies involve the whole person in
what is at best only a partial cognitive or intellectual
task of sense-making as they invite immersion in communal activity, rather than retreat into solitary critical
reflection. As Richards and James (2020) note in their
recent book Misreading Scripture with Individualist
Eyes, “the most important things in a culture usually
go without being said” (p. 2).
Although usually associated with religion, Smith
(2012) demonstrates “that there are practices and institutions that have the same function and force” as
religious liturgies but which we do not recognize as
such, even though they also embody “rituals and practices that shape our attunement to what is ultimate”
(p. 161). Smith’s provocative and penetrating analysis
shows that there are indeed secular liturgies that orient us toward a “rival understanding of the [Christian]
good life” (p. 161), but which we – in our immersion
in the secular world of common cultural practice that
gives birth to, and sustains and nurtures, such a rival
understanding – seldom ever recognize as being such
at all. And, because we do not recognize the “secular
liturgies” in which we participate to be liturgies in the
first place, we have little sense of how they are continually shaping and guiding us toward new and different
conclusions than those consonant with our faith. “Ultimately, Smith (2016) points out, “when such liturgies are disordered, aimed at rival kingdoms, they are
pointing us away from our magnetic north in Christ”
(p. 47). The predictable outcome, Smith (2016) notes,
is that “Our loves and longings are steered wrong, not
because we’ve been hoodwinked by bad ideas, but because we’ve been immersed in de-formative liturgies
and not realized it. As a result, we absorb a very different Story about the telos of being human and norms of
flourishing” (p. 47).
By way of example, Smith (2009) writes in considerable detail about such secular liturgies – or what he
also terms “pedagogies of desire” (p. 24) – as “the liturgies of mall and market” (pp. 93-103), the liturgies of
nationalism, entertainment, and the stadium (pp. 103112), and the “liturgy of the university” (pp. 112-121).
In each of these instances, Smith shows how the ordinary activities of people’s daily social and political lives
are shot-through with assumptions about the nature
of truth, God, the human soul, and the good life that

rival those that provide the conceptual foundation for
genuine Christian worship and understanding. Unfortunately, because these activities are so commonplace,
so utterly ordinary and widely shared, the nature of
their underlying assumptions – and the potentially
corrosive implications of those assumptions, both for
our clients’ own self-understandings and for their understanding of the meaning and possibilities of their
religious faith and covenants – often goes unnoticed,
even as our clients’ doubts about their faith mount and
their commitment to their covenants wanes.
Egocentrism

Among the perspectives that these secular liturgies
may instantiate for our clients is one in which human
nature is taken to be fundamentally and inescapably
egocentric. That is, in our larger culture, people are
taught to see themselves as essentially self-contained
individuals, continuously seeking gratification in a
world of potential costs and benefits, and their relationships with others primarily in terms of the economic exchange of goods and services (see Wilkens &
Sanford, 2009). One need not have ever taken a formal course in Rational Choice Theory from an Economics professor, or study Social Exchange Theory
with a psychologist, to be initiated into a worldview
in which all human motivation is reducible to selfinterest and the quest for the maximization of personal pleasure (Gantt & Williams, 2019). One need
only turn on the television and watch a few advertisements, take a trip to the local mall for some shopping,
enter the workplace to earn one’s keep, or visit a marriage counselor for a bit of couple’s therapy (Reckwitz,
2020). In each instance, the forms of living and relationship that structure and give direction to the social
practices in which clients engage, as well as the norms
and expectations (both written and unwritten) that
serve to maintain and enforce these practices, assume
a world of fundamentally independent egos arrayed
against one another in a relentless competition for
scarce resources (Gantt & Burton, 2013). Social life
is, according to the secular liturgies in play here, fundamentally a matter of negotiation, the weighing of
risk and opportunity in an endless dance meant to
secure maximum profit, whether in terms of such
10
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goods as fame, personal happiness, wealth, security, or
recognition and the love of others.

socio-cultural forces operating outside of their awareness or control. Thus, on the one hand, they may envision themselves as ‘free agents,” choosing how and
who they will be in a marketplace of enticing options;
while, on the other hand, they are convinced that some
of the most defining features of their identity are thing
in the formation of which they play no real, active part,
and before which they are ultimately rendered more or
less powerless.

Autonomy and Determinism

In a related way, these secular liturgies nurture a selfunderstanding in which our clients have often come to
see themselves as autonomous agents cast into a world
of near-infinite choices, responsible only to themselves
for the choices they make, uniquely able to define for
themselves the moral quality (if any) and meaning of
those choices. The promise of self-actualization and
true fulfillment they have been taught comes through
the unfettered freedom of the individual will. Likewise, they may have come to see life as essentially just
a vast panoply of possibilities, any and all ripe for the
taking. For some, one of the most important factors
in determining our choices is personal preference and
the guidance of individual desire. Thus, in much the
same way one might choose a particular shirt or pair
of shoes from among the various styles on offer in the
parade of shop windows at the local mall, our clients
may see the world as simply a place where they are
to select whatever lifestyle happens to “work” best for
them at the moment. Human agency, they may have
come to believe, is “free agency,” or the fundamentally
individual freedom to do whatever they happen to
want, whenever they want, and however they might
want (at least, that is, insofar as doing so does not restrict the freedom of another person to do the same).
In fact, they may well interpret scriptural and prophetic teachings about agency in just this way, thereby
making it all the harder to uncover the secular origins
and nature of such an understanding of agency.3
Ironically, at the same time, it is important to note
that some secular liturgies work to form our clients’
self-understanding such that they may believe that
certain important areas of their lives fall outside the
bounds of their exercise of agency or their meaningful
participation. For example, clients may have come to
believe that in regard to key features of their identity
they are a species of “things to be acted upon” (2 Ne.
2:14), beholden to the determinative forces of powerful abstractions, biological conditions, or contingent

Sexuality

Perhaps one of the best examples of this sort of
thinking can be seen in the way some clients, reflecting back the general consensus of our larger secular
culture, understand their sexuality. That is, having
absorbed certain basic assumptions about the nature
of human sexuality through various secular liturgies,
our clients may believe (along with many in our modern world) that sexuality is essentially a mysteriously
powerful abstraction that is the central fact of human
identity and purpose, and, as such, functions as the basic source of many of our deepest feelings and desires.
In this way, sexuality is taken to be the core element of
personality that defines for us (a priori) who we really
are, how we must feel, and how we must act – if, that
is, we wish to live authentic and fulfilling lives. Our
sexuality, we are informed, is that about us which we
must choose to discover, explore, and embrace, and yet
equally that about us which has been thrust upon us
by forces beyond our control (e.g., by our genes). This
widely accepted assertion is exemplified in Lehmiller’s
(2018) popular textbook on the psychology of human
sexuality:
As a starting point, it is useful to acknowledge that every single sexual act is the result of several powerful
forces acting upon one or more persons. These forces
included our individual psychology, our genetic background and evolved history, as well as the current social
and cultural context in which we live. Some of these influences favor sexual activity, whereas others oppose it.
Whether sex occurs at any given moment depends on
which forces are strongest at the time. (p. 2)

In short, Lehmiller asserts that human sexual
desires and relationships are best understood in
much the same way that Newtonian physics might
understand the motions and mutually influencing

3. For an excellent discussion of the difference between the
scriptural concept of “moral agency” and the notion of “free
agency,” see Judd (2005).
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behaviors of planets and other physical objects (see
Gantt & Williams, 2014).
In this secular view, sexual desire is not something
we do, it is not an agentic and moral expression of
meaningful relationships and purposes; rather, it is
simply taken to be the effect of mechanical forces beyond our control (or, even, our awareness), forces that
serve to constitute us as who we are and cannot help
but be. “It is clear,” Lehmiller (2018) states – echoing,
we believe, the general consensus of both our discipline and our larger secular society – “that human
sexuality is determined by multiple factors” (p. 20).
Unfortunately, especially for Latter-day Saints struggling to make sense of their sexual desires and relationships, moral agency is seldom, if ever, thought to
be one of those factors. In the moral context of the
modern world, reconciliation with the inescapable
givenness and power of one’s sexuality resembles a sort
of hopeless resignation to one’s fate, but is nonetheless,
at least in the eyes of many, something that is taken to
be of paramount existential, psychological, and even
political importance. Given the pervasiveness of such
views, it is perhaps no surprise that so many of our clients are not at all accustomed to thinking through the
possibility of reconciling their desires, sexual or otherwise, to the will of Christ. Instead, they assume that
if they are to remain faithful to their covenants, they
are thereby consigned to a life of unrelenting struggle
against their sexual identity, required to deny their
fundamental sexual nature, relegated to a constant war
within themselves.

Faith and Religion are held to be epistemologically
suspect, hopelessly subjective in nature and speaking
only of personal beliefs and private moral values. Indeed, because of this commonly assumed distinction,
a product of the secular liturgies that pervade modern political and educational life, clients often feel an
overwhelming demand to hold only those beliefs and
engage in only those practices that can be shown to
be valid in the light of the methods and findings of
scientific rationality. And, should science happen not
to confirm of their religious beliefs, clients may feel
trapped by the sense that the only viable alternative
available to them is fideism, the notion that because
Reason and Faith are inescapably hostile to one another religious belief can only ever be unjustifiable and
irrational.
In this way, religious faith can quickly come to be
seen as little more than a “crutch” for those who have
yet to arrive at certainty, or who are not strong enough
to “face reality” by accepting the facts of the world as
modern science has revealed them. Faith, then, is reduced to a sort of psychological coping strategy for
those who are unable to accept the world as it really is
in all its harsh, unrelenting pointlessness and finitude
– a reality the rational mind of the scientist knows to
be true irrespective of whatever the irrational mind of
the believer might hope to be the case. Evidence, we
are told, is the currency of Reason and Science, and
thus the source of their authority, while blind faith,
belief without foundation, is said to be the essence of
religious life (see, e.g., Coyne, 2015; Philipse, 2012;
Stegner, 2012). It is, perhaps, no wonder then, immersed as our clients are at almost every turn in the
secular liturgies founding and reinforcing such views,
that so many of them come to therapy these days in
the agonizing grip of deep doubts and the struggle to
find answers to questions of faith. Indeed, it is surprising that not more do so.
After long and careful study, however, we have come
to believe it most unfortunate that clients so often accept a view of faith in which it is taken to be simply
what one is forced to settle for when a thing cannot be
known for certain. It is even more troublesome that
some religiously inclined therapists encourage this
line of thinking, urging their clients to just “hope for
the best” in order to stifle their doubts. However, the
presumption that Reason and Faith are antithetical

The Fact-Value Dichotomy

Another way in which our clients’ immersion in the
secular liturgies of our day can foster serious religious
concerns that present in therapy can be seen in the
way these liturgies seduce into believing what scholars
have termed the “fact-value dichotomy” (Marchetti &
Marchetti, 2017). This term refers to the notion that
there is a fundamental difference between those things
that can be known to be true and those things that
are merely matters of the personal preference of individuals. Intimately (and inextricably) connected to
this dichotomy is the assumption that Reason, in the
guise of Science, is the final authority on what can be
known to be true and how it is to be known, while
12
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to one another, and that only modern science, as the
principle domain of human rationality, can achieve
certainty, and, thus, reliable knowledge, is a presumption that even many firmly secular thinkers find to
lack merit (see, e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Pasnau, 2017;
Yanofsky, 2013). Indeed, upon careful reflection, it
is quite clear that scientific rationality is grounded in
much that is taken on faith and that “faith has its reasons” (see, e.g., Boa & Bowman, 2005). A number of
scholars have shown that not only are faith and reason not diametrically opposed to one another, but
also that faith – as a trust born of intimate human
experience – is reliable and steadying in ways that human reason and scientific thought are not and cannot
be (Davis, 1999; Moreland, 2018; Plantinga, 2011;
Williams, 2008). While there are assuredly areas of
inquiry in which Latter-day Saint therapists and their
clients must both defer to the methods and findings
of empirical science, it is by no means the case that
scientific rationality holds the keys to answering all of
life’s important questions. Indeed, such a claim smacks
more of scientism, the reigning secular religion of science, than of genuine science itself (Gantt & Williams,
2018; Moreland, 2018; Williams & Robinson, 2015).

assumptions, our clients may feel as though there
is no ground upon which to stand in order to even
begin to doubt their doubts. Likewise, our clients
can fail to seriously doubt their doubts by thinking
only in terms of the pre-given categories of analysis or
established dichotomies that secular thought provides, and thereby seriously misunderstand – or
even just be blind to – alternative possibilities, the
topography of issues at hand, and the true nature of
the questions fueling their crises of faith.
Moral Agency

For example, it is not unusual for many of our clients to understand the nature of divine commandments and priesthood authority in the context of the
age-old “Freewill versus Determinism” debate. This is
an ongoing cultural and political debate, as well as an
academic one, in which human agency is either denied
at the outset (Determinism), on the one hand, or conceived primarily in terms of boundless individual autonomy, on the other (McKenna & Pereboom, 2016).
For many people, both in and out of the Church, this
dichotomy can seem not only natural, but also exhaustive. That is, it just simply is the case that either we
are free beings capable of independently choosing to
do whatever we wish, or we are simply the victims of
external forces, be they biological, environmental,
psychological, or societal, acting on us in subtle and
powerful ways so as to produce our thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors. For a people whose religious teachings
are suffused with the language of agency, freedom,
and choice, however, it is no surprise that Latter-day
Saints tend to be uncomfortable with the concepts of
determinism. Consequently, drawing on the basic categories provided by our larger (secular) cultural context and its various liturgies, we tend to think of and
talk about agency as “free agency” – a non-scriptural
mash-up of the secular concept “free will” and the doctrinal term “moral agency.”4 In so doing, we most often
(mis)understand agency as a matter of autonomy –
literally “self-law” (Greek: “auto” and “nomos”) – such
that we believe agency is entirely a matter of our capacity to make free, unfettered choices from amongst

Implications and Alternatives

Unfortunately, far too often, the formation and developmental progression of our clients’ worldview
assumptions (as well as our own) is something that
takes place without these assumptions ever being articulated in any explicit way, and without the secular origins of these assumptions ever being fully laid
bare. Thus, our clients have often been profoundly
shaped by the secular liturgies of our larger culture,
but without ever having genuinely considered the
logical, moral, or spiritual implications of the liturgies
that ground their thinking. Consequently, few of them
devote any serious effort to exploring the nature and
implications of the sort of alternative assumptions
Elder Oaks likely had in mind. It is in this way, we
believe, that clients so often struggle to “doubt [their]
doubts.” By not sufficiently interrogating their frequently taken-for-granted secular assumptions
about religious belief and the nature of faith, and
by not working through viable alternative starting

4. Elder Boyd K. Packer (1992) repeatedly taught, “The
phrase ‘free agency’ does not appear in scripture. The only agency
spoken of there is moral agency” (p. 67; emphasis in the original).
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the panoply of alternatives and possibilities life happens to offer us.
While moral agency, as taught in scripture and by
Latter-day prophets and apostles, most certainly does
require the capacity to make meaningful choices and
the ability to act for ourselves, viewing our agency
and freedom in terms of individual autonomy can lead
to serious difficulties when trying to make sense of divine commandments, priesthood authority, or prophetic counsel. Thus, it is not unusual to find that
some who are struggling to reconcile their faith with
the teachings and directions of priesthood leaders do
so because they see external authority (spiritual or
otherwise) as something that necessarily infringes on
their personal autonomy. When agency is conceived
in this fashion, commandments are seen as inherently
onerous, burdensome, and constraining, intrinsically placing limits on the individual exercise of “free
agency.” Rather than understanding agency as inherently moral and situated in a context of meanings,
responsibilities, and shared possibilities – and, thus,
commandments as a vital way of giving both moral
texture and guidance in that context – agency is understood in terms of the powers of self-determination
as possessed by self-contained egos for whom any external directive or expectation is necessarily intrusive
and confining. Granted, the individual freely and independently chooses to accede to the confinement of
obedience to external commands, but the very reality
of being commanded by another, even God, for any
reason is still typically seen as a burden of some sort,
rather than a boon.
If moral agency is not essentially about possessing the autonomous freedom to choose to do as one
pleases independent of influence, context, or constraint, however, then one might well ask what else it
could possibly be. If we reject the concept of agency
as individual autonomy (i.e., indeterminist will), is
the only alternative to embrace one or another form
of determinism (whether biological, mechanical, sociological, or what have you), along with its inescapable logic of nihilism (Gantt, Reber, & Hyde, 2013)?
Fortunately, a number of scholars have taken these
questions head-on and provided fruitful and insightful
perspectives on human agency from sophisticated, as
well as gospel-friendly, perspectives (see, e.g., Gantt &
Williams, 2014; Hansen, 2017; Judd, 2005; Slife &

Fisher, 2000; Williams, 2005, 2017; Yanchar, 2011,
2018). A central finding of the various analyses of
these scholars is that while it not possible to render a
conceptually coherent and meaningful account of human agency as “free agency” (i.e., autonomous, indeterminate willing), it is possible to offer such an account
in which agency is understood as fundamentally contextual, embodied, and intrinsically morally, and thus
relationally, situated.
A deeper recounting of the arguments put forward
regarding the nature of moral agency is beyond the
scope of our analysis here. Suffice it to say that an alternative starting point for discussing commandments
and freedom with our clients might be to think of
agency not so much as the ability to make unfettered,
independent choices, but rather as “having the truth or
living truthfully” (Williams, 2005, p. 131). As Richard
Williams (2005) has argued, it is vital to understanding the nature of our moral agency that we take seriously its intimate connection to truth. After all, Christ
has assured us that it is the truth that makes us free
( John 8:32), and that He is in fact that very truth.
Real freedom comes from being even as He is, living
as He does, perceiving and understanding and valuing
as He does. Williams (2005) writes:
Lacking truth, we are prevented from tapping into that
within us which inclines toward perfection and beckons us to be like our Father is. Understanding the nature of God, understanding the truth about ourselves
and what it means to be the kinds of beings we are,
knowing in our hearts the truth of the atoning grace
of Jesus Christ, and realizing the reality of our moral
purpose on earth – these are the truths that make us
free. These are the truths that provide the opportunity
for the flourishing of the moral agency with which we
are endowed. (p. 132)

In other words, divine commandments, priesthood
authority, and the counsel and guidance that flows
from that authority and those commandments, do
not constitute an infringement on the self-contained
power of our individual autonomy so much as they are
an invitation to real freedom – and, indeed, a powerful challenge to the false notion that we are first and
foremost autonomous individuals. The truth that is
revealed in Christ, and shared with us by means of
prophetic counsel and teaching, “gives us freedom
14
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from sin, self-deception, and falsity – from all those
construals of the world that hold us captive and prevent us from being who we, from a more truthful
perspective, really are and what we, from an eternal
perspective, might become” (Williams, 2005, p. 132).
Commandments are, thus, not constraints on our personal freedom, but rather the very framework for any
meaningful freedom in the first place.
Unfortunately, by teaching clients to value individual autonomy on the path to overcoming psychological challenges, therapists may actually be encouraging
their clients (however innocently) in a direction that
further intensifies religious doubts rather than offering a fruitful perspective for tackling those doubts.
Addressing questions of agency primarily from within
a conceptual framework that equates agency with unfettered individual autonomy can actually encourage
clients to question or reject the moral authority of the
Church, of the prophets and apostles, and ultimately
of God in determining what is and what is not sinful or acceptable behavior for them. This equation of
agency with autonomy stands in sharp contrast to understanding human agency, not as the freedom to do
whatever one wants, but as the capacity to do as one
should (Williams, 2005). By helping clients appreciate important distinctions between “free agency” (and
its secular presumptions) and moral agency (and its
scriptural foundations), therapists can better serve clients who are struggling and help them towards greater
insight about the role sacred commandments and prophetic counsel play in providing a grounding moral
context for properly weighing and valuing various
beliefs and behaviors. Further, therapists can assist
clients in coming to a deeper understanding of how
it is that Divine commandments are not the harsh demands or impositions of an external power meant to
control or subjugate one’s will, but are rather loving
invitations to live in a morally richer and spiritually
peace-filled way that is more harmony with truth and
reality.

question of human sexuality and its relationship (or,
more accurately, presumed non-relationship) with
moral agency. It is commonplace in our modern
world to hear sexuality spoken of as though it were
a powerful abstraction – one that, by virtue of the
pervasive causal efficacy it possesses, defines identity
at its most basic level, and determines the content
and aim of our most intimate desires, attractions, and
thoughts. Consequently, many people, including our
clients, tend to assume, with little serious reflection,
that people “have” or “possess” a “sexuality” or a “sexual
orientation” – something that is most likely rooted in
genetics, and which is responsible for how people are
attracted to others, whom they will find most sexually intriguing, and why they will perceive themselves
and others as they do. Indeed, this thing known as
“sexuality” is often taken to be so central to our clients’
identity that it colors and frames almost everything
else about them, so much so that, for many, almost every other aspect of their lives is thought to be best understood from the lens of sexuality. Indeed, for some,
sexual politics is held to be the inescapable and founding context for understanding all interpersonal relationships (see, e.g., Ray, Carlson, & Andrews, 2018).
The secular liturgies of the modern world persistently
seek to shape us to believe that to live an authentic
and fulfilling life, we must discover our “sexuality,”
learn to “accept” it, take opportunities to “explore” it,
strive to become “comfortable” with it, and find ever
more satisfying ways in which to “express” it. In fact,
many voices assert that unless people do such things,
and, in the end, give free reign to their “sexuality,” the
inevitable result will be deep psychological pain and
anxiety, crippling depression, or even suicide (Pumariega & Sharma, 2018).
Many claim that science has unequivocally demonstrated (at least to the satisfaction of any reasonable
person) that sexual orientation is a fixed and determinative category of being, and, thus, is non-agentic in
nature (see, e.g., Lehmiller, 2018; Weill, 2009). Nonetheless, serious questions about both the validity of the
methods and the soundness of the logic undergirding
the interpretation of such research persist unanswered
(see, e.g. Mayer & McHugh, 2016). The issue we wish
to raise here, however, is not so much about whether
the reductive interpretations of various scientific findings, or the impassioned arguments of various activists

Human Sexuality

Another area in which our clients sometimes
struggle to make sense of their faith, particularly in
light of the secular certainties they may have absorbed from our larger culture, is concerned with the
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across the political spectrum, have merit. Rather, what
is important to understand here is the way in which
pervasive secular certainties about the nature of sexual desire, especially when hidden because they have
been left unexamined, can facilitate a faith crisis in response to prophetic and scriptural teachings that run
counter to received cultural wisdom about such
things as same-sex attraction, marriage, and transgenderism. It is not surprising to find so many
members of the Church struggling to understand
Church teachings and policies regarding sexual intimacy and marriage in the face of what is a takenfor-granted truth of our modern world: sexuality is
identity. That is, one’s sexual orientation is taken to be
who and what one is, and limiting or constraining the
full embrace and expression of who one is, is intrinsically oppressive, harmful, hateful, and even perhaps
spiritually destructive. For some, in fact, any prohibitions against personally desired expressions of one’s
sexuality are seen as inherently and manifestly unfair
and unjust (see, e.g., Teunis & Herdt, 2007).
Unfortunately, as with so many issues over which
our clients struggle, not only of their faith commitments but also of the obligations placed upon them
by that faith, the struggle over sexuality is one whose
roots lie in secular soil rather than gospel sod. Despite our modern propensity to think of and explain
the world and ourselves in terms of powerful abstractions – what one scholar has termed “the metaphysic
of things” (Williams, 1990) – it is not at all clear that
such thinking is coherent on its own terms, much less
consonant with a gospel-centered worldview. Indeed,
as Jeffrey Thayne and Gantt (2019) have argued elsewhere, our modern fascination with abstractions is a
tradition inherited from our Greek intellectual ancestors, and not a feature of the Hebrew worldview
articulated in both ancient and modern scripture. In
contrast to abstractionism, the scriptural or Hebrew
worldview is one in which “truth is not a set of abstract
ideas, but a living, breathing Person who loves us as
His children” (Thayne & Gantt, 2019, p. 3). The focus
in such a perspective is fundamentally on the dynamic
and relational, on the unfolding of contextual meaning
in the vibrant ongoing activities of daily life and experience, rather than on the pre-given, the static, or the
metaphysically distant, unembodied, atemporal and
impersonal. This is a worldview in which such things

as moral depth, meaningful agency, and divine activity
(in the form of intimate and continuous personal relationship between Creator and created) are understood
to be the very warp and woof of reality.
Working outward from such premises, then, it becomes easier to see the grounding context for President
Nelson’s recent comments in the April 2017 General
Conference regarding the nature or the Atonement of
Jesus Christ. President Nelson (2017) stated:
It is doctrinally incomplete to speak of the Lord’s atoning sacrifice by shortcut phrases, such as “the Atonement” or “the enabling power of the Atonement” or
“applying the Atonement” or “being strengthened by
the Atonement.” These expressions present a real risk
of misdirecting faith by treating the event as if it had
living existence and capabilities independent of our
Heavenly Father and His Son, Jesus Christ.
Under the Father’s great eternal plan, it is the Savior
who suffered. It is the Savior who broke the bands of
death. It is the Savior who paid the price for our sins
and transgressions and blots them out on condition of
our repentance. It is the Savior who delivers us from
physical and spiritual death.
There is no amorphous entity called “the Atonement”
upon which we may call for succor, healing, forgiveness, or power. Jesus Christ is the source. Sacred terms
such as Atonement and Resurrection describe what the
Savior did, according to the Father’s plan, so that we
may live with hope in this life and gain eternal life in
the world to come. The Savior’s atoning sacrifice – the
central act of all human history – is best understood
and appreciated when we expressly and clearly connect
it to Him. (p. 40)

In other words, the atonement of Christ is no powerful abstraction with an existence independent of our
engagement with Him. Rather, the atoning sacrifice of
Jesus Christ is “the central act of all human history,”
both an historical and an ongoing event that lives and
breathes in the unfolding and dynamic relationship we
have with Christ here and now, in the immediacy and
pulsating context of daily existence. President Nelson
(2017) continued:

The importance of the Savior’s mission was emphasized by the Prophet Joseph Smith, who declared
emphatically that “the fundamental principles of our
religion are the testimony of the Apostles and Prophets, concerning Jesus Christ, that He died, was buried,
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or condition, is an unfolding and dynamic event that
flows out of their continuous “taking on” of the various
meanings and moral possibilities of sexual desire as
experienced in the relationships and activities of their
daily lives, obligations, and responsibilities (Williams
& Gantt, 2018). In this perspective, then, sexual identity and sexual desire are neither things pushed into
nor pulled out of our clients by powerful abstractions
such as drives, needs, or orientations. And, thus, our
clients’ sexual identities and desires need be no more
central to their lives than any of the other meaningful
phenomena of which their lives are made. Indeed, it
is often the case that when it seems to our clients that
their sexual identity is of more importance than anything else, it is usually because of the particular fashion in which they have taken on and given themselves
over to sexual relationships, activities, and meanings.
It goes without saying that such a view of sexuality,
one in which sexual desires are understood as intrinsically active and morally agentic, has implications for a
wide variety of human activities, including diagnoses
and therapies, interpersonal relationships, marriages
and families, and our larger conceptions of morality
and what constitutes “the good life.” It also has implications for our deepest aspirations, chiefly among
which is our understanding of what it means to be a
human being and to be “at-one” with one another and
with Christ. Additionally, it opens up a deeper understanding of our nature as fundamentally moral agents,
and in so doing shows that agency is not about exerting one’s will over one’s own (biologically based and
driven) sexual desires in order to maintain the necessary degree of self-control. In contrast, the view we are
outlining here is one in which sexual agency as moral
agency is a matter of living one’s sexual desires and aspirations, one’s relationships and self-understanding
in ways that are harmonious with the will of Christ.
In this view, unlike that propounded by secular liturgies, neither is our “sexual orientation” our most basic
identity, nor are we hopelessly governed by abstract
forces that dictate our desires and demand their gratification. Rather, we are children of a Heavenly Father,
made in His image and likeness, and equipped at the
very core of our being with the very moral agency He
enjoys. And, as His beloved children, we are continually invited to desire as and what He does, to aspire
to live the manner of life He lives, and to comport

and rose again the third day, and ascended into heaven;
and all other things which pertain to our religion are
only appendages to it. (p. 40)

Note carefully that the language of “fundamental principles” employed here by the Prophet Joseph
Smith refers directly to specific events and acts – the
bearing of testimonies by Apostles and Prophets
about encounters with Christ and the events of His
life and ministry – rather than abstract entities or
hypothetical constructs. Indeed, as Williams (1998)
has argued: “The truth claims of Mormonism rest on
events” (p. 2).
Thus, we believe it is worth considering the possibility that if something as sacred and intimately relevant to our lives as the Atonement of Christ is not
best understood as an abstraction, then it is likely
that something as sacred and intimately relevant to
our lives as sexuality is also not best understood in
terms of abstractions. Indeed, we believe it is more
enlightening and instructive to think of sexuality in
terms of actual sexual relationships, concrete acts of
sexual intimacy, specific contexts of sexual desire
and experiential meaning, and the inescapable moral
framework within which sexual desire and relationship takes place. In such an approach, the achievement of “sexual agency” (Albanesi, 2010) is not about
freeing ourselves from the behavioral constraints of
external authorities so we can freely choose how best
to obtain sexual gratification of whatever desires happen to arise out of the sexual orientation we possess.
Rather, sexual agency is fundamentally a matter of
the way in which we, as moral agents situated in relationship with Christ and our eternal brothers and
sisters, “give ourselves over to” and “take up” various
meaningful possibilities of sexual relationship and
moral understanding.
In the context of therapy, then, we can help our clients with their struggle against unbelief by helping
them to appreciate how their sexual identity is not
something that governs them, something abstract,
fixed, and causally determinative to which they must
surrender themselves in order to be at peace. To the
contrary, we can help them see how such a viewpoint
is rooted in secular assumptions that are not consonant with the teachings of scripture and the counsel of
apostles and prophets. We can help our clients come
to see that sexuality, rather than being some fixed state
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ourselves with one another as He does and for the
same reasons that He does. Fortunately, as fundamentally moral agents situated in morally meaningful and consequentially relational contexts, we are
uniquely positioned – indeed, uniquely blessed – to
be able to do just that.

Webb, 2013).5 Indeed, as Brown and Holbrook (2015)
point out:
The concept of embodiment as entanglement is a
constant in LDS beliefs and practices relating to the
body. . . . Mormons have since the beginning believed
that the entanglement of premortal spirit with mortal body is sacred and central to the meaning of life.
Our identities and our bodies metamorphose as we
progress from fetus (a life largely hoped-for and only
tenuously physical) to infancy through childhood and
adolescence, then into adulthood, maturity, and finally
advanced age (a life largely remembered and only tenuously physical). With each transition, spirit remains
entangled with body, and this entanglement for early
Mormons was physical rather than only metaphysical.
(pp. 293-295)

Countering Dualism

One common response to what we are proposing
here is that, in emphasizing the centrality of moral
agency in our account of the meaning and nature of
sexuality, we have not paid sufficient attention to the
legitimately powerful role that biology plays in generating the psychological phenomena of sexual desire
(Lehmiller, 2017). For example, as Balthazart (2012)
asserts, “We can choose to accept [our sexual] orientation, to act accordingly, and to reveal it or not to
the society, but the orientation itself is not in any
way a deliberate choice” (p. 159). In this view, it is
the impressive casual powers of biology that play the
primary role in accounting for sexual desires and
attractions, with the mind (or spirit), as the locus
of human will and choice, playing a secondary role,
one concerned only with behavioral matters, and not
the more central issues of feelings, identity, and basic
sense of self. However, while firmly agreeing that sexual desire and action cannot be adequately understood
absent a careful account of the biological conditions
of human embodiment, we would argue that such
objections reflect an essentially and fundamentally
secular, dualistic (Cartesian) conception of mind (or
spirit) and body – one that is at odds with a genuinely
Latter-day Saint perspective (Brown & Holbrook,
2015).
In contrast to the dualism found in most secular
liturgies, wherein the body and its processes are explained primarily in mechanical and deterministic
terms and the mind is held to be the internal, immaterial region of freewill where the mysterious processes
of choice occur, Latter-day Saint thought is marked
by its commitment to a form of holism in which
body and spirit are understood to be “entangled . . .
interconnected, enmeshed, interdependent” (Brown
& Holbrook, 2015, p. 292; see also Givens, 2015;

Similarly, Hartley (2019) notes:
The basic consensus in Mormonism, then, is that the
mind/spirit and the body are not two totally separate
things and that they are interrelated. So, things that
we feel and think in our spirit can have physiological
reactions and changes in the body because they are
connected. James E. Talmage wrote: “It is peculiar to
the theology of the Latter-day Saints that we regard
the body as an essential part of the soul . . . Nowhere,
outside the Church of Jesus Christ, is the solemn and
eternal truth taught that the soul of man is the body
and the spirit combined.” It is a unique philosophical
answer: I have a body and a spirit. Both are essential to
make up my soul. Both are substance. Both affect the
other. (p. 158)

In a nutshell, then, moral agency is not some freefloating power or capacity to make choices independent of or uninfluenced by things in the physical
world such as our own mortal, physical bodies. Rather,
moral agency is always embodied moral agency insofar
as meaningful, purposive agentic action always takes
place in the context of the biological realities and
constraints of our physical embodiment, never independent of it. Further, because the body is neither
some Platonic cage imprisoning the spirit, nor the mechanical determinant of psychological phenomena, as
so often portrayed in secular liturgies, our thoughts,
feelings, and desires (sexual or otherwise) are never
5. Or, as LDS scholar Terryl Givens (2015) has argued, a
two-tiered monism – a form of monism in which both spirt and
matter are held to be material, but there is a distinction to be
made in terms of refinement or purity.
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adequately reducible to the causal functions of impersonal meat and chemical, but must always be seen
as events occurring in a fundamentally moral, physiological, interpersonal, and spiritual context. Taking
up this distinctly LDS perspective on embodiment,
agency, and sexuality where appropriate in therapy,
then, LDS therapists can do much to help clients understand that their sexual desires are not things that
happen to them, the product of some fixed biological condition, but are instead intensely holistic embodied events that are intrinsically agentic, and, thus,
inherently purposive, moral, and meaningful. Therapy,
from this perspective, would afford an opportunity to
explore the specific purpose and meaning – particularly the divinely appointed purpose and interpersonal
meaning – of specific acts of sexual desiring.

certain desired blessings (or reach a certain heavenly
destination), the personal benefits that come from
paying the divinely dictated price of discipleship. All
too often our ordinary conversations about the Word
of Wisdom or the Law of Tithing, for example, center on the specific goods (i.e., blessings) that are presumed to derive from following these commandments
– i.e., longer life, needed financial windfalls, and so on.
Obedience to God, in such a view, is the instrumental means by which one obtains for oneself certain
items, experiences, or benefits one personally desires
(for various reasons). The possibility that one might
wish to obey God and follow prophetic counsel simply
because doing so is good in itself and serves no other
end or purpose, reflecting only love and self-forgetting
or self-transcendence, is a possibility seldom explicitly
entertained or articulated. Most often, personal desire
for benefit to self is taken to always come first as motivation, framing the meaning of any particular acts of
obedience and providing the only reasonable justification for inconveniencing oneself in the service of God
and one’s neighbor.
The ultimate consequence of this line of thinking,
though seldom noted, is that clients come to see their
relationship with our Father in Heaven and with Jesus
Christ primarily in terms of using individual means to
meet individual ends. The nature of such a relationship
is at root an economic or contractual one, rather than
a familial or covenantal one. It is a relationship whose
primary concern is the equitable exchange of desired
goods and services by separate parties with separate
– though perhaps converging – interests (Fowers,
2010). In the end, hedonism casts the nature of all relationships as essentially economic relationships, and
renders the meaning of all relationships in terms of
the self-interested exchange of goods and services.
For example, imagine a client struggling with depression, addiction, marital problems, unwanted samesex attraction, or any of a host of other psychological
and spiritual problems. Having absorbed the precepts
of hedonism from their immersion in our larger, secular culture (however unconsciously or innocently),
and, thus, assuming that their relationship with God
is fundamentally economic or transactional in nature,
the client may end up asking questions such as: “I’m
keeping the commandments, attending church, going to therapy, serving others, and everything else I’m

Hedonism

A final source of struggle and doubt for many members of the Church trying to make sense of their religious commitments and belief is hedonism. It is
difficult to overstate the pervasive influence that the
concept of hedonism exerts in our modern world, and
on the way we in the Church understand ourselves
and the gospel of Christ. Hedonism is, simply put, the
notion that the pursuit of pleasure (however it may
be individually defined) is the primary and most important goal of life (Wooten, 2018). Of course, there
are many versions of hedonism at work in the world
(see Fieldman, 2004 for a detailed analysis). Some
are quite unapologetically and forthrightly selfish and
self-aggrandizing, while others are more civil in nature, seeking to secure personal benefit through cooperation and mutual cost-sharing. We suspect we are
on safe ground assuming that most Latter-day Saints
would be repulsed by the former and more comfortable with the latter, more approving of Bill Gates, for
example, than Hugh Hefner.
What is sometimes missed, however, is the profound role the secular premise of hedonism (typically unacknowledged and unrecognized) can play in
shaping and guiding many Church members’ spiritual
lives and religious understandings. For example, many
Church members report that a primary reason why
they obey heavenly commandments and follow prophetic teachings is in order to secure for themselves
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supposed to do, so why am I still depressed? Why
hasn’t God taken away my addiction? Why won’t God
take these unwanted sexual desires away? Why are
my spouse and I still fighting? Where are the blessings
I was promised?” Because their covenant relationship
with God has been framed in the terms of contractual exchanges and fulfillments, grievances can begin
to mount when the blessings clients have come
to expect in return for their obedience do not show
up. The all-too-predictable result, then, is that clients
are left wondering why, in the midst of unmerited
suffering and setback, God is not keeping His end
of the agreed-upon bargain.
Viewing one’s life and relationship with God
through the lens of hedonism, especially in the face
of unexpected struggles, unrelenting heartbreak, or
unmerited pain and suffering, can easily lead to feelings of having been betrayed or cheated by God. They
have, after all, gone to great lengths and made great
sacrifices to secure the blessings they desire, but God
is withholding those blessings – and, it may appear
to them that He is doing so for no good or justifiable
reason. Operating from hedonistic premises, it becomes remarkably easy to believe that God is untrustworthy, arbitrary, or malicious when life does not go
as we have always thought it would, when God does
not act in the way we expect Him to act in light of
our hedonistic assumptions about who He is and how
relationships with Him work. It is easy to begin to believe that God is not actually a loving God at all, not a
God who wants His children to be happy, but rather
someone who demands obedience and sacrifice but
does not necessarily keep His promises to give back in
return. After all, the client might feel, if God truly is a
loving God, then He would not allow, or would take
away, unjust suffering, especially when the one suffering has clearly earned respite from suffering by having
dutifully obeyed God’s commandments. Such a God,
the client may ultimately decide, is not really worthy
of being worshipped and obeyed, and any Church that
preaches such a God cannot possibly be a true and living one.
Fortunately, there other premises from which clients
might understand the nature of divine commandments, prophetic counsel, and the possibilities of genuine relationship with our Heavenly Father and His

Son, Jesus Christ. It is possible to “think differently” in
light of the Restored Gospel. There are ways in which
faithful Latter-day Saint therapists can serve their
clients as they struggle with their unbelief and try to
make sense of their faith and their experience of suffering, tragedy, loss – what has been variously termed
“the dark nights of the soul” (Moore, 2004) and the
“silence of God” (Thielicke, 2010).
While space does not permit a full exploration
of the topic, one possible avenue to be explored is
one in which the fundamentality of moral agency is
merged with the reality of the “pure love of Christ”
(i.e., Charity), or what has long been known in the
Christian tradition as Agapé. In contrast to the secular assumption of hedonism, in which striving for
the gratification of self is taken simply to be inescapable human nature, and, thus, the foundation of all
relationships, Latter-day Saint therapists might encourage their clients to consider that as moral agents
they are capable of forgoing instrumental reasoning
and self-interest. Embodied moral agents are intrinsically capable of doing and being otherwise,
and, thus, of acting in ways that transcend matters of
self-regard and the means-ends relational calculus
of hedonism. Granted, as moral agents, our clients
can certainly give themselves over to the possibilities
of self-regard, take up the invitation to seek the maximization of personal benefit, or yield to the desire for
control in their relationships with others and God.
However, as moral agents, they can also yield to the
“enticings of the Holy Spirit” that call each of us to the
possibilities of the pure love of Christ and the freedom of self-forgetting and self-transcendence. From
the alternative perspective we are offering here, a perspective grounded in the teachings of scripture rather
than in secular liturgies, it is clear that moral agency is
our nature, and it is so in a way that hedonism is not.
By helping our clients come to understand themselves as fundamentally moral agents, we can help
them to see how it is possible to understand that the
commandments of a loving Heavenly Father, and the
compassionate and wise counsel of anointed priesthood leaders, are not instrumental means by which
they secure for themselves the satisfaction of their individual desires. Rather, divine law is an invitation to
live as our Father in Heaven lives, to be in the world
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as He is, and understand ourselves and others as He
does. Thus, divine commandments are in fact themselves heavenly blessings, and genuine obedience is at
its root an act of loving thanksgiving for the blessing
of commandments, an act of gratitude for the invitation to be “at one” with the Father and the guidance for
how to be so. As such, obedience constitutes a recognition of one’s dependence on and adoration of a compassionate, caring Father in Heaven who seeks always
and in all ways to comfort and bless and ennoble His
children. “And they shall also be crowned with blessings from above,” the Lord promises us in scripture,
“yea, with commandments not a few” (D & C 59:4)
– a promise immediately followed by a list of commandments/blessings our Father wishes to bestow on
us to make our lives fuller, safer, and more meaningful
and joyful.
Seen in this light, then, concern for the calculus of
personal cost and benefit that may have been subtly
inscribed on our clients’ hearts through the formative
processes of secular liturgies loses its persuasive power
over their religious imagination and spiritual understanding. Trials and suffering and painful setbacks
will come, they can begin to see, but not because God
has not been keeping His end of the “obedience bargain” with them. Rather, tragedy comes because that
is the nature of life in a world such as this, a world
jam-packed with other moral agents working out
their relationships with one another and with God –
sometimes doing it well and bringing much joy, and
sometimes doing it poorly and bringing much misery
in their wake. Reasoning from the premises of moral
agency and charity, rather than inescapable and normative hedonism, one’s perspective on justice changes
dramatically as it becomes clear that it is only mercy
that can make sense of a world of injustice. Only in
light of unearned mercy can unearned injustice be
made, if only in some small measure, intelligible. In
Christ’s merciful love for each of us in the midst of
the supreme injustice of His suffering for and because
of us, in Gethsemane and again on the Cross, we find
an alternative image of humanity and human possibility – and image in stark contrast to the secular assumptions of the hedonic basis of human nature. As
Arthur Henry King (1998) incisively noted, “Christ in
his incarnation as man shows the possibilities of the
human” (p. 17).

In Christ, we discover that commandments are gifts
freely and lovingly given, not instruments to be used
in the furtherance of individual aims and ends. And,
though injustice will come into every life and pain
will follow, we are never alone, even in the deepest
anguish of our own Gethsemanes. “Lord, I resented
your silence,” Father Rodrigues confesses in Shusaku
Endo’s novel Silence. “I was not silent,” God responds,
“I suffered beside you.” In Christ, the demands for fair
exchange are swallowed up in the promise of mercy,
compassion, communion, and a peace that speaks
soul to soul. The test set before us in this life, I believe, is not whether we will maximize our blessings by
dutiful obedience to divine laws, or whether we will
ensure our place in heaven by compiling a spotless record of compliance. Rather, we believe, the test set
before us all in this life is to learn what it means to
be moral agents, beings who can love and must allow
themselves to be loved. In so doing, we are able to give
ourselves on the altar in sacrificial similitude of the infinite and eternal sacrifice of the Son of God (Alma
34:14). No negotiation is needed, no contract is necessary, only yielding and submission to the loving will of
God is required, submission as pure love unburdened
by the quest for personal benefit or calculations of
the relative costs and benefits of discipleship.
Conclusion

In conclusion, then, the questions and doubts that
generate so many crises of faith for so many of our
clients must be met by Latter-day Saint therapists by
more sustained and careful reflection on the premises from which our clients’ questions and doubts and
struggles to believe actually spring. However, in order
for such reflection to do more than just recapitulate
tried and tired assumptions and categories of thought,
we as Latter-day Saint psychologists and mental
health professionals must open ourselves up to alternate starting points and the different ways of thinking
such alternatives entail. Perhaps, in so doing, we may
at last come to see what the real, most fundamental
difference is between secular starting points and sacred ones. Perhaps, if we are sufficiently open to divine
instruction as well as critical reflection, we will come
to see that Christ is, always has been, and always must
be, our one true foundational premise.
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This paper interrogates the relationship of the hard determinism inherent in the theories and models
currently on offer in mainstream psychology and the current trends in psychotherapeutic approaches.
It foregrounds the seeming contradiction between the emphasis placed on mastering and incorporating discipline-specific knowledge – which clearly assumes scientism and hard determinism – and the
emphasis placed on practitioners to develop a coherent theory of change as part of their approach to
effective clinical practice. We argue that hard determinism and strategies for facilitating genuine therapeutic change and transformation are incompatible where there is no clear, coherent view of human
beings as genuine agents. We further argue this is a particular problem for Christian therapists, and
for adequately treating Christian clients. The problem arises because genuine human agency is at the
heart of Christian doctrine and experience. Thus, it is a real question as to how well Christian clients
can be served by hard deterministic approaches to therapy and models of humanity itself. The paper
concentrates on the Christian doctrine of atonement and how Christian expectations of atonement
can be understood in ways that allow genuine Christian commitment, on the part of both therapist
and client, to bring about a positive contribution to genuine change. The conclusion is that genuine
human agency plays a central role in Christianity, and, therefore, must play a central role in Christian
therapeutic practice and theory.

T

he secular discipline of psychology has put its
practitioners, those who practice the healer’s
arts, in a completely untenable position. Therapists
find themselves in a position that is not only conceptually untenable but one that, depending which
ethical code one subscribes to, may well also be ethically untenable (O’Donohue & Ferguson, 2003). The
untenable position is apparent when we recognize

the inherent conflict between the two basic expectations central to contemporary clinical practice. First,
clinicians are expected to be sufficiently conversant
with the theories, models, data and knowledge bases
of the various subdisciplines of psychology that they
are able to competently integrate them into the real
and particular human interactions that comprise diagnostic and therapeutic practice in order to facilitate
25
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meaningful change and transformation in the lives of
their clients (Lane & Corrie, 2006). However, at the
same time, the endpoint of any system of therapeutic
intervention rooted in the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological commitments of mainstream
psychology (i.e., positivism, naturalism, materialism,
and necessary determinism) is one in which clinicians
and clients cannot but be reduced to merely complex configurations of variables operating in a closed
deterministic system of causes and effects (Martin,
Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003).1 Thus, on the one
hand, therapists are envisioned as being able to bring
particular behavioral insights and scientific knowledge
to bear on meaningful human problems in order to
help clients make important decisions, attain deeper
levels of self-understanding, and experience transformative change manifested in improved satisfaction
and basic happiness and success. But, on the other
hand, the primary theories and models that therapists are expected to endorse fundamentally presume
human beings (whether clients or therapists) inhabit a
strongly determined world; one in which all behavior
and experience is the product of specifiable efficiently
causal forces; one in which moral agents, genuinely
meaningful choices, and purposive actions do not exist
(Slife, O’Grady, & Kosits, 2017).

A central consequence of all of this is that any talk
of meaningful therapeutic transformation and change
ultimately becomes empty rhetoric. Although the
therapist is often said to be a rational human being
morally engaged in helping other human beings make
sense of their lives and relationships, in a deeper sense
– because of the underlying philosophical commitments of modern psychology – the therapist can really
only be understood as one part in an elaborate process
of “behavioral mechanics” (Dzendolet, 1999). In other
words, the therapist is that part of the larger causal
nexus of determinative influences that happens to
intervene at the level of physiological or neurological
systems (nature) and/or at the level of specific causal
regularities already operative in the clients’ environment (nurture) (see, e.g., Johansson & Høglend, 2007;
Dolev & Zilcha-Mano, 2019). In either case, however,
neither the therapist nor the client is truly the agent
of change as neither is in fact a genuinely agentic
being in the first place. Thus, given the reductive and
mechanical determinism characteristic of the theories
and perspectives in the mainstream of the discipline of
psychology, the normative model of change is clearly a
technological model (see, e.g., Heidegger, 1977), one
in which people’s problems are approached largely on
the same grounds as any other technological problem
we might encounter in the world of things. Of course,
such a summary statement would doubtless be rejected
by many researchers and practitioners in the discipline
as being too harsh, or out of touch with what therapists actually do. Be that as it may, the larger analytical
point we are making here is that no other approach
(i.e., non-mechanical, fully agentic) to intervention is
possible in the sort of strongly efficient-causal world
that mainstream theorists, researchers, and practitioners in psychology study, assume, endorse, and, in
conformity with the goals of their training incorporate
into their therapeutic interventions.
Of course, the immediate inclination here is to respond that this situation has not come about in any
intentional way. And, in a literal sense, if we take seriously the theoretical tenets and philosophical commitments of the intellectual mainstream of the discipline,
such a claim must be granted. After all, within virtually all the dominant perspectives in the mainstream
of the discipline, no human behaviors can be thought
to be genuinely intentional – because our thoughts,

1. Perhaps the clearest expression of the grounding metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of mainstream psychology,
especially as they are manifest in contemporary clinical theory
and practice, is this one offered in The Sage Encyclopedia of
Abnormal and Clinical Psychology: “Also associated with the
modern paradigmatic nature of psychology are assumptions
about science. These too contain philosophical roots in which
the field of psychology as a whole differs from other disciplines.
Consider the fundamental assumption of determinism. Determinism is the philosophical doctrine that what is being studied
can be understood in terms of causal laws; for everything that
happens, there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else
could happen. Compared with other scientific disciplines that are
concerned with discovering lawful relationships, such as physics
and chemistry, modern clinical psychology, with its partial focus
on subjective experience, is enigmatic. It recognizes that knowing
all the causes of an event is not necessary for determinism. It is
enough to assume that the causes exist and that as more causes
are discovered, predictions become more accurate. For these and
a host of other reasons, a multidimensional approach is required
to achieve an understanding of the intellectual, emotional, biological, psychological, social, and behavioral aspects of human
functioning across the lifespan; all of this begins with the underlying philosophical history” (Wenzel, 2017, p. 1644).
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feelings, and actions are all said to be caused by forces
and structures over which we exert no control, and of
the operations of which we are almost never aware
(Wegner, 2018). Indeed, deterministic forms of explanation are assumed by most psychological researchers and theorists to be essential for establishing the
discipline’s scientific credentials (see, e.g., Elster, 2015;
Goodwin & Goodwin, 2017; Hughes, 2016). As
Goodwin and Goodwin (2017) state, “In psychology,
we ultimately would like to know what causes behavior (determinism), and it is with the tools of science
that we can discover those causes (discoverability)”
(p. 9). Similarly, in a popular textbook on personality
theory, Crowne (2009) writes:

causally determined being or group of beings can
muster, pursued a scholarly course – reflected in both
its methods and its explanatory models and theories
– that has allowed it to remain firmly rooted within
the domain of positivist science developed in the 19th
century (see Bickard, 1992; Farrell, 2014; Gantt &
Williams, 2014; Robinson, 1995). While empirical
methods, per se, do not lock the discipline into positivistic or deterministic forms of explanation, the intellectual pull of these two perspectives has proven
too strong for the discipline to resist. It is simply a
fact of history that every dominant school of thought
that has risen to prominence in psychology since its
inception as a discipline in the latter decades of the
nineteenth-century has theorized human behavior
in deterministic terms that leave no place for moral
agency (see, Bem & Looren de Jong, 2013; Martin,
Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003; Robinson, 1995;
Walsh, Teo, & Baydala, 2014).
Only two major counterexamples to this conclusion, with which one might make a case that contemporary psychology is not solely wedded to hard
deterministic thinking, come readily to mind in the
context of the recent intellectual history of the discipline. The first is the “introspectionist” psychology
of the pioneering German psychologist Wilhelm
Wundt (1832-1920). Introspectionism, at least as articulated by Wundt, was principally concerned with
systematic self-observation of the processes of conscious thought and feeling. While Wundt’s goal was to
identify the underlying lawful structure and consistent nature of consciousness, his work was founded
on the assumption of an active mind, the actions of
which were in some sense “voluntary” or freely willed.
Indeed, Wundt often used the term “voluntarism”
to characterize his psychology in order to “highlight
the importance of feeling and volition in understanding the mind” (Araujo, 2016, p. 207). Unfortunately,
for a variety of reasons – some scientific, some
philosophical, and some socio-cultural – Wundt’s
vision of a “voluntarist psychology” failed to take
hold in the larger 19th and 20th century Anglo-American sphere as the academic and professional discipline of psychology was developing, and has, for the
most part, been left behind by the mainstream of the
discipline. As the historian of psychology Thomas
Leahey (2018) notes, “Although Wundt launched

A cardinal belief in science is that the universe and all
the things and organisms within it act in lawful and
orderly ways. This assumption of determinism establishes the basis on which all scientific inquiry rests,
and it is no less true of human action than any other
events. So, we believe that all human behavior – the
over things we can observe and the covert ones, like
thinking and feeling, that take place unobserved – is
lawfully determined. We may not know all the laws,
but our behavior is nonetheless obedient to them.
(p. 6)

In the mainstream view, then, “there is no need to
posit the existence of free will in order to explain the
generation of behavioral impulses, and there is no
need to posit free will in order to explain how those
(unconscious) impulses are sorted out and integrated
to produce human behavior and the other higher
mental processes” (Bargh, 2008, p. 148). Ultimately,
if we take the mainstream view of the discipline seriously, what we must learn to accept about ourselves is
that “what we don’t experience, yet which are just as
real [as what we do experience], are the multitude of
unconscious influences and determinants of what we
think, act, and feel” (Bargh, 2008, p. 149; clarification
added).
A Little Bit of History

None of this, however, actually helps to defuse the
underlying problem at hand. In fact, it really only
serves to disclose it all the more clearly. Psychology
has “purposely,” with as much purpose as a strongly
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psychology as a recognized discipline, his Leipzig
system did not represent the future of psychology . . . .
Psychology’s future lay with natural science and practical application” (p. 235).
The other counterexample is found in the broadly
Humanistic-Existential psychology movement which
arose in the first half of the 20th century and found
popular expression in the writings of such figures as
Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, Victor Frankl, Rollo
May, and, more recently, Irvin Yalom and Emmy van
Deurzen (see Schneider, Pierson, & Bugental, 2015).
Additional contributions to this broad attempt to
reconceptualize psychology on less deterministic
and reductive grounds came from the efforts of psychologists such as Karl Jaspers, Medard Boss, Ludwig
Binswanger, Amadeo Giorgi and others, to translate
the hermeneutic and phenomenological insights of
Continental philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-ponty into a viable alternative platform for psychological research and
psychotherapeutic practice rooted in lived-experience,
meaning, and human agency (Spinelli, 2005).
The influence of this (broadly-speaking) “third
wave” movement in psychology continues to be felt
around the margins of the discipline to this day but
was most influential during the first three decades
following World War II. Rooted more in the intellectual traditions of Continental Rationalism and Romanticism than British Empiricism, this movement
offered a clear alternative to the rather grimly pessimistic views of human nature found in Freudian psychoanalysis and Skinnerian behaviorism. However,
like Wundtian psychology of the previous century,
Humanistic-Existential and Phenomenological approaches struggled capture the disciplinary imagination of the mainstream, and, in the end, have met with
frequent rejection for not being sufficiently scientific
to warrant serious consideration.
As the memories of nearly half a century of global
war and economic turmoil faded somewhat from consciousness during the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s, and as a
seemingly softer (yet still rigorously scientific) “cognitive psychology” came to replace traditional behaviorism as the dominant force in psychology, humanistic
and existential perspectives have also declined in importance. The “third force psychology” has come to be
increasingly seen as “too philosophical” and, thus, as

an unnecessary impediment to, or distraction from,
psychology’s century-long quest to achieve scientific
respectability. This evolution of ideas has effectively
left the field dominated by one or another species of
hard-determinism, whether neuroscientific, genetic,
social-cognitive, or evolutionary (Ludden, 2020).2
The Contemporary Scene

Theory and practice in the clinical areas of the discipline have largely followed the conceptual lead of
mainstream research projects, with various “cognitive
therapies” emerging in the 1960s and coming to dominate psychotherapy training and research over the past
five or six decades. For the past three or four of these
decades, the cognitive approach to understanding human beings and treating their problems in therapy
has been increasingly melded with the findings and
models of neuroscience (Naji & Ekhtiari, 2016).
Accordingly, cognitive neuroscience, in one form
or another, has become the predominate perspective in the scholarly field, fitting nicely within the
long-standing disciplinary devotion to a “scientistpractitioner model” (i.e., the Boulder Model) that
was formally endorsed by the American Psychological
Association in 1949. The natural scientific aspirations
and presumptions of the discipline of psychology thus
continue to be widely endorsed and emphasized in
2. Here some might call attention to the influential research of
E. L. Deci and R. M. Ryan (2015; see also Ryan & Deci, 2017)
contributing to what they have termed Self-determination
Theory. “That most people show considerable effort, agency, and
commitment in their lives appears,” these authors maintain, “to be
more normative than exceptional, suggesting some very positive
and persistent features of human nature” (Ryan & Deci, 2000,
p. 68). Unfortunately, despite a seeming commitment to understanding human action in agentic or intentional terms, they are
clear that “we consider psychological constructs, whether conscious or nonconscious, to comprise the regnant causes of most
intentional behaviors. It is at the level of motives and intentions,
and the experiences of external and internal forces that instigate and affect them, where the most relevant determinants of
behaviors are taking place” (p. 7, emphasis added). Consequently,
it is difficult to accept that, regardless of what one might be led
to believe based on the name of the theory being espoused, that
these authors (and like-minded others) in any substantive way
value human agency above causal determinism in their attempts
to explain behavior. (For a more detailed examination of the deterministic underpinnings of Self-determination Theory, and its
incoherent account of human agency, see Gantt & Parker, 2020.)
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training and practice (Beck, Castonguay, ChronisTuscano, Klonsky, McGinn, & Youngstrom, 2014;
Norcross, Sayette, & Pomerantz, 2017). Clinicians
in training are, accordingly, required to master what
has come to be called the “discipline-specific knowledge” of the field, which knowledge – as the current
field has come to be constituted – consists almost exclusively of larger (i.e., not strictly clinically related)
theories, models, and great quantities of data from
research studies of all sorts (Kramer, Bernstein, &
Phares, 2019).
The underlying logic, as well as the great hope, attached to the scientist-practitioner model reflects
the natural expectations incumbent in the applied
branches of other established scientific fields. For
example, medical doctors are expected to be broadly
trained in medical science, and engineers are expected
to be masters of the physical science that underlies the
creation of bridges, airplanes, cell phones and other
such devices. However, this expectation, as it is generalized and transferred to practitioners of the healing
arts in psychology, becomes quite problematic for at
least two important reasons, each of which illustrate
why and how the discipline has placed its clinical practitioners in an untenable position. First, in the medical
field, the basic entity to be treated – i.e., the human
body – though highly individual in certain respects
is nonetheless quite similar across the whole range of
human bodies, and even across time. An injured knee,
to use a simple example, may get better or worse across
time, but it is fairly clear to medical science, when taking account of all knees, how any particular knee gets
better or gets worse, and why. It is also clear, within a
specifiable range, and allowing for periodical advances
in technology, how to treat injured knees and how to
fix them. Other aspects of physical health are similar,
differing more or less only along two simple dimensions – complexity and etiology.
This situation in the field of medicine is, however,
a poor fit for the situation we find in the field of
psychology. That is, while one can study quite faithfully and deeply the current knowledge base of the
discipline, when the need arises to apply that knowledge to a particular clinically relevant phenomenon
resident in a particular human person, it becomes
clear very quickly that every case of depression, for example, unlike every ACL knee sprain, is not the same

across patients. The effectiveness of various talkinterventions, unlike the effectiveness of stitches, or
anti-inflammatory drugs, is not so uniform. Indeed,
it seems fairly obvious that there are many more
ways of becoming depressed and experiencing being
depressed than there are says of spraining or tearing
an ACL. And more importantly, the ways depression
may manifest itself and be understood by therapist
or client are much more numerous than the ways in
which an ACL tear can be understood, expressed, and
experienced.
The closest psychology seems able to come to the
fulfilling the aspirations and presuppositions of the
scientist-practitioner model, that fits so well in medical science or engineering, is in the area of drug treatment. However, even in this area, differences between
the medical and psychological are obvious, if for no
other reason than, in medicine, we have developed
many drugs that target particular pathogens or bodily
states, and eliminate specific causes of dis-ease, while
in psychology the drugs developed are almost entirely
symptom-oriented, operating roughly at the level
of basic analgesics in medicine (Harrington, 2019;
Whitaker, 2010). In this way, psychological science
has put its therapeutic practitioners in the untenable
position of needing to master a wide theoretical landscape and, hopefully, digest mountains of data, despite
the fact that the conceptual tie between the theories
and the data, on the one hand, and the conditions
the practitioners will actually face and be expected
to treat, on the other, has not yet been established
by the field itself. Indeed, as Lane and Corrie (2006)
note: “Of all the criticisms levied against the scientistpractitioner model, perhaps the most resounding has
been that it represents a vision of professional practice
that can rarely, if ever, be fulfilled” (p. 14). Citing the
criticisms of Jones (1998), they continue by suggesting that “the scientific identity of the practitioner is in
fact ‘fraudulent’ and should be abandoned in favor of
a more honest account of how psychologists actually
function” (p. 14).
The second way in which the larger discipline of psychology, because of its prevailing intellectual commitments, has put its clinicians in an untenable position
has to do with the nature of the (presumably scientific)
assumptions that inform the discipline-specific knowledge that training programs are required to impart to
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clinicians-in-training. The scientific perspectives currently most in play in the discipline are all strongly
deterministic, particularly in the realm of personality
theory and psychotherapy (see Jones & Butman, 2011
for a sustained analysis of this issue from an explicitly
Christian perspective). None of the predominant perspectives informing contemporary psychotherapy case
conceptualization and practice give serious consideration to the possibility of meaningful human agency
in either their etiological accounts of psychological
disorder or their explanations of therapeutic change.
Indeed, as Wilks (2018) recently concluded in his
review of counseling theory development, “views of
behavioral causality are fundamentally linked to the
practice of counseling,” and, therefore, “it is important
that the profession’s guiding paradigm rests on sound
causal assumptions” (p. 219).
It simply is the case that neuro-psychological models and data are not offered (nor, indeed could they
be offered) in the service of providing explanations
of how persons develop and deploy meaningful human agency in their daily lives and relationships (Williams, 2001). Likewise, cognitive models are replete
with the deterministic conceptual language of “inputs/
outputs,” “mechanisms,” “systems” and “feedback loops,”
and “automaticity” (see, e.g., Leahy, 2018). Even when
some theorists grant that people act as they do for particular “self-determined” purposes and reasons, they
then account for those purposes and reasons in fundamentally deterministic terms that explain them as
arising out of the underlying biological conditions and
mechanical processes that govern cognition itself (see,
e.g., Gantt & Parker, 2020). For example, Ryan and
Deci (2017) state that “Insofar as the causes of intentional behaviors lie in the necessary events that initiate
and sustain them, it is the forces that ‘move’ people, as
conceptualized within the scope of motivational psychology, that frequently supply the most relevant and
practical predictive models and the most meaningful
explanations of behavior” (p. 7).
Unfortunately, humanistic theories and models
fair no better. Although such approaches often espouse agentic positions, they seldom go on to provide anything remotely approaching a sophisticated
conceptual analysis or defense of human agency that
might be deployed effectively against the necessary
determinism, reductive materialism, and scientific

naturalism that has so captured the imagination and
intellectual allegiance of the mainstream of the discipline. Thus, even while humanistic perspectives have
been congenial to agentic language, and sometimes,
even to agentic understandings, they have steadily declined in prominence and influence on the field, both
in scholarship and practice. Consequently, what this
means is that the discipline is training clinicians to
help people with real pain and with real problems to
experience real changes while arming clinicians to do
so with a knowledge base that, in its very content and
methods, obviates human agency and meaning. And
it does this by holding to the suppositions of efficient
causal determinism in its predominant theoretical and
methodological formulations – formulations which,
in therapy training programs, underlie the accepted
protocols for how help is to be offered and how the
help offered does in fact really help.
The Untenable Position

In the end, this is, in every way, an untenable position in which to place practitioners of the healing arts
in psychology. That this unfortunate condition exists
is supported (ironically) by a large body of literature
– across a broad spectrum of clinical experience and
settings. A key finding of this literature is that the
most important factors in successful therapy have
more to do with the so-called “process variables” operative within the therapist-client relationship – and,
of course, the casual laws that govern those operations
and their interactions – than with particular theoretical orientations and knowledge bases (see, e.g., Ablon,
Levy, & Katzenstein, 2006; Gelo, Pritz, & Rieken,
2015; Johansson & Høglend, 2007; Lambert & Barley, 2001; Laska, Gurman, & Wampold, 2014; Tompkins & Swift, 2014). Indeed, as Lambert and Barley
(2001) pointed out almost two decades ago roughly
30 percent of the variance in psychotherapy outcome
is accounted for by the quality of the client-therapist
relationship, while an additional 40 percent of variance is “attributable to factors outside the therapy” (p. 358). Indeed, in their summary review of
meta-analytic research on therapy outcomes, Laska,
Gurman, and Wampold (2014) demonstrated that
treatment method itself accounts for only about 1
percent of outcome variance.
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This troubling state of affairs makes one wonder
just where and how much discipline-specific knowledge can really be helpful in therapeutic practice if, at
best, whatever it does, it likely does as part of those
therapeutic effects occurring “outside of therapy.” In
addition this all cannot help but leave one wondering
whether the scientist-practitioner model has not in
fact gotten the conceptual cart (i.e., emphasis on discipline-specific, empirically derived knowledge) before
the praxis-based horse (i.e., skill and sensitivity in the
craft of therapeutic relating). Further, engaging this
question only serves to reveal an even deeper question.
That is, if the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical commitments of the mainstream of the discipline
are to be taken seriously, as would seem to be the hope
baked into the curricula of clinical training programs,
then it would seem necessary to admit that because
of the laws and principles that the discipline takes to
be governing all aspects of our lives and relationships,
there will always be so much causal inertia at play in
any human life that therapeutic intervention is really
always marginal, and, thus can be mostly just palliative in nature. Therapy can only operate at the margins of human life and experience where, for whatever
reason, cracks in the deterministic flow of life may
have formed, where unexpected, or as-yet unidentified lawful relations, are operating but are not yet fully
understood, or where “error variance” (the psychological equivalence of random mutation in the biological
world) is found to occur. In the end, we are forced to
ask ourselves just what therapy might actually be able
to accomplish that would be of any genuinely meaningful or transformative consequence operating way
out on those extreme phenomenal fringes of life while
the whole of our humanity (according to the scholarly discipline and the philosophical commitments
on which it rests) is the necessary result of all sorts of
causal forces.
It is important to note here, however, that the central issue in all of this is actually not whether clinical
practice should be informed by the larger knowledge
base of the discipline. Rather, the central issue concerns the nature of that knowledge base and the relevance it might have for clinical practice. In other
words, the central issue is the underlying ontological, epistemological, and moral assumptions and
assertions the mainstream of the discipline makes

regarding the nature of human nature itself, and,
thus, the ontological being of the persons who turn to
counselors for help in understanding themselves and
others. This issue is, we firmly believe, the one that
should be of utmost concern both to individual practitioners and to the discipline as a whole.
The current knowledge base and general theoretical
outlook championed in the psychotherapeutic disciplines, when taken seriously, forces clinicians into the
untenable position we have described above because
it inserts into clinical practice mechanistic, naturalistic, and deterministic assumptions about the nature
of clients, their relationships, and their problems. The
effects of inserting such assumptions into therapy are
actually fairly easy to specify. They include regarding
one’s clients, and human beings in general, as fundamentally non-agentic natural organisms whose lives
and struggles are principally the product of determinative physical and environmental conditions, which,
as such, possess no intrinsic meaning or purpose.
Granted, it might be argued that human beings are a
very complex sort of organism, one whose actions and
motivations are in many ways far too complex, most
of the time, to allow for the sort of exhaustive causal
explanation or prediction that naturalistic psychology
aims to achieve. Such a response reflects an attempt
to preserve some sense of meaning or freedom in human life by appealing to the frequent unpredictability
of behavior resulting from ignorance of the operative
causes in any and every instance. Unfortunately, the
tactic fails because it offers to balance the epistemological limits that naturalistic accounts of human action face by retreating to the vagaries of randomness
and “error variance” in order to preserve some small
space for agency. Conceiving of human agency as indeterminism is, however, just as conceptually indefensible as invoking determinism to explain it away (see,
Williams 2005, 2017). Nonetheless, even were there
to be identifiable cases where exhaustive explanation
and prediction of human behavior were possible, the
understanding of such cases would really only reflect
an understanding of the operations of impersonal,
dull, meaningless material or mechanical stuff, and not
the “stuff ” of actual human experience or concern.
In contrast, if the discipline-specific knowledge that
was available to students and practitioners reflected
extended and sophisticated study of the core issues of
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our humanity – that is, for example, what it means to
be a human being, the nature of the good and flourishing life, the meaning of suffering, the moral purpose of life itself, and the nature of genuine human
agency – then it would be possible to make a convincing case that such discipline-specific knowledge is in
fact crucial to effective and meaningful therapy. Not
only would such a knowledge base be deeper and more
engaging at moral and existential levels, it could not
help but be more insightful and more faithful to genuinely human phenomena than the existing scientistic
orthodoxies the discipline currently privileges (Gantt
& Williams, 2018). And, as we will argue later in this
paper, this possibility is especially important if our
therapeutic training and practice is to reflect in any
legitimate way Christian and Latter-day Saint understandings and commitments – especially, and for
all the same reasons, when the clients themselves are
Christians and Latter-day Saints, and want to experience life, self, and healing as such.

as second-wave feminism, critical psychology, Critical Theory generally, and various other structural or
post-structural “-isms” (Parker, 2015). Second-wave
feminism, in particular, has found its way into therapeutic practice in the form of various feminist-therapy
perspectives (see, e.g., Evans, Kincade, & Seem, 2011).
Mainstream psychology’s tradition of self-insulation
from postmodern intellectual life seems, however, ultimately to be doomed. Various species of Critical
Theory (Bronner, 2017), having incubated for decades
in places such as the Frankfurt School, and establishing root and flower in the humanities, are now poised
to have a major impact in psychology, particularly in
the clinical areas. After Second-wave Feminism, Critical Race Theory (Delgado & Stefancic, 2017), followed closely by Queer Theory and Gender Theory
(Wilchins, 2014), is perhaps the most active and influential of the new “critical theory” movements, and
one that appears likely to have the most far-reaching
impact. It is becoming increasingly clear that these
various critical theory approaches are beginning to
exert significant influence on both the knowledge
base and the actual practice of psychotherapy (see,
e.g., Loewenthal, 2015; Paquin, Tao, & Budge, 2019).
While this particular essay is not the place to examine
this movement in detail, we can make one important
observation.
This entire family of theories has its roots in postmodern, neo-Hegelian and neo-Marxist or cultural
Marxist traditions (Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2020).
Thus, central to all “critical theories” is: (1) a commitment to epistemological and moral relativism, in the
form of a “radical skepticism as to the possibility of
objective truth and knowledge,” (2) an “obsession with
language” and its power to construct reality, (3) an insistence that “no one set of cultural norms can be said
to be better than any other,” and, finally, (4) the assertion that “the individual, like everything else, is a product of powerful discourses and culturally constructed
knowledge” (Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2020, pp. 39-42).
In this way, postmodern critical theory “largely rejects
both the smallest unit of society – the individual –
and the largest – humanity – and instead focuses on
small, local groups as the producers of [purely contingent] knowledge” (Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2020,
p. 42; clarifying comment added). However, despite

Postmodernism and Critical Theory

One final observation remains to be made regarding the current state of discipline-specific psychological knowledge. As the second decade of the 21st
century comes to close, it is increasingly apparent
that, for the most part, psychology has managed to
“sit out” many of the substantive cultural conflicts that
have roiled the Western intellectual tradition since at
least the inter-war period of the 20th century. Except
among certain small groups and organizations at the
periphery of the discipline, postmodern movements
such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism,
deconstructionism and social constructionism have
remained safely at the fringes of the discipline. One
often searches in vain to find among the most widely
used texts in the discipline even a cursory examination of these postmodern traditions, and the larger
political, scientific, and cultural debates their analyses have stimulated. Their authors seem to simply
review (often poorly) the assumptions, methods, and
findings of positivistic social science (O’Donohue &
Willis, 2018). Perhaps the greatest inroads have been
made, though only fairly recently, in the form of various neo-Hegelian and neo-Marxist movements such
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a common rejection of positivistic models of scientific inquiry (i.e., Western science), and the various
therapeutic approaches founded on such inquiry, there
is nonetheless an important sense in which these new
and increasingly influential critical perspectives can
be reconciled with more traditional, modernist forms
of psychological theory and practice. This happens as
we realize that regardless of their clear differences,
both positivist psychology (in its commitment to reductive naturalism) and postmodern critical theory
(in its commitment to epistemological, cultural, and
moral relativism) are united by their utter rejection
of meaningful human agency. That is to say, at their
very conceptual core, both views are committed to a
view of human beings as inherently and inescapably
the products of powerful, fundamentally impersonal,
global/cosmic forces against which they themselves, in
their personhood, are effectively powerless. Additionally, not only do these rival perspectives reduce human
thought, feeling, and action to being the merely contingent outcome of powerful causal forces, they also
assert that these forces operate almost exclusively outside individual conscious awareness, control, or participation; thereby, further depriving persons of the
possibility of playing any substantive role in the creation of their own lives.

hope and transformation. It affects all of our interpersonal experiences; for example, as we wonder whether
other people can be trusted, whether the future of any
relationship lies in the hands of the people involved,
or whether our relationships are ultimately prey to
things outside our control.
In one form or another the question of determinism is deeply, even inescapably, imbedded in our humanity. How we answer the question cannot help but
profoundly impact how we understand ourselves and
others. And, to take this discussion to the direction
of the purposes of this essay, the question of determinism is at the heart of our Christian faith – indeed,
of any Christian conception of life and meaning. In
a closed universe where hard determinism holds true
– the kind of universe that the mainstream theories
and schools of contemporary psychology endorse and
the kind of universe that informs cultural theories of
all stripes – the concepts of responsibility, sin, forgiveness, and atonement are mere fictions, concepts without genuine content or meaning, label for one family
within the inevitable givens life. In such a world, therapy becomes merely one formalized approach among
others for providing comfort and support to those who
suffer in particular ways, a technical means by which
various “coping strategies” or “behavioral management”
regimes are taught and implemented to mitigate to
some degree the inevitable misfortunes and unpleasantness of living. Sadly, in such a world, nothing can
truly change or be otherwise than it is, as everything
that is, everything that occurs, is as it must causally
be. We move next to a discussion of how and why this
is the case and how that impacts the meaning of life,
which meaning must surely be at the core of anything
that motivates people to seek therapy, and any therapy
that intends to respond.

The Christian Perspective

It is certainly the case that not many of the topics and questions that engage scholars and intellectuals find their way into the thought and discourse
and everyday life of the broader population, from
which almost all counseling client populations come.
However, the issue of agency in its relation to determinism is one issue in particular that makes contact
with everyday experience, appearing in even fleeting
questions about why we do certain things, feel certain ways, or think the way we do. The question of
agency and determinism is at the very core of our
moral lives – our sense of right and wrong. It is the
question of whether we have real choices in what we
do and whether we ought to feel guilty for the things
we do. It touches, thus, our sense of the importance
of the past and its power and influence over us. It
touches our sense of the future and the possibility of

The Fundamental Vulnerability of Meaning
and Meaningful Action

In the 21st Century, taking seriously the hard determinism that contemporary psychology offers entails
accepting at least two conclusions, one or both of
which must necessarily be true for all of us:
1. Our psychological lives, actions, moral sensibilities, and social relationships (the very stuff of
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a Christian life) are necessarily determined by the
physical mechanisms of our bodies, including genes,
neurotransmitters, hormones, and the functions of
the meat and chemical of the nervous system (and all
other bodily functions connected to that system).
2. Our psychological lives, actions, moral sensibilities, and social relationships (the very stuff of a Christian life) are essentially determined by any number of
invisible, ubiquitous, and causally powerful abstractions (i.e., constructs, variables, structures, systems,
etc.) presumed to constitute the underlying reality of
our psychological and social worlds, but whose operations are for the most part opaque and whose influences can only be overcome (and only in some cases)
by enhanced awareness or re-education.
The first of these conclusions is the one we find
most often in contemporary cognitive neuroscience
and evolutionary psychological approaches – even if
they are not always explicit in admitting as much.3
The second conclusion is one more articulated in social constructionist, postmodern, structuralist, systems theories, and critical race and gender theories,
perspectives that assume that only those persons who
have been specially trained, or whose consciousness
has been sufficiently awakened and attuned, can detect the existence and operations of the relevant powerful abstractions and their effects in the world and in
the lives of people.
Given the reductive and deterministic nature of each
of these two consequences, it is only reasonable to
conclude that if either or both are in fact the case, then
human beings are not in fact moral agents operating
meaningful and purposefully in the world of genuine

possibilities. Rather, we are merely the mechanically
ordained products of powerful external forces –
whether biochemical and physical or structural and
systemic – that dictate our every thought, feeling, and
behavior, and do so with little if any real awareness or
active participation on our part in the process. Ontologically speaking, then, human beings are relegated to
being fundamentally passive objects – or, in the words
of the prophet Lehi in the Book of Mormon, “things
to be acted upon” (2 Nephi 2:14) – pressed upon continuously by any number of impersonal, non-rational,
mechanical or structural forces. If, however, we are
not moral agents – if we are not the sorts of beings
whose nature it is to initiate and carry through morally meaningful actions – then it becomes difficult to
see what possible need there could be for a Savior, or
what meaning or purpose an atonement could ever
serve? In the absence of any real agentic capacity to
direct our lives in purposive and genuinely meaningful ways that are morally sensitive and responsive to
others, it is hard to imagine that any behavior could
be judged worthy of either praise or blame, blessing
or condemnation. What possible hope for redemption
could “things acted upon” ever need or even have? In
a world such as that envisioned in each of the above
consequences, the gospel of Jesus Christ and His
atoning sacrifice can only operate around the margins of our lives, at the most perhaps affording some
sort of subjective comfort or a handy coping strategy
to those who happen to believe – a sort of spiritual
opium or Christian crutch for those who might need
such things – very much in keeping with Karl Marx’s
classical assessment of religion.

3. Oddly, approaches endorsing this sort of sweeping claim
about the biological basis of human behavior and thought do
so despite the fact that our knowledge base lacks even a single
instance of any particular, meaningful, purpose human behavior
having ever been created or produced by any physical or chemical state. Indeed, the examples typically used to bolster the expansive deterministic claims of contemporary neuroscience and
evolutionary psychology are not examples of the causal production of meaningful, intentional psychological phenomena at all.
They are, rather, examples of deficits, constraints, and limitations,
or generalized, gross, non-historical and non-purposive events
that never ascend to the level of the genuinely psychologically
meaningful in the first place (for more extensive analyses of these
important, though often overlooked, issues, see, e.g., Bennett &
Hacker, 2003; Canter & Turner, 2014; Gantt, 2002; Tallis, 2011;
Uttal, 2001; Williams, 2001; Wiseman, 2016).

The Fundamental Role of Real Change from a
Christian Perspective

It hardly needs saying that the real possibility of
genuinely meaningful change in the lives and the very
being of human beings lies at the very heart of any
Christian perspective on psychology, particularly in
those areas related to counseling or psychotherapy
(Gantt, Wages, & Thayne, 2015; Jones & Butman,
2011; Knabb, Johnson, Bates, & Sisemore, 2019;
Neff & McMinn, 2020). Central to all Christian understanding is the doctrine that we, being born into a
fallen, mortal world. We are all broken and in need of
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redemption and the transformative healing it brings.
Unfortunately however, if we are all broken, morally
and spiritually, but are, in addition, inevitably born
into a set of conditions where virtually all of our actions and meanings are simply dictated by accidents of
biology and environment, then there can be little hope
for genuine healing or transformation. In the prevailing
metaphysics of virtually all contemporary psychology
both our fallen brokenness and our chance for healing are controlled and dictated by virtually the same
set of circumstances – so we can only hope that various aspects of our causal endowment can really contradict each other to our benefit. A risky proposition
at best. In other words, any change in behavior that
might occur would simply be the necessitated result of
whatever the joint actions of biology and the natural
laws and structures of the universe might happen to
produce (by chance) for and in us. If our psychological
lives, and even consciousness itself, are nothing more
than the determinative products of those sorts of impersonal causal realities, then whatever our responses
to our circumstances, our relationships, and even our
future possibilities might be, they are likewise simply
things brought about by other things, none of which
we control. Indeed, any control we might think we
have in our own behavior, thoughts, and aspirations
is itself a product of those self-same causal realities
and thus illusory (see, Caruso, 2013 on the illusion of
agency and moral responsibility).
Nonetheless, some have argued that so long as we
can live within the illusion of freedom, we might also
be able to maintain the illusion of meaning (see, e.g.,
Dennett, 2004; Harris, 2012). In short, given that
what happens to us is experienced in gross pleasant/
unpleasant terms, and that this meaningful us (in the
conversational sense of “we care about those things”),
then our lives can be meaningful on some elementary level, and an elementary hope for meaningfulness, mattering, and perhaps even “salvation,” might be
maintained (however ironically). Unfortunately, even
if all this adventure in sustaining the illusion of freedom were to work in the attempt to maintain meaning in a fundamentally deterministic and meaningless
world, even if we were all to agree that we are going to
save meaning in our lives by deceiving ourselves about
what we really know to be true about ourselves, such a
strategy cannot work for morality, unless morality too

is similarly distorted or redefined. Without genuine
human agency morality can have no meaning above the
level of whatever we happen to designate (for ourselves)
as pleasant or unpleasant. In such a scheme, the “good”
is whatever happens to produce and become associated with pleasant feelings, or that which happens to be personally preferred. Likewise, the “bad” is
whatever happens to produce and become associated
with unpleasant feelings, or whatever we happen not
to prefer. In this way, morality, like agency and meaning before it, is reduced to simply a “useful fiction”
( Joyce, 2016, p. 219).
Of course, the problems run even deeper than
agency and meaning being illusory, and our moral sensibilities nothing more than fictions, because even our
evaluations of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of
the state of affairs each of us is presented with in life is
itself determined for us and are, thus, in no way deeply
or meaningfully our own. In a completely determined
world the things we experience as most profoundly
and significantly relevant to making sense of who we
are and we ought to be, the things that appear to matter at the most fundamental levels, are in fact things
without real substance or import. In the end, a world
of this sort is not one that is compatible with the central claims and promises of the Christian worldview as
revealed both in scripture and in the living person of
the Savior, Jesus Christ.
It is incumbent upon us as Christians to try to make
sense of the Gospel of Jesus Christ in general and the
Atonement of Jesus Christ in particular. In the deterministic world of reductive naturalism that contemporary psychological theories and models presupposes,
however, the Gospel of Christ is simply impossible to
defend or explain in any comprehensive way because
its foundational claims and premises are dismissed
at the outset. Commandments such as “love one another” or “seek ye first the kingdom of God” might
sound good, but whether they will be lived-out in any
individual case depends entirely on the biological, environmental, and socio-structural factors that happen
to be operating on the individual so as to produce obedient or disobedient behaviors. Stronger commandments, such as “thou shalt not kill,” can perhaps be
defended as important in strictly utilitarian terms (as
in various social contract theories), having usefulness
in regard to both social and personal survival, but in
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the end, on the deterministic account, people will do
that they are determined to do. Perhaps such injunctions (e.g., “thou shalt not kill”) might help to modify
behavior around the margins, but whatever power
they may have in human affairs, or whatever power
of self-reflection they might help to generate, can only
be based on the constructive and rhetorical power of
language to create ideas in us (see, e.g., Gergen, 2009).
Such rhetorical power, however, either has within itself the capacity to propel us to choices and actions
– in which case our behaviors are no more meaningful than those produced by biological and environmental factors – or, the capacity to create rhetoric and
act upon its meanings must be, according to the extant theories of the discipline themselves, causally determined. In other words, any attempt to explain the
work of human agency without allowing for genuine
human agency is doomed to fail and become, in the
end, merely empty rhetoric.
For Christians, there is a much more serious matter
to be dealt with in relation to all of this. It is simply
that if we live in a causally necessitated world without meaningful agency and moral responsibility, then
commandments relating to moral action are grossly
unfair and unjust, perhaps even cruel – or they are
merely non-sense. Any punishments or rewards connected to human behavior must be seen to be fundamentally arbitrary and, therefore, very hard to render
sensible or justifiable. Granted, one might accept this
view and join the ranks of those existentialists and
cynics who have already noticed the problem and
opted to embrace absurdity (Daigle, 2006). But, barring such a retreat into irrationality, one must explain
why, if the moral requirements and recompense of the
Christian theology of divine commandments are real,
then how, in a deterministic world, they could ever be
just. And, if they are not real, then how and why have
they gained and maintained the influence they have
when moral scrupulosity is a Promethean task at best.
The deep Christian question here is this: If we are all
broken but not really fixable, if there is no responsibility for the good or evil in our lives because there is no
real agency in our beings, and if any moral judgment
must be arbitrary and meaningless, then what possible meaning can there be in the Atonement of Jesus
Christ? Indeed, why should we even care about such
things? One might argue here that we have simply

overstated the case for hard determinism, and that the
discipline does not really hold to such strict views of
causation. While we have tried to build a conceptual
case for the fact that virtually all theories and models
in psychology really are deterministic in the hard sense
we describe here, the best evidence for our case is the
near complete absence on truly agentic perspectives,
theories, models, and practices within the literature
and training within the discipline. Even the “softer,”
so called CBT family of models lacks a literature of
agency itself as well as a philosophical grounding that
foregrounds real human agency and anchors it intellectually or practically.
Atonement as the Model of Change

We have argued that one or another species of hard
determinism is woven into the intellectual fabric,
and often the practice, of contemporary psychological models of human being and human behavior. We
will now argue that genuine human agency is woven
into spiritual as well as intellectual understandings of
Christianity. The hope of every Christian is that his
or her brokenness can ultimately be healed through
the atoning sacrifice and redemptive power of the love
of Jesus Christ. The need for atonement in the life of
every Christian comes about because Christians know
that human beings are in fact incomplete and capable
of sinning, broken and in need of being remade, and
that real healing and transformation comes only in and
through the atonement of Jesus Christ (Crisp, 2020).
Granted, one could deploy Christian rhetoric to speak
of an atonement through Jesus Christ that could rearrange our physiology so that whatever actions, desires, or thought our brains were producing could be
stopped or changed so that our bodies could then start
producing actions, desires, and thoughts more in line
with the ones God desires us to have (see, e.g., Stanford, 2010 for an account of the “biology of sin” from
just such a perspective). However, this line of reasoning raises important questions as to why God would
engineer us with built-in morally relevant flaws in the
first place, or put us in a position where such problems
were physically and environmentally inevitable.4 If we
reject the doctrine of predestination, then the answer
4. Another forum would be necessary to provide a sufficient
analysis of non-morally relevant physical problems.
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must be that He wouldn’t do such a thing; for, there is
no purpose in doing so. It would be like an engineer
building a flawed and unstable bridge on purpose, just
so she or he could watch it crumble and build it over
again – correctly this time. And, we know from LDS
scripture that His purpose, His “work” and His “glory”
is to “bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of
man” (Moses 1:39).
A similar question we might pose is why would
God put us in our particular socio-historical-cultural
contexts, governed as they are by abstract, unconscious structures and systems of thought, the essence
of which is to cause us to carry out all the harm and
immorality we visit on each other, only later on (after
death) to make all the adjustments necessary to repair
those predeterminate exigencies. This “repair shop”
model of Christianity, particularly the atonement of
Christ, simply does not work for serious Christians
who understand the centrality of moral agency to
God’s plan for our lives and happiness (Crisp, 2020;
Givens & Barlow, 2015; Ostler, 2006). Indeed, such an
approach would seem to nullify the purpose for having mortal experiences and the opportunity to choose
between good and evil in the first place. At very least,
it makes it difficult to make sense of God’s promise to
the prophet Joseph Smith in Liberty Jail that “all these
things shall give thee experience, and shall be for they
good” (D & C 122:7). Determined organisms cannot
learn from experience. Certainly, a model of atonement as simply reparative does not rise to the scriptural accounts we have of the atoning event (see, e.g.,
Matthew 26 and D&C 19).

because contemporary psychology trivializes or eliminates from our nature, human agency and the possibility of genuine change, not only does no good Christian
service to Christian students and clients, but it also
only seems to exacerbate the problem with which so
many already struggle – the problem of finding meaning, purpose, and hope in their lives.
Some might argue that the Christian message of
human agency is more likely to produce or worsen
psychological problems than it is to ameliorate them
because the freedom of agency brings with it the possibility of moral responsibility and, therefore, may
serve to intensify felt guilt. For far too long, however,
we believe Christian psychologists and psychotherapists have downplayed agency in the interest of eliminating guilt, and in so doing actually eliminated the
possibility of genuine relief and healing because, for
moral agents who understanding that they are agents
in the strong sense, things (even things at the core of
one’s self ) never have to be as they presently are. In
other words, no matter how dark and heavy the pall of
guilt and responsibility, the atonement of Jesus Christ
promises that all can be made light and lighter. But,
one might ask, why is this sometimes not the message
people seem to get from the study and practice of their
Christianity? We will conclude this essay by responding to just that question with five observations about
Christianity and agency as therapeutic, that we think
have genuine potential for therapeutic effect.
Observation 1: Christianity may be the only religious/cultural movement with the necessary combination of intellectual tradition, reasoned argument,
established historical record of positive cultural influence and motivation to stand against the current
secular zeitgeist and challenge the scientistic paradigm
that locks human beings into a hard determinist world
that offers no real hope for their development as moral
agents (Moreland, 2018; Willians & Gantt, 2013). Indeed, every Christian should be uneasy with the prevailing intellectual tide of the discipline (Cummings,
O’Donohue, & Cummings, 2009). Stated succinctly,
the central reason Christians must reject the scientistic paradigm is rooted in the realization that (1) if the
human moral world really is as the mainstream of the
discipline takes it to be and hard determinism does
prevail in human affairs as it does in non-human
affairs, rendering human agency an illusion, and (2)

A More Meaningful Understanding of Therapy
in Light of the Atonement of Jesus Christ

In every Christian tradition there are adherents who
take little comfort in the Christian message as it is filtered through the assumptions and theories, especially
psychological theories, of our larger (secular) culture
(Gantt, Christensen, & Tubbs, this issue). There are
many who can appreciate the good intentions and
ethical aims of the Christian message, but who cannot understand how to navigate a world in which they
are to be held accountable for moral acts over which
they really have no control. Just eliminating the Christian message from psychological theory and practice,
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influence comes from common readings of the Old
Testament, with a little bit of Newtonian science (or,
perhaps more accurately, Newtonian metaphysics)
mixed in. It is completely non-controversial to observe that Judaism has given great emphasis to what
is commonly referred to as “the Law.” Indeed, the Hebrew word Torah, typically taken to mean the first five
books of the Hebrew Bible, literally means “the Law”
(Patrick, 1985). According to the common available
scriptures, the “Law” is what God selected to be his
fundamental means of communicating with and managing his creations, including His children. On this
understanding, God works with us first (and chiefly)
through the intermediary of His Law. Examples, or
parts of that “Law,” include what is referred to as the
Law of Moses (Patrick, 1985), as well as the many laws
governing proper worship, prayer, dietary observance,
and sacrifice that are specified, for example, in the
book of Leviticus. Ordinances and required practices
were based on revealed laws and careful observance
ensured conformity to the law. Sometimes, God’s response to ignoring or breaking of His Law was swift
and sure. Other times God’s patience stretched over
decades or centuries as His people brought hardships
upon themselves through disobedience. Blessings and
protection were understood to be contingent upon
obedience to laws. Final, the narrative suggests, the
people of ancient Israel were taken captive and scattered finally because they had broken the Law given to
them by God.
It is worth pointing out that much of the trouble
that the Savior encountered during his earthly ministry was related to the fact that he seemed not to be
sufficiently devoted to observing the many, and highly
rigid and specific, requirements of the Law that dominated Jewish culture at the time. Ultimately, it was
the Savior’s frequent contravention of the Law that
His enemies used as justification for his crucifixion. It
is important to point out that ancient conception of
“Law” seems not to be obviously present in the Christian faith that was forming and being articulated in the
writings of the New Testament. Paul especially seems
concerned that his fellow Christians understand the
issues at play and the dangers of misunderstanding
the nature and role of law in contrast to the clear centerpiece of Christian faith – i.e., divine grace (Wright,
2018). However, since those early days, Christianity

there is a creator God, then that god should not be
expected to atone for the sins of the world but rather
to apologize for them – since He is the one ultimately
responsible for the causally determined mess that has
been human history. Christians cannot accept the reality of a loving, caring God whose every intention is
to redeem and save His children and NOT reject outright, and actively seek to counter, the rising influence
of scientism. For Christians, the atonement of Jesus
Christ is real, and, thus, human fate is open-ended,
human life is intrinsically meaningful, and human action is inescapably moral, i.e., it matters.
The clinical relevance of this observation should be
obvious, but perhaps bears repeating. It is that most
things in the world do not need to be as they are. Most
things did not necessarily have to happen as they did.
Certainly nearly all human events, including our personal psychological, emotional, and behavioral lives
did not have to come about as they did, and do not
now need to be what they are. They came through
complex understandings, feelings, doings, identities,
and desirings. And, thus, they can be undone in the
same way. This does not imply that such change can
be easily or casually done merely by some extraordinary act of will. On the contrary, often the road out of
any particular being-in-the-world, will be as complex
as was the road into it. But it can be done because our
mental, psychological and moral being is at all times
something we are doing and not something we just
are. And all things that are done can be undone, done
over, or abandoned. The ultimate therapeutic implication of all of this is that, stated in terms familiar in
the Christian LDS tradition, nothing in the universe
change a person from the kind of being created to act
into the kind of being created just to be acted upon.
There is always a real and a truer possibility within
our reach, and within our being-in-the-world.
Observation 2: We often (mis)read and (mis)interpret the scriptural and prophetic teachings of the
gospel of Jesus Christ in the light of two subtle influences that, we believe, ultimately serve to limit access
to the gospel’s fundamental healing power. The first
of these influences5 comes from our broader culture,
which inherited it from years and centuries of what
is known as the Judeo-Christian tradition. This first
5. We shall discuss the second of these influences in Observation 3 below.
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has managed to make peace with the Judaic (or,
perhaps more accurately, Judeo-Hellenistic) concept
of Law (see, Wilson, 1989). Unfortunately, it is this
aspect of Christianity, this commitment to the concepts and languages of what may be referred to as
“biblical legalism” (Ferguson, 2016) that seems to
cause real difficulties for the faith life of some people
in our day. It seems safe to say that for some people
today, this legalistic conception of God, gospel, and
faith is as likely to create guilt and dis-ease as it is to
comfort some who is struggling emotionally and psychologically. For these people their Christian faith,
unfortunately can be as likely to be seen as a burden
as a boon – as part of the problem more than part of
the solution.
At least two things can be identified as contributing to the continuing emphasis on laws and lawfulness
(i.e., legalism) in contemporary Christianity. One is
the emergence of the approach to theology, and thus
to faith, known as sola scriptura, an approach that has
been very influential in the Protestant movements
(Barrett, 2016). This idea is essentially that we, as
Christians, should confine our faith and practices to
what can be established by direct reading of the Biblical text alone. This process of supporting doctrine,
often by “proof texting” from written sources clearly
has its strengths and purposes. However, it also has
significant problems. For example, it can sometimes
devolve into using isolated, out-of-context quotations
to establish a doctrinal proposition without sufficient
care to avoid introducing one’s own presuppositions
and biases due to a lack of sufficient attention to context, translation and etymological histories, alternative
readings, or authoritative clarifications. It is important, at least for purposes of this essay, to note that this
“hard” reading of scripture, is quite similar to the way
decisions are reached based on the reading of written
Law in Old Testament, Hebraic traditions (Patrick,
1985).
One other historical factor has contributed to our
current tendency to find elements of the old familiar
understandings of law and lawfulness in our contemporary understanding of our Christian faith. We
submit that this influence comes largely from our intellectual tradition of Newtonianism (Feingold, 2005).
Sir Isaac Newton was undoubtedly the most influential early figure in the establishment of our modern

physical sciences. He formulated laws that allowed
for prediction, causal explanation, and, to a significant
extent, control of the physical world. The subsequent
tradition of “Newtonian” thought became a larger and
wider worldview – an approach that enshrined lawfulness as the key aspect that rendered the known world
controllable and predictable (see, e.g., Cohen, 1985;
Gantt & Williams, 2014, McMullin, 1978). It is not
surprising that the religious world, particularly, certain popular strands of theological reasoning, would
find it attractive, even necessary, to integrate Newtonian conceptions of the lawful universe into theology and our understanding of the divine (Force &
Popkin, 1999). From this perspective, it made sense
to conceive of God himself as the greatest of the Newtonian scientists. It seemed reasonable to assume that
Newton’s laws were in fact God’s laws, and thus emphasis on and confidence in cosmic lawfulness found
its way into religious doctrine, including our thinking
about God and the manner of his interactions with
us, as well as about the conditions and requirements
of salvation (Oakley, 1961). It was easy even to make
grace itself conditional upon universal (i.e., Divine and
Natural) law.
The Christian world kept alive the tradition of relating the lawfulness of the physical universe, and events
within it, to the human moral realm and human moral
events. For some this comparison has been a loose,
metaphorical one, for others, the comparison is much
tighter, and sometimes quite literal. This emphasis on
the gospel of Jesus Christ as first and foremost lawful has had, we suggest, at least two principal effects
(and a vast number of particular manifestations in the
lives of people, including Latter-day Saints). Unfortunately, neither of these effects has been particularly
helpful for people struggling with religious issues,
moral issues, or issues of emotional and psychological well-being. Indeed, these effects of the tradition of
“lawfulness” we have described here have affected our
understanding of, and faith in, the atonement of Jesus
Christ itself, and our confidence that it can have any
salutary effects on us – principally because the whole
process is seen as first and foremost lawful, externally
determined, and cosmic in proportion. Simply put, to
one struggling with emotional, moral, or psychologically relevant issues, it may seem like “God is a nice
enough person, but he can’t really help me because I’m
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not keeping all the laws, and He can only come and
help me if the law between us is satisfied and in place.”
This is all to be expected, of course, when people come to see themselves as having no real agency
(having accepted the prevailing social science view of
themselves). People with no genuine moral agency
would be expected to consider themselves as powerless in their moral/religious lives as they are in their
psychological/emotional lives, as having no say in how
God’s judgment will turn out for them, and, thus, no
influence on their own eternal fate. The laws (both
theological/divine and psychological/scientific) are,
after all, in control. And, even for those who do take
themselves to have freedom of the will, to be in control
of their own lives, the weight and number of moral
laws, in addition to all their other responsibilities in
life, quickly becomes overwhelming. Indeed, scripture
is replete with examples of people condemned for failing to adequately keep the laws of God. Contrasting
examples of success in keeping those laws, however,
seem fewer in number. Thus, as we contemplate this
state of affairs regarding the state of our souls, we
are never, it seems, assured of God’s approval. First,
because we may not understand all the laws, or any
of them in their fullness, and second, because we are
expected not only to keep them, but to keep them sincerely, happily, and to love the Lawgiver all at the same
time. Doing all of this can seem a considerable psychological challenge.
Finally, we should mention here the effect of this
emphasis on laws and lawfulness on our understanding the nature and meaning of the Atonement. If God’s
chief mode of interacting with us is through law, and if
the moral as well as the physical world is governed by
law or laws, which God Himself must likewise obey,
then the act of Jesus’s atoning sacrifice takes on (or
can take on) more an air of cosmic necessity than of
personal love and compassion. Whether it can apply
to oneself, personally, becomes a matter of immense
lawful complexity, replete with infinite nuances that
are beyond anyone’s cognitive capacity to understand
or control. In this way it becomes difficult for many
to find comfort in an atonement that reflects cosmic
lawful necessity rather than voluntary love and sacrifice. When this line of thinking is at the core of our
Christian understanding, the atonement is not able to
reach us and help us change – law is in the way and it

is impassive. It is thus from a therapeutic point of view,
irrelevant.
Observation 3: The second influence on how we
(mis)read and (mis)understand the gospel of Jesus
Christ has to do with the role particular doctrines
and tenets are taken to play. We mentioned above the
influence of the theological principle of sola scriptura
in the Christian world, particularly in various Protestant denominations. The commitment to an exclusive reliance on the authority of written scripture has
had a profound effect in the Christian world (Barrett,
2016). One notable effect is the importance that has
been placed on the traditional Christian creeds and
their use in the attempt to rationalize the nature of
God, among other issues (Olson, 1999). The attempt
to thematize religion and provide a formal account of
God that is consistent with established rational principles and categories of thought is the foundation of
systematic theology. Systematic theology aims, among
other things, to rationalize and, thus, “cognitivize” our
understandings of, and conversations about, God, the
Gospel, scripture, and even the Atonement.
While the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints has largely avoided the project of centralized
or official systematic theology, we have not been immune from the tendency over the last two centuries to
rationalize and intellectualize, as we have attempted
to articulate our beliefs and teachings about God and
His Gospel. For too many members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints – often more or less
unaware of the larger Christian, especially Protestant,
context of the project of systematic theology – faith
is often conceptualized as an essentially cognitive, intellectual issue, and personal worthiness is frequently
seen as strongly connected to strength of belief in particular doctrinal propositions, tenets, or beliefs. As
a people, we tend (albeit informally) to bring up what
are essentially questions and concerns of systematic
theology and give them considerable importance in
our faith lives. An effect of this “systematic theologizing” approach to understanding our religion and
religious lives is that we pose questions to ourselves
that have their origins in, and take their form from,
the propositional or creedal approach native to other
forms of Christianity.
This issue bears directly on the topic at hand; in
that, bringing such an approach to making sense of
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scriptural and prophetic teachings, as well as the
Atonement of Christ, tends to foreground belief in
the “truth” of abstract doctrines, or even practices and
particular articulations of basic principles, as foundational to our faith and essential both to our spiritual
identity and our moral character (Thayne & Gantt,
2019), as well as our perceived worthiness and thus
whet her we merit, i.e., deserve, atonement and forgiveness. For example, because we know that we
should believe in Jesus Christ, we might worry about
how clearly and strongly we might believe that he literally raised Lazarus, cursed a fig tree, or walked on
water. And, if perchance our confidence falters, we
might then count our faltering cognitive commitment
as fundamentally a moral failure. Or, we might question how important it is that baptisms be by immersion, and what the rational grounds are for any belief,
and where faith or belief get their authority over our
minds and reason. Unfortunately, it is only in light of
the subtle, tacit influence of rationalizing or “cognitivizing” belief, and the taking of the Gospel of Jesus
Christ to be a series of religious propositions (playing
essentially the same role that logical propositions play
in formal logic) that we read the gospel propositionally – that is, as a series or collage of propositional
statements about God, good, and us.
Sadly, in the end, making all of this cognitive stuff
work can seem unduly difficult and largely unfulfilling. Once that feeling sets in, it is easy to begin thinking that the Gospel itself is what is failing us. Even
worse, some come to feel that it is they who have in
fact failed the Gospel – that they have personally
failed Jesus because they just cannot seem to put the
Gospel all together in a rationally sensible way that
gets all the pieces to fit together as they should. In
the modern cultural and religious climate – infringed
upon by the power to logic and the rationalizing and
cognitivizing of nearly everything – it is easy to see
our rational failure as a moral failure. Thus, either we
have failed or the gospel has failed us, intellectually.
Whatever the case, the Gospel ceases to be a viable
source of healing or help and seems more like a burden, complicating everything else in our psychological
and emotive life that we may be dealing with. Thus
understood, it does not reveal God to us. The pull
to understand the Atonement of Jesus Christ in this
hyper-cognitive way is almost as irresistible as it is

debilitating and dispiriting. Within this intellectual
regime, the Atonement of Christ simply becomes a
proposition of exhaustingly cosmic proportions, an
equation with too many unknowns and unknowables. In this form, it is not readily apparent just how
the Gospel of Christ can actually help to heal, center,
and bestow hope. It may seem more like a burden one
needs to put down in order to work on other, perhaps
more soluble relational, emotional, or moral problems.
Observation 4: It is possible to read and understand the gospel of Jesus Christ in a way that does not
require reconciling with the specter of the angry and
demanding god of the Old Testament – we need not
sense that particular god is hiding behind the promises of atonement. It is possible to understand the Restored Gospel of Jesus Christ without over-cognizing
it, without first having to rationalize or hypothesize
abstract realities in terms of principles and doctrines
interposed between Christ the Savior and us (Thayne
& Gantt, 2019). This reading of the Gospel of Jesus
Christ is made most clear, perhaps, in two sections
of Latter-day Saint scripture. The Book of Mormon,
subtitled Another Testament of Jesus Christ, contains
an account of the resurrected Christ appearing to the
descendants of a colony of Israelites on the American
continent. In this ancient record we find two occasions, one at the beginning of the account of His ministry and another at the end as He is leaving, in which
Jesus Himself states plainly what his mission was (and
is) and thus what His gospel is in its plainest and most
powerful sense. We will consult each of these declarations briefly.
The core of the first account is found in 3 Nephi
11:31-40. We note here the first three verses (31-33):
31 Behold, verily, verily, I say unto you, I will declare
unto you my doctrine.
32 And this is my doctrine, and it is the doctrine which
the Father hath given unto me; . . . that the Father
commandeth all men, everywhere, to repent and believe in me.
33 And whoso believeth in me, and is baptized, the
same shall be saved; and they are they who shall inherit
the kingdom of God.

The end of Christ’s declaration, recorded in verses
39-40, assures us:
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be particular kinds of life, actions, beliefs and meanings in every age which will be particularly likely to
work against believing in him and accepting His gift.
There will also be ordinances that allow us to perform
public statements and affirmations of our belief in and
acceptance of His atonement and our willingness to
live the way He asks us of us. But, and this is perhaps
the most important point, the Gospel is performative,
and, thus, really quite simple. It is not cognitively complex at all, not subtle, and apparently within our agentic power to realize.
Our point here is that our Christian faith, our religion, can be salutary in every age. If facilitates life
and abundance. But this healing power of the Gospel
can be overlooked or even dismissed, in the lives and
minds, of those who are struggling and need psychological, spiritual, and moral healing, if the central gift
of love and healing is occluded by one or another of
the perspectives we have described above. It’s hard
to see, hear, or feel the healing if the “angry God” still
scares us, if we are consumed by guilt from broken
laws, or if all that is left of our religious life is rational
and cognitive commitment. It is also hard to see, hear,
or feel healing is we do not experience ourselves as
moral agents possessed of the power to act regardless
of our circumstances. But if we can get past all those
things, the promise of the atonement is sure and it can
heal all wounds and brokenness.
Observation 5: Given the foregoing analysis, the final point to be made as we consider the meaning and
power of the Atonement in providing us healing and
peace is how the atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ might
be fruitfully understood and what role moral agency
really plays in being able to be helped and healed by
Him. Much of our analysis thus far has suggested that
there are many aspects in our contemporary culture,
and in the discipline of psychology in particular, that
can exert a profound effect on how we understand
ourselves (as moral agents or reactive organisms) and
how we understand the Gospel (in terms of law and
abstract principles or gifts and endowments). These
same things will have an effect on how and whether
the Atonement of Jesus Christ might be seen primarily in terms of cognitive complexity or whether it is a
source of genuine hope and healing.
In the April 2017 General Conference of The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, President

39 Verily, verily, I say unto you, that this is my doctrine,
and whoso buildeth upon this buildeth upon my rock,
and the gates of hell shall not prevail against them.
40 And whoso shall declare more or less than this, and
establish it for my doctrine, the same . . . is not built
upon my rock; but he buildeth upon a sandy foundation, . . .

At the end of His ministry, Jesus delivered a very
similar account of the crux of his Gospel (3 Nephi 27:
13-16):
13 Behold I have given unto you my gospel, and this is
the gospel which I have given unto you—that I came
into the world to do the will of my Father, because my
Father sent me.
14 And my Father sent me that I might be lifted up
upon the cross; and after that I had been lifted up upon
the cross, that I might draw all men unto me, that as
I have been lifted up by men even so should men be
lifted up by the Father, to stand before me, to be judged
of their works, whether they be good or whether they
be evil—
15 And for this cause have I been lifted up; therefore,
according to the power of the Father I will draw all
men unto me, that they may be judged according to
their works.
16 And it shall come to pass, that whoso repenteth and
is baptized in my name shall be filled; and if he endureth to the end, behold, him will I hold guiltless before my Father at that day when I shall stand to judge
the world.

These passages are important to our analysis here
for a number of reasons. First, they contain concise
statements of the Gospel in the way that the Savior
Himself chose to articulate it (assuming it was copied
correctly into the Nephite record from which the Book
of Mormon was taken). The crux of the Gospel seems
to be believing in Christ in that most important sense
of knowing and trusting in who He is and what He
did (which is different from believing in a proposition
or principle). The Gospel itself is thus quite simple.
It is that there will always be warnings and counsel,
including commandments and principles given in every age, regarding the kinds of life, actions, beliefs, and
meanings that will take one to Christ and facilitate the
acceptance of the Atonement he offers and there will
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Russell M. Nelson spoke directly about the nature and
meaning of the Atonement of Christ. What he taught
has bearing on the therapeutically relevant questions
we have been raising here. He stated:

take upon him their infirmities, that his bowels
may be filled with mercy, according to the flesh, that
he may know according to the flesh how to succor his
people according to their infirmities.

It is doctrinally incomplete to speak of the Lord’s atoning sacrifice by shortcut phrases, such as “the Atonement” or “the enabling power of the Atonement” or
“applying the Atonement” or “being strengthened by
the Atonement.” These expressions present a real risk
of misdirecting faith by treating the event as if it had
living existence and capabilities independent of our
Heavenly Father and His Son, Jesus Christ.

There are many things we might learn from this
passage, but the least we should take away from it is
an understanding that Christ’s life on earth was not
simply for “show,” he did not simply provide Himself
as an example. He came to know and He experienced.
We suggest that while such experiences serve, perhaps, many purposes, there are two that are especially
are relevant to our discussion here. First, we can be assured that His mortal experience enabled Him to understand us, to know intimately and thoroughly how
to succor us in our moments of particular need and in
our neediness, all of which is occasioned by our own
mortal experiences. Second, because of the Savior’s
firsthand knowledge and experience of suffering and
pain (both physical and emotional), there is no person
who can legitimately claim that the Savior “just doesn’t
understand,” either in this life or the life to come.
Additionally, we also find in scripture two further
accounts of the Savior’s role in the coming Day of
Judgment. In the Book of Mormon, in the seventh
chapter of Moroni, verse 27, we read:

Under the Father’s great eternal plan, it is the Savior
who suffered. It is the Savior who broke the bands of
death. It is the Savior who paid the price for our sins
and transgressions and blots them out on condition of
our repentance. It is the Savior who delivers us from
physical and spiritual death.
There is no amorphous entity called “the Atonement”
upon which we may call for succor, healing, forgiveness, or power. Jesus Christ is the source. Sacred terms
such as Atonement and Resurrection describe what the
Savior did, according to the Father’s plan, so that we
may live with hope in this life and gain eternal life in
the world to come. The Savior’s atoning sacrifice – the
central act of all human history – is best understood
and appreciated when we expressly and clearly connect
it to Him. (p. 40)

27 Wherefore, my beloved brethren, have miracles
ceased because Christ hath ascended into heaven, and
hath sat down on the right hand of God, to claim of the
Father his rights of mercy which he hath upon the children
of men? (emphasis added)

This emphasis on the Atonement of Jesus Christ as
something He did, an action, rather than as a powerful invisible force or principle lawfully governed and
quite apart from any person, mortal or divine, is vital
to understanding what atonement means for us and
how we can participate in the work of Christ’s atonement. Two additional scriptures give insight into how
this all might work in the lives of morally agentic children of God. In the Book of Mormon, we find two very
poignant expressions of the meaning and purpose of
the mission of the Savior. The first is Alma 7:11-12,
which reads:

We learn here a central feature of the Savior’s active,
living role and function in the judgment of all of God’s
Children. He has earned a claim of mercy on all of us,
and his ultimate purpose is to claim us as His own.
This fundamental truth is expressed in even greater
detail in another passage of modern scripture (Doctrine & Covenants 45:3-5) which teaches:
3 Listen to him who is the advocate with the Father,
who is pleading your cause before him—

11 And he shall go forth, suffering pains and afflictions
and temptations of every kind; and this that the word
might be fulfilled which saith he will take upon him
the pains and the sicknesses of his people.

4 Saying: Father, behold the sufferings and death of
him who did no sin, in whom thou wast well pleased;
behold the blood of thy Son which was shed, the
blood of him whom thou gavest that thyself might be
glorified;

12 And he will take upon him death, that he may loose
the bands of death which bind his people; and he will
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Being ready to accept it, to desire at-one-ment is a different thing entirely than learning to identify and conform to abstract principles and impersonal universal
laws or doctrinal tenets. The view of judgment and
atonement we have attempted to articulate here is
one in which there is real power to heal and to exalt.
In this sense, the gospel of Jesus Christ is everyone’s
– certainly every Christian’s – “safe space” (see Gantt
& Thayne, 2017). It is not an appendage to “real life,”
which is the life of causal necessity the discipline of
psychology lays out for us. Rather, it is the real life.
However, regardless of its simplicity and its scriptural basis, the atonement of Jesus Christ ultimately
comes to nothing if human beings are not, in fact and
fully, moral agents. To natural organisms the promise of atonement is it at best a fiction and at worst
nonsense; for, natural organisms have no need of any
atonement and their acts cannot in any way be judged.
In contrast, a Christianity focused on the ongoing
atoning ministry of Jesus Christ, the One who has
worked out his “rights of mercy” that He might lay
claim to us, to every moral agent, is a Christianity that
has the power to lift and heal, to make whole and
to exalt.

5 Wherefore, Father, spare these my brethren that
believe on my name, that they may come unto me and
have everlasting life.

Here we learn an additional detail concerning the
nature of the Lord’s participation in judgment. Note,
here again, the Savior’s participation consists of his
claim of mercy – based on His own merits, not ours.
This sacred reality grants us permission to give up the
fruitless quest of trying to measure up to the requirements of the “angry God,” or the unyielding demands
of abstract principles and forces, or of whatever our
limited cognitive abilities and understanding suggest
may be required of us to enjoy the loving redemption
of our Savior. Such things (principles, laws, and requirements) are important, perhaps, in any age, in a
pragmatic sense, but they are not the crux of our eternal welfare or happiness and they are not the essence
of the Gospel of Jesus Christ as restored and taught
in these latter-days. And, thus, they are likely not the
source of our happiness and healing here and now.
Sadly, for any number of cultural reasons, too many
of us have come to spend far too much time preparing
for “judgment” as our culture teaches us to understand
and expect such a thing. In this tradition, judgment is
always imposed on someone. Thus, we too easily find
ourselves spending a good deal of time preparing for
judgment and agonizing, sometimes, over how best to
make our case to convince a disinterested or even, perhaps, hostile tribunal, weighing in our own minds the
incriminating and exculpatory evidence from our lives
in the hopes that we won’t be found wanting and rejected. If the interpretation of scripture we offer here
has merit, however, then maybe the real test we face is
whether we will find ourselves in a position of desiring
and being able to accept, not an imposed judgment,
but rather a gift of mercy and a welcome extend to us
by our atoning Savior. It is too often the case that we
spend much time and effort working on and worrying
about how best to prepare for a final judgment, and
almost inevitably castigating ourselves over our sorry
state. We are, unfortunately, not so well-practiced in
preparing to receive a gift of mercy, a loving hand extended in welcome and biding us to come and be “atone” with Him and be even as He is . . . if that is what
we have come to want.
In the end, we firmly believe, nothing could be a
better source of hope than a promised hand of mercy.
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Naturalism, Theism, and the Risks of Professional Values
Imposition in Psychotherapy with Theistic Clients
Jeffrey S. Reber
University of West Georgia

The codes of ethics guiding the work of counselors and psychotherapists state that ethical practitioners
pursue training in areas where they are at risk of imposing values. While training in the potential imposition of personal values is pervasive, training in the potential imposition of professional values is rare.
Naturalism, the guiding worldview of science and psychology excludes theism, which is the guiding worldview of many people. Consequently, naturalism is a professional value that may be imposed on theistic
clients in psychotherapy. The exclusion of theism from psychology and psychotherapy along with the
naturalization of theistic experiences and concepts and the omission of theism from theistic theories that
are imported into psychotherapy demonstrate how great the risk of imposing the professional value of
naturalism in psychotherapy is. In light of that risk and given the lack of training in this area of need,
several forms of theism that fall on a continuum from weak to strong theism are briefly reviewed as an
initial step in educating counselors and psychotherapists about this important aspect of many clients.
Also, to encourage careful and critical reflection, some of the challenges that accompany the common
ways in which counselors and psychotherapists might include theism in their therapy is provided. Specific points of emphasis for therapists who are members of the church and work with theistic clients who
are members of the church are addressed in the conclusion.

T

he American Counseling Association Code of
Ethics (2014) states that ethical counselors and
psychotherapists, “seek training in areas in which they
are at risk of imposing their values onto clients, especially when the counselor’s values are inconsistent
with the client’s goals or are discriminatory in nature”
(section A.4.b.; see APA, 2017, Principle E, for a similar statement). Generally speaking, counselor values
come in two forms: personal values and professional
values (Packard, 2009). Personal values typically stem
from the therapist’s upbringing, culture, and personal
experiences and can include things like religious beliefs, political leanings, and gender role expectations.

Professional values stem from the disciplines and
institutions within which the therapist has been
educated and trained and can include things like
ontological assumptions (e.g., individualism), epistemological preferences (e.g., empiricism), and ethical positions (e.g., utilitarianism). In both cases, the
values may be explicitly adopted, but they can also
just as often be implicitly held ( Jackson, Hansen, &
Cook-Ly, 2013).
Training in the risk of personal value imposition in
domains such as race, ethnicity, culture, gender and
gender identity, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic
status, religion, and ability is abundantly available,
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both in degree programs in which counselors and
psychotherapists are initially trained and in continuing education classes that are offered across the country and at annual conventions of the ACA and APA.
Training in the risk of professional value imposition
is scarcer, in part because values stemming from the
counselor’s or psychotherapist’s discipline and institution are often hidden (Slife, Reber, & Richardson,
2005). Consequently, professional values receive less
attention in the literature and in training and education than personal values. Nevertheless, professional
values constitute an important area in which the risk
of value imposition exists. Increasingly, psychologists
have uncovered forms of institutional and disciplinary bias in course and degree program curricula and
materials (e.g., Peterson & Kroner, 2006), research
studies (e.g., Roberts, Bareket-Shavit, Dollins, Goldie,
& Mortenson, 2020), graduate education (Diggles,
2014), and more. Indigenous psychologists also point
to cultural biases in psychology’s professional values
concerning research design, instrumentation, and
analysis, including within the scientific method itself
(e.g., Sundararajan, 2019).
Is it possible that counselors and psychotherapists,
given the training and education they have received in
psychological theory, method, and practice, may be at
risk of imposing professional values on their clients?
An increasing number of psychotherapists believe it
is possible and call for increased training and education for counselors and psychotherapists to address
this ethical concern (Slife, 2011; Tjeltveit, 2004). One
professional value central to psychological science and
practice, and which has been critically examined as
to its risk of biasing the discipline and institution of
psychology in a number of significant ways, is naturalism (Armstrong, 2011; Slife & Reber, 2009; Bishop,
2007). This paper extends that critical examination to
include counselors and psychotherapists, who might
be at risk of imposing the professional value of naturalism on their clients, especially clients of faith. The
professional value of naturalism will be described, its
impact and imposition within the discipline of psychology will be reviewed, and the extension of those
same forms of imposition to counseling and psychotherapy will be explicated. Then, given that ethical
counselors and psychotherapists “seek training in areas
in which they are at risk of imposing their values onto

clients” (ACA, 2014, Sect. A.4.b), some preliminary
education and training in the theistic worldview that
is held by many clients of faith will be provided.
The Professional Value of Naturalism

The worldview of naturalism, which the historian of
psychology, Thomas Leahey (2013) describes as “the
central dogma of science” (p. 379) has been adopted
by the discipline of psychology and by the institution of science (Plantinga, 2011). Naturalism is the
idea that all events are explainable in terms of natural
laws and processes. Naturalism has been historically
divided into two components or aspects: ontological
and methodological (Bishop, 2007). In its ontological form, naturalism is concerned with the question
of what is real. For the ontological naturalist, the real
is what is material, tangible, and operates according
to natural laws. What is not real, for the ontological
naturalist, is all that lies outside of this definition of
the natural, or what is often referred to as the supernatural. Regarding the supernatural and ontological
naturalism’s treatment of it, Decaro and MacArthur
(2010) state that ontological naturalism cannot “countenance the supernatural, whether in the form of entities (such as God, spirits, entelechies, or Cartesian
minds), events (such as miracles or magic), or epistemic faculties (such as mystical insight or spiritual
intuition” (p. 3). For the ontological naturalist, such
things simply are not considered to be real and therefore have no place in scientific explanation.
Recognizing the potential for value imposition
in such a strong ontological position, a number of
scientists and psychologists endorse instead the
methodological or scientific form of naturalism.
Methodological or scientific naturalism claims not to
weigh in on the reality of things, like those just described, but instead confines itself only “to the search
for natural causes to explain natural phenomena”
( Jones, 2005, sect. 4, para. 2). The methodological
naturalist believes that the scientific method is the best
way to investigate reality and can be applied without
weighing in on what that reality is (Bishop, 2007).
Thus, methodological naturalists do not explicitly
deny non- or super-natural realities, but only exclude
explanations invoking such realities from their study.
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As Jones (2005) put it most frankly, “while supernatural explanations may be important and have merit,
they are not part of science” (sect. 4, para. 2).
A number of philosophers of science have strongly
argued that this methodological approach, in which
God and “supernatural” things are bracketed rather
than ontologically denied, creates a slippery slope in
which methodological naturalism inevitably slides
into ontological naturalism (e.g., Gantt & Williams,
2020; Zargar, Azadegan, & Nabavi, 2019). Schafersman (1997), for example, has examined the slipperiness of the slope on which these two forms of
naturalism are located and concludes that “the practice or adoption of methodological naturalism entails
a logical and moral belief in ontological naturalism,
so they are not logically decoupled” (sect. Methodological and Ontological Naturalism, para. 11). In
a similar vein, Forrest (2000) notes that whether its
practitioners intend for it to do so or not:

Despite this resolution and methodological naturalism’s ostensible neutrality with regard to the
ontological claims of religion, only a few years after it
was published, one of the best known psychologists
in the United States, a specialist on prejudice, bias,
and morality, Jonathan Haidt, gave a presentation
to a group of scientists titled, Enlightenment 2.0 Requires Morality 2.0, in which he began his talk with
the following items on a PowerPoint slide: “Broad
scientific consensus: 1) A world with gods should be
measurably different. 2) We can’t be certain that no
supernatural entities exist, but . . . 3) Our world does
not look like a world with gods. 4) Historical, cosmological, & causal claims of religions mostly false. 5) Religion is a natural phenomenon; it can and should be
studied with methods of science.” After Haidt quickly
reviewed the items on the list, none with a single citation or shred of evidence offered as support, he summarized his argument by stating that “the factual
claims of religion are by and large, if not altogether,
false.” He then asked for agreement with his argument
and seeing what appeared to be all the hands in the
audience go up, he moved on with his talk, noting
that anyone who did disagree with any item on the list
could see him afterward at lunch, ostensibly to be put
straight on their error.
Were this the only example of this slippery slope
in psychology, it would not be worth mentioning, but
a systematic review of the most popular psychology
research methods texts used to teach psychologists
how to conduct their studies shows that the slip from
methodological to metaphysical naturalism is common, though rarely acknowledged (Reber, 2018).
Thus, psychological naturalism, which states that human behavior and mental states “must be explained in
terms that are compatible with the broader physicalistic view of nature provided by the natural sciences”
(Stich, 1992, p. 246; also Fils, 2019), inevitably slips
into a metaphysical/ontological naturalism that arbitrates matters of faith and theology and results in
an pervasive implicit bias in the discipline (see Gantt,
2018; Gantt & Williams, 2020; Slife & Reber, 2009).

methodological naturalism has consistently chipped
away at the plausibility of the existential claims made
by supernaturalism by providing increasingly successful explanations of aspects of the world which religion
has historically sought to explain, e.g., human origins.
The threat faced by supernaturalism is not the threat
of logical disproof, but the fact of having its explanations supplanted by scientific ones” (sect. Philosophical Naturalism’s Ontological Categories, para. 7).

Whether in its metaphysical or methodological
form, then, naturalism has inescapable implications
for the viability of any non-naturalistic worldviews.
An illustration of this slippery slope in action may
be useful at this juncture. In 2007, the American Psychological Association Council of Representatives
issued a Resolution on Religious, Religion-Based and/
or Religion-Derived Prejudice. In that resolution the
council makes a statement that is consistent with psychology’s methodological naturalism, which is that
“psychology has no legitimate function in arbitrating
matters of faith and theology” (para. 5). Thus, with
regard to the truth claims of religions, including theistic religions, psychology is to exclude such ontological
matters from its science and not judge their veracity.
Such things, on this methodological naturalistic account, simply lie outside the purview of the discipline
of scientific psychology.

Psychology’s Imposition of Naturalism

Theism, like naturalism, is a worldview. Indeed, it
is considered the other major worldview of Western
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civilization (Smith, 2001). Unlike naturalism, theism
assumes “that a God (or Gods) is actively and currently
engaged with and makes a meaningful difference in
the practical world” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 6; see
also Barbour, 1997 and Plantinga, 2011). On an ontological level, then, theism assumes that divine “present,
ongoing, and difference-making activity” (ibid) is real.
Methodologically, theism asserts that this divine activity can and should be included in a study of the world,
including a scientific study of the psychological world
(Reber, Slife, & Downs, 2012). In this sense, theism
stands in direct and clear contrast with the naturalistic
worldview, which, given the slippery slope already described, both denies and excludes God’s engagement
in the world. Psychology, as a naturalistic science,
then, is at risk of an implicit anti-theistic disciplinary prejudice, which could result in professional value
imposition, both within the discipline of psychology
and within psychotherapy and counseling specifically.
I will review the evidence of this value imposition in
psychology and psychotherapy below.

study religion and spirituality. Indeed, the flagship
APA journal whose primary focus is on such matters
(Psychology of Religion and Spirituality) explicitly prohibits the publication of any articles that take a theistic approach. The founding editor of the journal stated
in his introduction to the first edition of the journal
that “papers that aim to use theological constructs as
explanatory variables in psychological models are . . .
inappropriate” (Piedmont, 2008, p. 1). The succeeding
editor added her support, stating, “I feel strongly that
as a science, psychology should not and cannot admit
into its domain non-empirical approaches such as theistic psychology” (Park, 2017, p. 72). Aside from the
false claim that theistic approaches are non-empirical
(see Reber, Slife, and Downs, 2012), both editors cite
no justification for their exclusion. Given psychology’s
resolution discussed above, one can safely assume that
the editors would justify their exclusion of theism on
the grounds of methodological naturalism, though as
we have shown, a methodological exclusion of theism is not methodologically necessary or warranted
(ibid). More likely, given the slippery slope previously
discussed, these editors have implicit ontological commitments that lead them to arbitrate matters of faith
and theism, despite the APA (2007) resolution that
prohibits psychologists from doing so.
In any case, just over one hundred years after its
founding, psychology overwhelmingly excludes God’s
activity from its education, research, and publications.
Consequently, a student in an introductory psychology class might find a few references to religion in
their textbook, but they would likely find no mention
of God or God’s activity at all (Slife & Reber, 2009).
Students in research methods courses might find faith
and God’s activity cursorily mentioned in their textbooks, but usually only as an example of an alternative
epistemology to empirical science that is deemed inappropriate to psychological investigation despite the
absence of evidence or the presence of a justification
(Reber, 2018).

Psychology’s Exclusion of Theism

One of the obvious examples of the imposition of
the value of naturalism within the discipline of psychology is what Maier (2004) labels “God’s exile from
psychology” (p. 323). Maier has carefully examined
the history of American psychology and he identifies
a clear shift from its founding, in which psychology
was described by G. Stanley Hall in 1885 as “Christian to its root and center” (cited in Slife & Reber,
2009, p. 70), to becoming within almost a single generation, almost completely secularized. He attributes
this abrupt shift to a change in education. Maier finds
that while the chief founders of psychology, James
McCosh, G. Stanley Hall, and William James, among
others, were theists who saw education and training in
psychology as a necessary blend of theology and scientific courses, their students compartmentalized their
theistic beliefs, stopped taking theology courses, and
in true methodological naturalist fashion, banished
theism from the psychology classroom and laboratory
to the domain of the church.
This approach, in which God and God’s activity
are compartmentalized and exiled, remains a key feature of the discipline, even in fields of psychology that

Psychology’s Operationalization/
Transformation of Theism

Psychology’s exclusion of God and God’s activity
from psychological research, textbooks, and journals
limits any study of religious and spiritual phenomena
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and experiences to naturalistic constructs, variables,
and psychological models (Piedmont, 2008). The
result of this naturalistic restriction is that theistic religious and spiritual phenomena and experiences are
either excluded from psychological research or have to
be operationalized and transformed into naturalistic
phenomena and experiences, even when they center
on God and God’s activity (see Gantt & Williams,
2020; Slife & Reber, 2012; Reber, 2006).
Research on people’s image of God, for example,
cannot include an examination of participants’ experiences of God as a potential factor that could contribute to the development of their image of God
even when the explicit focus of the study is the participants’ “relationship to God” (Cassibba, et al., 2008,
p. 1755). This is not because those experiences cannot be gathered and examined just as readily as any
other experiences people have had and could describe
to a researcher, but only because the use of “theological constructs as explanatory variables in psychological models” (Piedmont, 2008, p. 1) has been deemed,
without reason or justification, to be “inappropriate”
(ibid; Park, 2017). The curious result of this restriction to only naturalistic variables and explanations is
that the researchers replace theists’ experiences of God
with naturalistic “proxy” variables, like frequency
of church attendance, prayer, and other measures of
“religiosity”. This is like trying to understand a person’s relationship with his or her marriage partner by
counting how many times he or she eats dinner together with his or her spouse each week instead of
asking the person about his or her experiences and
relationship with his or her spouse directly.
Reviews of the psychological research on religious
and spiritual experiences and phenomena, including
God image, relationship with God, and faith (Reber,
Slife, & Downs, 2012), and also miracles (Reber &
Slife, 2013a), conversion and forgiveness (Slife, Reber,
& Lefevor, 2012), and prayer and meditation (Slife &
Reber, 2012), shows that the operationalization and
transformation of these experiences and concepts into
naturalistic proxy variables is almost universal. So too
is the absence of a single theistic interpretation of the
findings on any of these topics, even though for theists, including the theistic participants in the studies,
these topics necessarily include an active, differencemaking God. Nevertheless, the transformation of

theistic factors and theistic interpretations into naturalistic factors and interpretations took place in every
study reviewed, even though theistic experiences,
constructs, and interpretations are as available and
are as empirically viable as naturalistic constructs and
interpretations (Reber & Slife, 2013b). Moreover, the
data gathered from a theistic approach to psychological research, as has been demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Reber, Slife, & Downs, 2012), are just as
capable of quantitative and qualitative analysis and
can produce tests of hypotheses, results, and theistic
interpretations that are interesting, informative, and
compelling, while also according with the experiences
and interpretations of the people studied. Thus, it is
not empiricism in general, or the scientific method
specifically, that compels these naturalistic operationalizations, transformations, and interpretations, but
rather the assumption of naturalism that pervades the
discipline as an implicit anti-theistic bias (Slife & Reber, 2013b).
Psychology’s Omission of Theism
from Theistic Theories

Given the pervasive exile of God and divine activity
from psychology and in light of what we might refer
to as the naturalization of theistic theories, experiences, concepts, and interpretations in psychological
research, it should come as no surprise that the importation of theistic theories into psychology results
in that theism being stripped away. If not surprising,
the omission is still glaring, especially when the theory’s author is explicitly theistic and theism is clearly
essential to their theory. Butera (2010), for example,
claims that even the theism of Saint Thomas Aquinas,
which is foundational to all of his thinking and is the
primary focus of his work, is not necessary to a psychology based on Aquinas’s ideas. Aquinas’s psychology, Butera asserts is “’philosophical,’ not ‘theological,’
even though Aquinas was first and last a theologian,
because the psychology he developed is able to stand
on its own, independent of his theological commitments (p. 348).
Aside from the indelible alteration of Aquinas’s
ideas that would ensue from the removal of the foundational assumption of theism from those ideas,
why does Butera deem it necessary for Aquinas’s
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psychology to stand on its own, independent of theological commitments? Do naturalistic theories need
to stand alone independent of their naturalistic commitments? No, only theistic theories need their theism removed as they are imported into psychology
so the theory can fit within the naturalistic worldview
that psychology embraces. But can the theory even be
ascribed to Aquinas after such a drastic omission?
The same questions arise with the importation of
Martin Buber’s theistic philosophy into humanistic psychology (Slife & Reber, 2009). Martin Buber
stated that:

that, “the self ’s relation to the Other, in Kierkegaard,
is mediated by God. Furthermore, God is the Thou
who addresses me and who gives me an identity and
vocation of which I am not the origin” (para. 1). Despite the many clear statements and even warnings
about the necessity of Kierkegaard’s theism to his
ideas, psychologists assert, without justification or explanation, that Kierkegaard’s theism can be left out,
even as his philosophy is used to develop theory and
conduct research. Rusak (2017) argues, for example,
that “one can accept Kierkegaard’s use of religious archetypes in crafting a psychical metaphysics, irrespective of whether one forthrightly believes in Christian
doctrine’s actuality or not” (para. 15). Lippitt (2016)
notes that psychology has largely secularized Kierkegaard’s work and even recalls a colleague stating that,
“Kierkegaard is a source of great insight provided ‘we
ignore the religious stuff ’” (p. 23).
The fact that these and other psychologists who use
Kierkegaard’s philosophy, but remove its theistic elements, acknowledge that they are doing so speaks to
their awareness that Kierkegaard was a theist and that
his work assumed theism. However, as with Butera
and Rogers, they provide no justification for their
omission, no evidence that leaving Kierkegaard’s theism in the theory would be a problem, and they in no
way account for the significant changes to the theory
that result from the removal of its theistic foundation
once it is imported into psychology. The justification,
it would seem, is implicitly provided by the professional value of naturalism, which requires that theism
be omitted, even without testing whether and to what
extent the theory is capable of having a positive impact
on psychological theory, research, and practice with its
central theism left in. Like exclusion and transformation, the omission of theism from theistic theories,
justified only by psychologist’s adoption of naturalism
rather than by critical, empirical, or any other form
of evaluation, is a form of disciplinary discrimination
against the theistic worldview.

If I myself should designate something as the ‘central
portion of my life work,’ then it could not be anything
individual, but only the one basic insight. . . that the IThou relation to God and the I-Thou relation to one’s
fellow man are at bottom related to each other” (cited
in Friedman, 1988, p. 429).

Carl Rogers, who drew from Martin Buber’s philosophy in his understanding of relationships in the
development of his person-centered psychology, left
Buber’s foundational theistic principle out of that psychology. As Friedman (1994), the world’s foremost expert on Buber’s thinking described it, “Rogers clearly
accepted Buber’s I-Thou relationship and made it his
own without plumbing the depth of the philosophical
anthropologies...that Buber judges to be its necessary
underpinnings” (p 46-65).
A similarly glaring omission of theism from an explicitly theistic philosophy can be found in the importation of Soren Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy
into existential psychology. Speaking of his life’s work,
Kierkegaard stated:
What I have wanted and want to achieve through
my work, what I also regard as the most important,
is first of all to make clear what is involved in being a
Christian, to present the picture of a Christian in all
its ideal, that is, true form, worked out to every true
limit, submitting myself even before any other to be
judged by this picture, whatever the judgement is . . . ”
(Kierkegaard, 1859/1998, p. 129).

Even a cursory reading of Kierkegaard’s works demonstrates clearly that for him being a Christian rests
upon a theistic foundation. This is confirmed by those
with expertise in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Westphal
(2015), for example, notes that Kierkegaard’s theism
is unmistakable and is central to his work, stating

Psychotherapists’ Risk of Imposing
Naturalism on Clients

To what extent might psychotherapy and counseling, which in many ways can be understood as the
practice arm of psychological theorizing and research,
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be susceptible to these same forms of disciplinary
and institutional anti-theistic bias and discrimination? To examine this question, it may be helpful to
first acknowledge that in the case of counseling and
psychotherapy, there is an added level of complexity
at play. As mentioned in the introduction, therapists
and counselors must abide by their ethics codes and
are expected to receive regular training and education in the risks of imposing their values on clients.
Counselors and therapists have received a great deal of
training in the risks of imposing their personal values
on their clients, including personal religious values.
Perhaps, they have been trained using a vignette like
this one, which demonstrates potentially damaging
ways in which a therapist’s personal religious values
can be imposed on a client:

imposition, exile God and God’s activity from their
therapy offices? And, if they do keep their own and
their clients’ beliefs about religion and faith outside
the door, what are the implications of that exclusion
of God and God’s activity for clients of faith who often want their religious and spiritual beliefs and experiences to be part of therapy (Rose, Westefeld, &
Ansely, 2001). Holmberg, Jensen, and Vetere (2020)
addressed these questions in a mixed-method study of
family therapists and their clients. They found that the
clients in their sample overwhelmingly wanted there
to be “’room to speak’” (p. 7) about spiritual matters in
therapy. They wanted to be “‘met and acknowledged’
as a whole person, which included the spiritual and
religious dimension of life” (p. 8). And they “described
leaning on God in their crises, and felt that God could
be included in their therapy, both as a contributor and
as a relationship” (ibid).
Holmberg, Jensen, and Ulland (2017) note how
these same therapy clients, whose beliefs and experiences are inherent to their identity and their understanding of their psychological issues and struggles,
find a therapist’s unwillingness to include religion
and spirituality in their work frustrating and unproductive. A research participant named “Julia” demonstrates this frustration well, noting that when she
brought up what she describes as the “room” of her
spirituality to her therapist, he would not enter the
“room” and instead closed the door. The study authors
quote directly from the interview transcript to capture
Julia’s experience and frustration with the therapist’s
exclusion of her spiritual “room”.

A Christian therapist is working with an atheist client
who is suffering from a terminal illness. The therapist
is concerned about the client’s salvation and sees this
as a more important issue than their psychological
health at this point of therapy. They seek consultation
from a colleague who says, “At this point, you must
follow God’s will, not your ethics code.” The therapist
goes into the next session and shares about their faith,
encouraging the client to accept Jesus as their savior
(Hoffman, 2008, p. 23).

Having been well-trained to recognize such behavior as a clear violation of the ethics code and desiring
to avoid even the slightest hint of personal value imposition, it is possible that many therapists steer clear
of religion, spirituality, and faith altogether in working
with their clients (Hathaway, Scott, & Garver, 2004).
What they may not realize, however, is how their efforts to avoid the imposition of personal religious
values might inadvertently contribute to professional
value imposition, especially when training in the risks
of the professional value imposition of naturalism in
psychotherapy is rare. Consequently, therapists who
avoid spiritual and religious issues in an attempt to
steer clear of personal religious value imposition may
not appreciate the degree to which they might exclude
theism, naturalize theistic experiences and interpretations, and/or omit theism from theistic theories, in
their work with their clients.

Julia: The therapist did not understand. He said, ‘So
what?’, and for me it was very strange. I felt that he
couldn’t understand my Christian background, that
even such a cruel man [her husband] is hard to leave,
because it’s wrong in a way . . . And I felt, it was something about our connection, because this ‘room’ is so
big in my life, and with the therapist, I needed to close
the door. I could talk about everything else, there were
thousands of things, but I felt it wasn’t fruitful to continue.
Interviewer: And this ‘room’ is, as you say, quite big?
Julia: For me it is very big, yes, it infiltrates everything;
it infiltrates who I am as a person, and . . . I just felt that
a door was closed, yes; he did not understand me at all.
I felt I was a problem (p. 16).

Psychotherapists’ Risk of Excluding Theism

Is it possible that some counselors and psychotherapists, in an effort to avoid personal religious value
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The study authors conclude that, “the therapist
in this case was unable to enter the client’s spiritual
world; he really did not understand her frustrations”
(Holmberg, Jensen, & Ulland, 2017, p. 16). By excluding the client’s “room”, the therapist may believe
he or she successfully avoided imposing any religious
or spiritual values on the client. However, this is not
the case, because the therapist’s exclusion of God and
God’s activity is itself an imposition, one that is reinforced by the professional value of naturalism. By refusing to open the door to the room of Julia’s spiritual
world, a room that she states “infiltrates everything; it
infiltrates who I am as a person” (ibid), the therapist
imposed an exclusionary professional value on the client and the client discontinued therapy as a result.
Another research participant (“Betty”), laments that
after nearly three decades of working with multiple
therapists on her marriage that any attempt by her to
raise religious and spiritual issues in therapy were not
taken up by any of the therapists. She recalls one couple’s session in which she got up the courage to share
with the therapist that her and her husband’s:

It may be that Betty and Julia coincidentally encountered therapists who have the personal value that
matters of God and God’s activity are to be kept out
of therapy, but Holmberg, Jensen, & Vetere’s (2020)
interviews of the psychotherapists suggest a more professional values-based norm toward this practice of
exclusion:
It is of concern to us that some said if they talked
to clients about this topic they would keep this secret, as they were afraid to become unpopular in the
therapeutic establishment. One therapist said: ‘If you
want to stay within the most recognised therapeutic
environments, those who have the greatest authority,
my feeling is that they do not talk much about this’
(T1, 1, 40-42). Some therapists had tried talking with
other colleagues, but felt rejected and almost ignored.
. . In this study, therapists found it easier to raise and
respond to secular spirituality: values and meaning
not connected to religion. Both clients and therapists
found that religious perspectives were more marginalised (p. 12).
Psychotherapists’ Risk of
Transforming Theism

spiritual life was difficult. She said a few sentences
and then stopped. Her husband replied that he did
not agree, and trivialized her raising of the issue. The
therapist did not follow up, and the dialogue about the
topic ceased. The therapist did not raise the issue in
the succeeding sessions (Holmberg, Jensen, & Ulland,
2017, p. 16).

Along with exclusion as a potential professional
value imposition, might some counselors and therapists be at risk of imposing naturalism on their theistic clients by altering, re-framing, or explaining away
their clients’ theistic experiences, concepts, and understandings? One therapist’s account of an event in his
training as a clinical psychologist anecdotally suggests
this possibility:

In addition to feeling like her efforts to bring religion and spirituality into therapy went nowhere,
Betty expressed frustration that the therapists never
attempted to bring these things up in therapy themselves. She told her interviewer:

I still remember one of my supervisors laughing at a
video of me working with one of my clients. The client was a good Christian woman from Indiana who
honestly felt that her unhappiness stemmed from her
spiritual struggles. My supervisor was perfectly clear,
“Help her get out of that religious claptrap. Her sadness has nothing to do with God. It has solely to do
with her lack of reinforcements or pleasures in her life.”
Now, as a doctoral student who was anxious to please,
I’m ashamed to say, I carried my supervisor’s message
back to this Christian woman. In fact, I was so good
at selling this message that she eventually learned not
to think of her happiness in relation to God at all. She
learned to think of herself and her relationships as
though God had nothing to do with her emotions and

I believe it really is about time. I have been ready for
years. I think it is completely strange that questions
haven’t been raised before, not a single question for 27
years; what does your faith mean within this context?
(ibid).

In summarizing the outcome of Betty’s three decade
failure to have religion and spirituality included in
therapy, the authors state that, “the couple’s therapists
had never introduced the topic of their spiritual world
during the sessions and Betty felt she had become
resigned to the situation” (Holmberg, Jensen, & Ullande, 2017, p. 16).
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activity and even if the believer describes experiencing God’s involvement in the development of the beliefs. In this way, the therapist transforms the theists’
theism into naturalism. Once transformed, the basic
processes involved in theistic beliefs are understood
to be the same as the basic processes involved in all
other beliefs. As a result, as Maloney (1998) puts it
in his somewhat dated but still apropos description
of the psychological processes that underlie conversion, “the decision of a Muslim to become a Moonie
is no different than the decision to change from using
an electric typewriter to using a computer” (para. 5).
Each “conversion” involves a process of change in belief
system, but the nature of the belief systems involved is
not relevant.
Once theism is naturalized in this way, therapists
can work with religious and spiritual beliefs in the
same way they work with other beliefs in their treatment. In Religious Cognitive-Emotional Therapy
(RCET, Rajaei, 2010), for example, the therapist interprets the client’s theism in the same way the therapist
would understand any other beliefs, as being more or
less rational, supportive of health, or helpful in finding meaning. As a set of beliefs, RCET therapists can
apply the same techniques to the treatment of theistic
client’s beliefs as any other client’s beliefs to help them
change or reframe any irrational or unhealthy beliefs
into beliefs that promote mental health and wellbeing.
If a client tells their therapist that their emotional
struggles are a consequence of God punishing them
for past sins, the RCET therapist interprets that statement for the sake of treatment, not as a description of
the client’s relationship with God or as a description
of God’s activity in relation to the client’s righteousness, but as a problematic set of beliefs that need to be
changed. Change for the RCET practitioner is about
the valence of the belief, more so than the content.
Negative beliefs, regardless of what they are about,
need to be changed into positive beliefs, because a
positive view of the world promotes mental health
and wellbeing, as the RCET therapist understands it
(Rajaei, 2010). So, the therapist works with the theistic client to reframe and adjust their negative belief
about God and God’s punishment into a positive belief about God and God’s support. The excerpt below
outlines the process by which this is done:

the relevant events of her life. “After all”, I recall her saying, “What you’re saying Brent has to be right because
science has proven it.”
When my client and I were finished, she no longer saw
God as the source of her emotional healing. She no
longer considered even the possibility that her spiritual struggles could be intertwined with her emotional
struggles. At least for this part of her life, she was a
Christian atheist, a Christian in other aspects of her
life, but an atheist in her understanding of her emotions. I do think however, that if she had continued her
therapy with me and my supervisor, I would have persuaded her little by little, one problem after another, to
understand every part of her life as though God didn’t
matter (Slife, 2013).

This example of transformation is striking, but not
rare. On the contrary, many psychotherapy approaches
that seek to integrate religion and spirituality into
therapeutic work, operationalize and truncate clients’
and therapists’ theistic experiences and interpretations into psychological constructs and mechanisms
that will work within the profession’s naturalistic
worldview. Transformations and operationalizations
include: “virtues” (Peteet, 2013), “basic human values”
(Corey, n.d., p. 118), “religious content” (Abernethy
& Lancia, 1998), “the dynamic human spirit” (Helminiak, 2001), a dimension of personality (Piedmont
& Wilkins, 2013), an evolved meaning-making system (Paloutzian, 2017), and above all others, beliefs
(Khoynezhad, Rajaei, & Sarvarazemy, 2012).
By focusing on and working with naturalized constructs, like religious beliefs or values, therapists might
assume they are open to their clients’ theism. However, if religious beliefs or values are understood by the
therapist only naturalistically, for example, as mental
states that evolve to help people make and find meaning in their lives (Paloutzian & Mukai, 2017), then
the therapist is not open to the possibility that God
could be involved and actively participating in the formation of those beliefs. Paloutzian’s work on beliefs
confirms this (e.g., Paloutzian & Mukai, 2017; Seitz,
Paloutzian, & Angel, 2018). For Paloutzian and his
colleagues theists’ beliefs about God are “a mental activity generated by neural circuits in the brain” (Seitz,
Paloutzian, & Angel, 2017, p. 3).
On this account, clients’ religious beliefs are naturalistic even if the target of the beliefs is God or God’s
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Cognitive Therapy (CT). Believing that he can separate Aquinas’s psychology from Aquinas’s theology
without irrevocable consequence to that psychology in
the psychotherapy context, Butera seeks to provide all
CT practitioners with a secular theoretical foundation
that will guide their application of CT.
Similarly, existential psychotherapists who utilize
Kierkegaard’s theoretical concepts in their practice acknowledge Kierkegaard’s theism, but believe they can
separate that theism off from their therapy and secularize Kierkegaard’s religious and spiritual concepts in
developing and applying their therapeutic practices.
Spivak (2004), for example writes that:

The RCET therapist identifies the clients negative and
nihilistic beliefs about the world and existence and
helps them to change these beliefs into positive and
purposeful one’s, so that the clients acquire a new insight of existence. . . The therapist makes clients aware
of God’s role. (God is the best patron with best characteristics that guides human beings). When people accept God as the unique creator, they will gain the safe
and reliable force in the world and feel relief in their
lives (Rajaei, 2010, p. 84-85).

Even though theistic clients may desire and feel
“that God could be included in their therapy, both as a
contributor and as a relationship” (Holmberg, Jensen,
& Vetere, 2020, p. 8), the RCET therapist does not
have to include these participative, relational features
in their treatment. They could be added on for effect,
but they are not necessary (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt,
2010). For the RCET therapist, all that is needed is a
reframing of their clients’ beliefs about God and God’s
role from one that is negative, irrational, and unhealthy
to one that is positive, rational, and promotes mental
health. The risk of value imposition involved, however, as we saw with the anecdote above (Slife, 2013),
is that these transformations of theism, as the client
experiences and understands it, into naturalism, as the
therapist understands it, might persuade clients that
God does not really matter. That is, an operationalization of theism into a set of beliefs might teach the client to understand their relationship to God and God’s
activity as only a matter of their personal beliefs, beliefs which they can choose and change, as they might
change from using a PC to a MAC computer. They
can do all of this with the help of the therapist, but apparently not with the help of an actively engaged God.

Kierkegaard’s writings range from the philosophical to
the deeply religious. I have drawn from both streams
of his thinking but have secularized his more religious
concepts. I believe that his writings so powerfully portray a genius’ incisive observations of human struggle,
that even when his religious intent is de-emphasized,
the concepts that are distilled can greatly empower the
process of psychotherapy and counseling (p. 2).

Wanting to be clear that he is not the first or only
therapist to omit Kierkegaard’s theism, Spivak goes
on to note that “the secularization and use of Kierkegaard’s works for psychotherapeutic theory and practice
is not unique. Many psychotherapists including Guntrup (1969), Binswanger (1944), and Loewald (1980)
utilized Kierkegaard’s writings to enhance their work”
(p. 3).
Finally, like Carl Rogers, psychotherapists who have
imported Martin Buber’s philosophy into psychotherapy (e.g., Scott, et al., 2009) have left Buber’s theism
out. Even, Maurice Friedman (2002a), the foremost
expert on Buber’s philosophy, developed a dialogical psychotherapy in which Buber’s central theistic
relationality has been altered so that only the I-Thou
relation between client and therapist is discussed:

Psychotherapists’ Risk of Omitting Theism
from Theistic Theories

Do we see any evidence that counselors and psychotherapists omit theism from theistic theories in
their therapeutic practice? I have already mentioned
Butera’s (2010) assertion that Aquinas’s psychology
can stand alone without attending to Aquinas’s theism, but I should note here that Butera’s ultimate
purpose for importing Aquinas’s psychology into the
discipline is to use it as a “theoretical framework” for
understanding and treating emotional disorders using

By ‘‘dialogical psychotherapy,’’ we mean a therapy that
is centered on the meeting between the therapist and
his or her client or among family members as the central healing mode. . . Only when it is recognized that
everything that takes place within therapy—free association, dreams, silence, pain, anguish—takes place
within the context of the vital relationship between
therapist and patient do we have what may properly be
called dialogical psychotherapy (p. 11-12).
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A significant problem in each of these cases, is that
theologians and philosophers who have studied these
thinkers’ work in great depth and detail, have noted
that the importation of these thinkers’ ideas into psychotherapy with their theism removed, is not possible,
or at least fundamentally alters the ideas and the practices that ensue from them. Philosophers Tietjen and
Evans (2011), for example, have shown that therapists
who wish to use Kierkegaard’s ideas cannot escape Kierkegaard’s theistic commitments: “If Kierkegaard offers contemporary therapists anything at all, it is quite
clear that it is not value-free or neutral. Mental health
is inextricably linked to spiritual health, and ultimately
a client’s relationship with Christ cannot be dismissed
as incidental to the healing process” (p. 282). Ventimiglia (2008) intimates the same concern with Buber’s
work, noting that “Buber’s religious beliefs are basic to
his system of dialogical psychotherapy. . . For Buber,
God is at the heart of every human encounter. He is
the “Eternal Thou” that is experienced in every genuine meeting between two people” (p. 612).
Most curiously, Friedman, asserts in his theological
and philosophical publications that the relationship
with God is central to Buber’s thinking, is the source
of transformation, and cannot be separated from our
relationships with each other, as this example illustrates:

psychology’s professional commitment to naturalism
and, as a result, leaves the theism that is central to Buber’s work completely out of his psychological publications. The odd consequence of that omission is an
education and training in a dialogical psychotherapy
that is based on Buber’s work, but leaves “the reality of
the meeting between God and Man which transforms
man’s being” (Friedman, 2002b, p. 87) out of the therapeutic process, a process which, for Buber, requires
God’s participation.
These omissions of theism from theistic theories
in the practice of psychotherapy does not allow theistic clients access to the transformative and healing
core of the theory. In all three of these cases, but especially in Kierkegaard and Buber’s work, these thinkers
dedicated their lives to understanding how a person’s
relationship with God is necessary to and can bring
about transformative and healing mental and spiritual
outcomes, including relief from depression, anxiety,
and social isolation. To deprive a client of faith access
to these theistic insights and relational engagements
because the therapist knowingly or unknowingly endorses the professional value of naturalism risks an
unethical imposition that could stand in the way of
improved health and wellbeing.
Training in Theism

The fundamental beliefs of Buber’s I-Thou philosophy are the reality of the I-Thou relation into which
no deception can penetrate, the reality of the meeting
between God and man which transforms man’s being, and the reality of the turning which puts a limit
to man’s movement away from God (Friedman, 2002b,
p. 87).

If, as these illustrations discussed above suggest,
there is at least the risk of imposing the professional
value of naturalism on clients in psychotherapy and
counseling, and if that imposition might result in the
exclusion, transformation, or omission of theism in
the practice of psychotherapy and counseling, then as
the code of ethics asserts, ethical counselors will seek
training in this area of risk. This would seem to be especially important given that anywhere from 53% to
77% of clients want to discuss religious and spiritual
issues with their therapist and 72% of clients would
prefer to work with a therapist who respects and integrates the client’s faith into the therapy work (Pearce,
2015). Unfortunately, even among psychotherapists
and counselors who do want to be more inclusive of
their client’s faiths in their work, many do not feel sufficiently trained (Vogel, et al., 2013) and competent to
do so (Hathaway, Scott, & Garver, 2004). In light of
these feelings and given the high risk of professional

However, in his psychological publications where he
reviews his dialogical psychotherapy based on Buber’s
work, he makes no mention of our relationship to
God and its transformative impact on our being at all:
Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ philosophy is concerned with the
difference between mere existence and authentic existence, between being barely human and being more
fully human, between remaining fragmented and
bringing the conflicting parts of oneself into an active
unity, between partial and fuller relationships with
others (Friedman, 2002a, p. 9).

It would seem that Friedman, perhaps with the guidance of journal editors and peer reviewers, is aware of
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value imposition just reviewed, regular and meaningful training in theism is critically needed and should
be actively pursued by psychotherapists and counselors. This paper introduces some of the key features of
theism as an initial educational step toward the development of a more comprehensive training program in
this area of significant need.

matter of his theorizing, but as his direct experience
of God’s difference-making participation in his writing. Kierkegaard states that God not only provided
the help and assistance he needed to write each day,
but that God also “directed things behind the scenes,
when K was not yet conscious of the full meaning
of his written words” (Moser & McCreary, 2010,
p. 128) and “had curbed me in every respect” (Kierkegaard, 1859/1998, p. 87). As a result of God’s ongoing
participation in the writing process, Kierkegaard can
state with confidence that God “finds favor” (p. 24)
in the works produced and that “it is truly pleasing to
God that the truth is served in this way” (p. 60).
Just as our three exemplar theistic philosophers differ in their ideas and experiences of God’s activity in
the world, therapists should expect differences among
their clients (as well as differences among theistic
therapists). Furthermore, they should be prepared for
their clients to have a less explicit and less well-defined
articulation of their theistic position than theologians
and philosophers who have dedicated much of their
lives to thinking about these things. Nevertheless,
theistic clients will bring to therapy experiences and
ideas about God’s activity in the world that matter
to the way they live and understand their lives, and it
behooves the ethical therapist, who is sensitive to the
risk of imposing their personal and professional values and perspectives on their clients, to engage clients
in a discussion, first about whether they are theists
and second, to what degree they view God as actively
involved in their lives. In order to do this effectively,
ethical therapists will seek to gain an understanding
of the common forms of theism and will benefit from
learning to identify where these forms fall on the continuum of God’s activity in the world (fig. 1). They will
also examine their own position on these matters and
share that position with the client as they discuss how
therapy might proceed.
Before examining the common forms of theism, it
is important to define the poles of the theism continuum. The terms used to designate these poles, “weak”
and “strong” theism do not speak to God’s strength
or to the strength of a person’s faith. They also do
not designate a moral position, as if one pole is good
and the other bad. They simply designate the conceptualized level of God’s activity or involvement in
the world. If God is experienced and assumed to be

The Theism Continuum

Theism, like naturalism (Dixon, 2008) or any other
worldview is not a monolith. Theists can differ widely
on their assumptions and experiences concerning
the nature of God’s activity in the world. One theist
might experience and understand God as directly and
personally involved in every aspect of their life, while
another might describe God’s activity in their life as
limited to rare miracles. Theistic theologians and philosophers differ in their experience and understanding
of God’s involvement in the world as well, including
the three exemplar philosophers discussed previously
in this article. Aquinas, for example, views God as directly inaccessible and unknowable. For Aquinas, it is
only through the via negativa or negative way (i.e., by
knowing what God is not), that we gain an indirect
sense of what God is. As such, Aquinas:
distances from our world all discussion of real divine
relation by stating quite baldly, ‘there is no real relation
in God to the creature’. Creatures, that is, may experience a real relationship of dependence on and need of
God, but God experiences no such relationship to his
creatures (Mackey, 1983, p. 182).

Buber’s theism, by contrast, is direct, personal, and
relational. In his words, God:
enters into a direct relation with us men in creative,
revealing, and redeeming acts, and thus makes it possible for us to enter into a direct relation with him.
This ground and meaning of our existence constitutes
a mutuality, arising again and again, such as can subsist
only between persons” (Buber, 1958, p. 135).

Kierkegaard (1846/1992), like Buber, embraces
a relational theism in which God is personal and
directly involved in our lives, such that “the Godrelationship of the individual human being is the
main point” (p. 77). It is “what makes a human being
a human being” (p. 244). However, Kierkegaard not
only writes about God’s involvement in our lives as a
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Figure 1. The theism continuum.
made with an individual (Helaman 10:5-10) or group
of people (D&C 82:10).
The poles of the theism continuum could as easily
be labeled “limited” and “unlimited” as they are weak
and strong, but given the predominate use of weak
and strong theism in the literature, this article will use
those more common terms as well. The figure above
indicates where on the theism continuum, with weak
theism on the left and strong theism on the right, the
most common forms of theism fall. Five of these common forms of theism fall on the left half of the continuum and as such can be regarded as representing
varying levels of weak theism. The other five fall on
the right half of the spectrum and can be understood
as representing varying levels of strong theism. Each
of the five weak forms of theism, ranging from the
weakest of the weak to the strongest of the weak, will
be reviewed first, followed by the forms of strong theism, ranging from the strongest of the strong to the
weakest of the strong.

involved in everything that happens in the
world at all times and in all spaces, then the theism is
strong. If God is assumed to be only involved in certain, rare times and places, then the theism is weak.
One way to understand the distinction between
weak and strong forms of theism is in terms of limitations. In weak theism some form of a priori spatial
and/or temporal limits on God’s activity are assumed
to be necessary (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010).
These limits are often put in place to reconcile theism
with naturalism. A number of 18th century scientists,
for example, limited God’s activity in the workings of
nature to the creation period or to occasional miraculous moments of intervention, like the parting of the
Red Sea. Aside from these unusual times of direct involvement and intervention, these scientists asserted
that natural causes and processes operate without
interruption or alteration by a divine source (Dixon,
2008).
Strong theistic approaches, on the other hand,
would require that no a priori spatial, temporal, or
any other form of limitation is placed on God’s activity. As Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010) describe
it, for a strong theist “God’s activity would be seen
as potentially unlimited at any given time and at any
given place, including the here and now of the psychotherapy session” (p. 166). The only restriction on
that potentiality would be any self-limitations that
God would choose, not some set of necessary a priori
restrictions. God may choose, for example, to limit or
“bind” himself through specific promises or covenants

Weak Theism

Deism and Dualism. These two forms of theism are
located on the far-left side of the continuum because
both place major limitations on God’s activity. Deism
is the idea that at the time of creation God was directly,
intentionally, and actively engaged in the world, but
once the creation period was complete God stepped
away from the universe to allow it to run according to
natural laws autonomously (i.e., without divine intervention). The quote below captures the essence of this
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form of theism and illustrates the implications of this
significant temporal limitation on God’s activity:

ontological naturalist, the supernatural realm is a fiction and is not a real world. For the methodological
naturalist, it could be real, but it cannot be studied or
understood using the scientific method, nor does it
have any necessary bearing on the operations of the
natural world. In this sense, dualism results in the
same outcome as deism, which is that God and God’s
activity are not part of the world we currently live
(Slife & Reber, 2009).
Although Deism mostly came and went as a form
of religion during the Enlightenment, remnants of
this weak form of theism continue to inform the way
many theists see the world. Dualism, on the other
hand, which has been around since the time of the
pre-Socratics, is very much alive and well today, both
within naturalistic science and scientific psychology, as
well as among the laity and some theologians. Given
its compatibility with naturalism, many therapists of
faith also likely embrace some form of deistic and/or
dualistic theism.
In light of its ubiquity, therapists should expect to
encounter clients who, when asked about God and
God’s activity in the world, would say that they believe
God exists and they believe we are created by God. At
the same time, they also believe that God created us
with our minds and our capacity for reason and empirical science so we would manage and make sense
of this life and work out our psychological issues on
our own. In such cases, therapy with theistic clients
of a deistic or dualistic type would likely proceed with
little change from the therapeutic approach used with
non-theists or atheists, except that the client’s religion
and spirituality might be included as a source of some
of the client’s beliefs. These beliefs, like any other beliefs, could be examined in terms of their irrationality
and negativity and could be treated using principles
and techniques like those described by RCET or
other CBT approaches to therapy. It is likely that a
client who endorses a deistic and/or dualistic form of
theism would have little if any concerns with therapy
of this type and would probably support it.
Sacred Places and Sacred Times. Continuing with
temporal and spatial limitations on God and God’s
activity, there are forms of weak theism that allow for
God’s involvement in this world, but only at times and
in locations that are unique for their holiness. As such,
these forms of theism are found somewhat closer to

According to deism, we can know by the natural light
of reason that the universe is created and governed by a
supreme intelligence; however, although this supreme
being has a plan for creation from the beginning, the
being does not interfere with creation; the deist typically rejects miracles and reliance on special revelation
as a source of religious doctrine and belief, in favor of
the natural light of reason. Thus, a deist typically rejects the divinity of Christ, as repugnant to reason; the
deist typically demotes the figure of Jesus from agent
of miraculous redemption to extraordinary moral
teacher. Deism is the form of religion fitted to the new
discoveries in natural science, according to which the
cosmos displays an intricate machine-like order; the
deists suppose that the supposition of God is necessary as the source or author of this order (Bristow,
2017, section 2.3, para. 4).

The common simile for deism is God as the perfect watchmaker, who set all things in order, wound
the watch up, and then let the watch run its intended
course without any additional tinkering.
Dualism, like Deism, separates God and God’s activity from the world we live in, but does so spatially. For
the dualist there are two worlds or realms, the realm
in which God dwells, which is divine and metaphysical, colloquially referred to as heaven, and the realm in
which we dwell, the earth, which is human and physical (Dixon, 2008). Given their unique natures (e.g.,
God and heaven’s perfection vs. Human and Earthly
imperfection) these two worlds cannot and do not directly interact or affect each other. They run alongside
or parallel to each other. For theologians who embrace
dualism this means that Jesus Christ was not and
could not be “literally divine” (McCabe, 1985, p. 471)
and that “God did not literally suffer in Jesus” when
he was nailed to the cross. Instead, God “surveys the
suffering of Jesus and the rest of mankind” from his
wholly transcendent heavenly purview and perhaps
knows “a kind of mental anguish at the follies and sins
of creatures“ (ibid).
The ontological and metaphysical forms of naturalism described in the first part of this article are both
dualistic in that they separate the natural world and
its processes, events, and causes, from what they describe as the supernatural world. Of course, for the
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the center of the theism continuum. For sacred space
theists, there are specific places that are endowed with
a special sacredness that allows for God’s involvement
in our lives at that place. Within the Jewish faith tradition, Mount Sinai, the tabernacle which housed the
ark of the covenant, and eventually the Holy of Holies
within Solomon’s temple, were places of a uniquely
hallowed designation where a prophet could receive
revelation from God in a way that might not be possible otherwise. In Christianity, the incarnation of God
in Jesus Christ, who was in Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Gethsemane, and Golgotha made these locations sacred places where God walked among men and
taught them, healed them, and redeemed them. And,
for Muslim theists, Mecca, where Muhammad was
born and the Dome of the Rock covering the place
where Muhammad’s ascent to heaven began are holy
places where God’s presence is manifested.
Many theists take pilgrimages to these holy sites
seeking revelation, guidance, and purification from
divinity that cannot be achieved in everyday places.
Eliade (1980) illuminates the theistic conception and
experience of sacred space:

be time periods that bring heaven closer to earth than
would otherwise be possible. Eliade (1987) speaks
of the way in which festivals commemorating sacred
events can “reactualize” that sacredness and God’s activity in it. Sacred time, he writes:
Is the time that was created and sanctified by the gods
at the period of their gesta, of which the festival is precisely a reactualization. In other words the participants
in the festival meet in it the first appearance of sacred
time, as it appeared ab origine, in illo tempore. . . By
creating the various realities that today constitute the
world, the gods also founded sacred time, for the time
contemporary with a creation was necessarily sanctified by the presence and activity of the gods (p. 69-70).

Therapy clients who endorse a sacred space/sacred
time theism differ from deistic and dualistic theists
in that for them God is involved in our world in a
difference-making way, albeit only in those places and
times that are sacred and holy. All other places and
times are profane, meaning they operate as they always
do, following natural laws and processes regardless of
God’s existence and activity. For these theists, religion
and spirituality, then, constitutes more than a set of
beliefs or the workings of the rational mind that God
has given human beings in our creation. Religion and
spirituality include experiences that have occurred in
holy places and within sacred times in which God was
present and participatory in a meaningful way. It may
also mean that they see their path to health and wellbeing as one that needs to include visits or even pilgrimages to sacred places and participation in sacred
events and festivals where the client can commune
with God and receive guidance, comfort, and support.
Therapists working with clients of this stripe would
want and need to be prepared to appreciate, encourage, and integrate visits to sacred sites, like churches,
temples, and synagogues, as well as participation in
sacred holy days, rituals, and festivals into their work
with clients alongside their more naturalistic techniques and practices in order to treat the whole person in a way that does not discriminate against their
clients’ sacred place and sacred time theism.
“God of the Gaps”. Somewhat closer to the center
of the continuum, God of the Gaps theism emerged
initially as an Enlightenment theology that tried to
explain phenomena that scientists could not account

Within the sacred precincts the profane world is transcended. On the most archaic levels of culture this
possibility of transcendence is expressed by various
images of an opening; here, in the sacred enclosure,
communication with the gods is made possible; hence
there must be a door to the world above, by which the
gods can descend to earth and man can symbolically
ascend to heaven. We shall soon see that this was the
case in many religions; properly speaking, the temple
constitutes an opening in the upward direction and ensures communication with the world of the gods. Every sacred space implies a hierophany, an irruption of
the sacred that results in detaching a territory from the
surrounding cosmic milieu and making it qualitatively
different (p. 25-26).

Sacred times are also viewed and experienced by
many theists as unique periods in which God is active
in the world. Passover, Ramadan, and both the coming
of Christ and the anticipated second coming of Christ
are sacred times for many theists for they signify
events in which God’s presence and activity was and
is made manifest on earth. Similarly, the holy days and
festivals that honor these sacred events, like Christmas and Hanukkah, are thought by many theists to
63

volume 40

issues in religion and psychotherapy

for within their Deistic conception of the world.
Plantinga (1997) outlines the precepts of this original
conception:

Contemporary God of the Gaps theists, then, are
very comfortable relying upon science for explanations of many of the phenomena and events that take
place in the world. They trust in medicine, technology, and scientific research for many, if not most aspects of their lives. As such, theistic clients of this type
would be comfortable with science-based therapeutic practices and treatments for much of their therapy.
At the same time, they have experienced God’s involvement in their lives in areas where science may
be lacking or does not apply, areas like miracles, personal revelation, material blessings that come to the
obedient and faithful (e.g., from paying tithing), and
so on. In a therapeutic context, clients who embrace
this form of theism might want to work with a therapist who is open to talking about these events and
experiences and is willing to do so in terms of a God
who is involved in certain aspects of the clients’ lives.
They may also desire or even expect that in addition
to using therapeutic techniques and practices that
have received scientific support and are helpful for
many aspects of their treatment, the therapist would
be open to and might even involve the activity of God
in understanding and treating features of the clients’
disorders and issues where scientific explanation and
treatment fall short.

Natural science investigates and lays out the structure
of this cosmic machine, in particular by trying to discover and lay bare [natural] laws, and to explain the
phenomena in terms of them. There seem to be some
phenomena, however, that resist a naturalistic explanation — so far, at any rate. We should therefore postulate a deity in terms of whose actions we can explain
these things that current science cannot. Newton’s suggestion that God periodically adjusts the orbits of the
planets is often cited as just such an example of Godof-the-gaps theology. The following, therefore, are the
essential points of God-of-the-gaps theology. First,
the world is a vast machine that is almost entirely selfsufficient; divine activity in nature is limited to those
phenomena for which there is no scientific, i.e., mechanical and naturalistic explanation. Second, the
existence of God is a kind of large-scale hypothesis
postulated to explain what cannot be explained otherwise, i.e., naturalistically. Third, there is the apologetic
emphasis: the best or one of the best reasons for believing that there is such a person as God is the fact that
there are phenomena that natural science cannot (so
far) explain naturalistically (para. 2).

Though both strong theists, like Plantinga, and
many naturalists have refuted God of the Gaps as a
coherent and persuasive theology, some contemporary
theists do invoke God’s activity to explain personal
life events and experiences that science cannot or has
not yet explained. For example, when medical professionals and the scientific instruments and tests they
employ fail to explain how a loved one seemingly miraculously healed from a life-threatening injury or disease following faithful prayers or blessings given on
their behalf, family and friends will often reference
God’s intervention. When a person hears an audible
voice instruct them to turn down one street instead
of another and they find out that a horrible car accident occurred on the street not taken, science cannot
explain the voice and its direction to the driver, but
the activity of God does explain the protective voice
for the theist. Given that for a number of these theists
there are more than a few Gaps that God fills and
God does so on somewhat regular occasion, this form
of theism falls closer to the center of the theism continuum.

Strong Theism

A defining feature of weak theism is that the limitations placed on God and God’s activity in the world
stem from naturalism and science. In the case of strong
theism, there are either no limitations placed on God
at all or the limitations are self-imposed by God, but
no limitations come from the natural world or scientists’ study of it. Two forms of strong theism that place
no limitations on God and God’s activity will first be
reviewed followed by a description of two forms of
strong theism in which God’s activity is self-limited.
Supernaturalism. Located on the extreme right
side of the continuum, supernaturalism represents the
theological position that there are no natural or consistent causes. Instead, God directly causes everything
that exists and happens in every moment and does
so solely according to His will. This form of theism,
which is sometimes associated with pantheism and
extreme forms of theistic determinism, has ancient
origins across many early religions and cultures. It was
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directly challenged by proponents of the philosophy
of naturalism, which emerged primarily at the time
of the Renaissance and became fully realized in the
Scientific Revolution. Naturalists’ chief concern with
supernaturalism is that “because in every occurrence
only divine will matters, [supernaturalism] precludes
any human understanding of cosmic functioning”
(Helminiak, 2013, p. 44). Nothing can be explained,
even the consistent and replicable speed at which a ball
rolls down an incline plane, beyond “God wills it so”.
This form of theism is widely refuted by naturalists and theologians alike, largely because it restricts
our understanding of the world and compromises
free-will, yet threads of it can be found among some
theists who attribute everything that happens in the
world and to them personally to God’s will. Therapists who encounter clients who embrace this form of
theism will find that they give all credit to God for
who they are, what they have experienced, and what
they will become. Also, since God is the agent of their
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, then any change in
their psychology, including change resulting from the
therapist’s practices and techniques, will come from
God and will only occur if God happens to will it. In
this sense, the therapist too is caused by God, as is
the theorist who developed the therapeutic approach
initially, as is the effectiveness of the techniques associated with the approach. God’s hand is actively and
directly bringing about the efficacy of all these things.
Occasionalism. Just to the left of supernaturalism
on the theism continuum is occasionalism. Occasionalism, like supernaturalism, holds the position that
there are no natural laws and God is the direct cause
of all things. However, God has made a covenant to
maintain regularities and order in nature by intervening at every point in time. As Plantinga (2001) describes it, “God is already and always intimately acting
in nature which depends from moment to moment . . .
upon divine activity” (Plantinga, 2001, p. 350). Consequently, Plantinga (2016) argues, every time I have
the will to raise my arm, God takes the occasion of
my willing it to raise it, for only God can cause such a
thing to happen:

event; for example, there is a more or less constant correlation between my willing to raise my arm and my
arm’s rising. That is because God ordinarily takes my
willing to raise my arm as the occasion for causing my
arm to rise (p. 136).

This “more or less constant correlation” that God allows and facilitates makes possible regularities in the
world that make explanation and prediction possible
and still allows for human agency (though Plantinga
himself is unclear on how our will is not also caused
by God). Occasionalists then, like Supernaturalists,
give all credit to God for all that is and all that they do
and become, but they also appreciate God’s promise
to act consistently and constantly, for the most part in
predictable and understandable ways. Theistic clients
of this type would be less likely to describe God as
capricious than the supernaturalist and would demonstrate less of a superstitious theism. The therapy
process, from the occasionalist perspective, consists
of a series of more or less constantly correlated human willing/ God acting events that are all brought
to fruition by God. As such, God is fully present and
intimately involved in every aspect of therapy and its
outcomes, for good or ill, just as God is active in all
mental disorders and issues, and in every occasion for
health and wellbeing. Occasionalism, then, is a thoroughgoing theism in which God acts consistently and
constantly in the lives of clients and therapists and in
their work together.
Concurrence. The forms of theism that are right of
center on the theism continuum all involve a level of
God’s self-limitation that is not found in occasionalism and supernaturalism. In concurrence theism, for
example, God is the primary cause of all things, but he
allows human beings to be secondary causes (i.e., to
make decisions; Vicens, n.d.). Sproul (n.d.) describes
concurrence through the example of Job:
In essence, concurrence says that two or more parties
can act in the same event and produce a given outcome
without all parties having the same intent. Job’s life is
a good illustration of concurrence. Satan intended to
discredit Job, and by extension, to discredit God. The
intent of the Chaldeans and Sabeans was to enrich
themselves. Our Lord’s intent was to vindicate Job’s
faith. Each of these players was necessarily involved in
Job’s suffering, but at different levels and with different
motivations (para. 3).

The only causal power is divine causal power. God
causes every change that occurs. God is the only real
cause. Sometimes, however, there is a correlation between certain events and God’s causing some other
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Concurrent theism is a popular form of theism today as it supports many theists’ belief in and experience of moral agency and accountability, but it also
acknowledges a very involved and purposeful God
who wants human beings to grow and learn from their
choices and mistakes while still guiding us toward the
outcomes He has designed for us. Therapists who
encounter concurrent theists as clients and have a
conversation with them about God and God’s activity in therapy will likely find that they give God ultimate credit for their lives and their circumstances. At
the same time, they also genuinely believe that their
choices and the choices of others matter and have contributed to who they are and to the issues and concerns
that have led them to seek therapy—all for the greater
good of realizing God’s will. Not unlike the example
of Job above, the concurrent theistic client would see
such things as parental neglect or even abuse in their
childhood as bad choices made by parents that nevertheless work within God’s plan for the client. The
client, like Job, will desire to make choices about
how to interpret, live with, and heal from that history
in ways that align with God’s will, and a therapist who
understands that desire can be helpful in that process,
for the therapist too makes choices about treatment
that, from the client’s perspective are ultimately concurrent with the activity of God, whether the therapist intends that concurrence or not.
Process Theism and Open Theism. These two
forms of theism both embrace the idea that God selflimits, each to varying degrees, for the sake of having a
full and meaningful relationship with his children. In
process theism:

surprised by us, and we can choose to go against
God’s will. As Rissler (n.d.) describes it:
Because God loves us and desires that we freely choose
to reciprocate His love, He has made His knowledge
of, and plans for, the future conditional upon our actions. Though omniscient, God does not know what
we will freely do in the future. Though omnipotent, He
has chosen to invite us to freely collaborate with Him
in governing and developing His creation, thereby also
allowing us the freedom to thwart His hopes for us.
(para. 1)

The distinguishing feature of both of these forms of
theism is human self-determination, which God allows for and makes genuine by limiting his determination and to some extent his foreknowledge. Therapy
clients who embrace these forms of theism experience
their relationship with God as mutual and open to the
possibility that the human side can persuade the God
side of the relationship in some ways. They see God
as involved in every aspect of their lives, but not in a
determinative way, as much as in an open, responsive,
and collaborative way. These clients may not only want
to discuss this open and responsive relationship with
their therapist, but they would likely also want the
therapist to participate in this relationship, collaborating with the client and with God as active participants
working together in the treatment process.
Including Theism in Psychotherapy

This review of the various forms of theism located
along the theism continuum is not intended to be exhaustive. Nor does it suggest that theists find themselves located once and for all on a given point on
the continuum. As with other aspects of human being, theism is contextual and fluid and can shift and
change, especially in times of crisis and suffering,
which are often the times in which people seek out
therapy. In light of this, the theism continuum should
be considered a guide or signpost to help therapists
prepare for and navigate their initial and ongoing discussions with theistic clients. It also offers therapists
of faith some points for reflection on their own theism
and the opportunity to think carefully and critically
about how they generally relate theism to naturalism
within their therapeutic approach and how they might
need to adjust their typical approach when working

it is an essential attribute of God to be fully involved
in and affected by temporal processes. This idea contrasts neatly with traditional forms of theism that hold
God to be or at least conceived as being, in all respects
non-temporal (eternal), unchanging (immutable,) and
unaffected by the world (impassible). Process theism
does not deny that God is in some respects eternal, immutable, and impassible, but it contradicts the classical
view by insisting that God is in some respects temporal,
mutable, and passible (Viney, 2018, para. 1).

Open theism increases the level of God’s selflimitation to such a degree that there is genuine
give and take with God, God allows himself to be
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Figure 2. The theism continuum and psychotherapy.
with clients who embrace a form of theism that differs
from their own.
To encourage that careful and critical reflection
a brief overview of some of the challenges that accompany the common ways in which counselors and
psychotherapists might include theism in therapy is
provided. As figure 2 indicates, some of these inclusions of theism in therapy are weak in that they assume an add-on God who is limited by natural laws
and processes and is therefore not a necessary factor
in the therapy treatment. Other forms of inclusion
of theism in therapy are strong because an altering
God is assumed to be necessary to the treatment and
unlimited in his activity in the therapy.

even talk of their own theism and acknowledge
that God’s activity is an important part of mental
health and wellbeing. Then, when they engage in the
practice of their therapy and treat the client’s presenting concerns, they will take off their theism hat
and put on their naturalism hat, because when it
comes to therapeutic efficacy, “God’s influence
is unnecessary to the mechanism of client change”
(Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010, p. 170). Of course,
“God Talk” can be added-on to help the client “relax
and relate” (ibid), but as Lovinger (1996) describes
it, “psychotherapy with religious clients is not essentially different from nonreligious clients” (p. 353).
Compartmentalized theism does include God in
psychotherapy to some degree and would encourage
sensitivity and respect for the client’s theism in some
ways, but it does not include theism in the psychotherapy process itself. This may not be an issue for
some theistic clients, who may share a compartmentalized sense of their theism with the therapist, but
for theistic clients who embrace a stronger theism,
compartmentalized theism would be at odds with
their understanding and experience of God and God’s
activity.

Compartmental Theism

Therapists who embrace a weak form of theism
(e.g., dualism) may be prone to compartmentalizing
theism. Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010) describe
this approach:
These therapists may consider themselves to be strong
theists personally, perhaps disclosing their religious
affiliation and/or theistic beliefs in order to attract
or build rapport with theistic clients. However, their
professional theories and explanations do not reflect
strong theism as a core philosophy, and, in fact, are
often identical to secular and naturalistic approaches
(p. 170).

Peripheral Theism

Many therapists see the value of religious practices and activities, such as prayer and forgiveness, in
promoting mental health and wellbeing, and some
therapists practice these activities themselves. Despite
their theistic origins and depending on the therapist’s

Some clinicians refer to the compartmentalization
of their theism from their psychotherapy in terms of
wearing “two hats” (Landau, 2017). They will wear
their theism hat to learn about their client’s faith and
speak in their same religious language. They may
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compartmentalization tendencies, these practices and
activities can be:

Inconsistent theism is closer to strong theism than
compartmentalized and peripheral theism, but limitations are still placed on God and God’s activity, and
they are usually put in place by the therapist for naturalistic reasons.
Inconsistent theistic therapists might include theistic interventions and practices in areas that appear
more obviously spiritual to them (e.g., seeking forgiveness), but exclude theistic interventions and practices
from areas that they perceive to be more naturalistic (e.g., drug therapy). Such an approach would be
incompatible with strong forms of theism that place
no limitations on God’s activity and are embraced by
many theistic clients. As a result, psychotherapists approaching theism inconsistently might intentionally
or unintentionally teach their clients that “the spiritual
portion of therapy, in which God’s activity is clearly
needed, could be viewed as an ‘add-on’ to the naturalistic theories and methods that are presumably seen as
neutral to God’s activity” (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt,
2010, p. 172).

conceptualized either as requiring an active God or
as working through more conventional psychological
mechanisms, and thus not requiring an active God. In
peripheral theism, therapy strategies may include and
even focus on these peripheral aspects, but their relation to or need of an active God is not part of their
understanding or significance (Slife, Stevenson, &
Wendt, 2010, p. 170).

In peripheral theism, then, the therapist includes
theistic practices and activities in the therapy process,
but ignores or separates off the theistic components
of the practice that for theists are necessary. Consequently, rather than forgiveness requiring God’s grace
to soften the heart of a wounded or offended person,
forgiveness is understood only as “a sequential process
of ceased resentment followed by understanding, empathy, and altruism” (Krejci, 2004, p. 96). God’s activity is moved to the periphery and as such becomes
unnecessary to the implementation and efficacy of the
practice in the psychotherapy process. The therapist
can add on theistic language and reference God’s grace
and other activities in the application of the practice,
but only because the client desires it, not because
God’s activity is necessary for change. Thus, as Liccione (2017) states with regard to the use of forgiveness in therapy as a peripheral aspect of theism, “one of
its advantages is that it can be applied with or without
a theological context.” (Liccione, 2017, para. 8). Not so
for the strongly theistic client who experiences God’s
grace moving through them as a necessary condition
for forgiveness.

Thoroughgoing Theism

For counselors and psychotherapists who assume a
thoroughgoing theism, “God is seen to be already present in the world and is potentially involved at all times
and in all places” (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010,
p. 168), including the therapy office. This could mean
that God is seen as the sufficient cause of everything
that happens in therapy, as in supernaturalism and
occasionalism. Or, rather, God is a necessary condition for what happens in therapy, along with other
psychological and contextual conditions, including
the client and the therapist’s free-will, as in open and
process theism. In any case, “God’s activity is conceptualized to be the center of therapeutic change” (ibid).
This negates the possibility of compartmentalization
or inconsistent theism and means “prayer and other
peripheral aspects have a unique meaning from their
relation to a God who is already present and functionally active” (p. 167). For the thoroughgoing theistic
therapist, “God’s necessary activity is clearly reflected
at all levels of theory, method, and practice” (ibid).
Strongly theistic clients would find the inclusion
of God’s involvement in every aspect of therapy supportive of their thoroughgoing theistic worldview and

Inconsistent Theism

Some therapists may believe that some aspects of
therapy require and relate to an active God, while
other aspects do not. Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt
(2010) describe inconsistent theism as:
an attempt to combine—within the context of therapy—the incompatible assumptions of naturalism and
theism, resulting in a dualistic form of weak theism
where God’s activity is limited to a certain realm or set
of factors. The theistic components of therapy are thus
inconsistent with the naturalistic components (p. 171).
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would work very well with therapists who also embrace this form of theism. Clients who embrace weak
forms of theism, on the other hand, would not share
the thoroughgoing theistic therapist’s perspective that
“God’s influence is conceptualized ‘all the way down’”
(Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010, p. 168) and would
likely prefer some form of compartmentalization
of theism in the therapy process. As with the other
risks of a mismatch between the therapist’s conceptualization of theism and that of the client’s, it will
be essential for therapists to have initial and ongoing
conversations about their clients’ position on theism
and naturalism and to carefully and critically examine
any potential risks of their personal and professional
values, including in this case strong theistic values, being imposed on the theistic clients they treat.

Being members of the same church does not obviate the risk of value imposition in the area of theism.
It could, given potential presumptions of similarity by therapists actually encourage value imposition,
including the professional value of naturalism. Thus, it
is especially important that therapists who are members of the church receive training in theism, carefully
and critically evaluate their own theistic position, and
engage their clients, including especially clients who
are members of the church, in initial and ongoing dialog about their theism so they can provide therapy in
a sensitive, respectful, and ethical manner.
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A Synopsis and Extension of Thayne and Gantt’s
Who is Truth? Reframing Our Questions for a Richer Faith
Lane Fischer
Brigham Young University

Thayne and Gantt’s recent book, Who is Truth?: Reframing Our Questions for a Richer Faith,
presents an ancient but revolutionary conception of truth. They compare the ancient Greek conception
of Idea-truth with the ancient Hebrew conception of Person-truth. They explore the implications of
Person-truth for our faith. They use Person-truth to reframe questions. This article presents a synopsis
of the book and extends its implications around the issue of suffering and psychotherapy.

J

reframing truth as the person of Jesus Christ (capital
“T” Truth, as it were) leads to the hope that “readers
will center their faith more on the Savior Jesus Christ
and the covenants they have made with God and less
on abstract lists of doctrines or beliefs” (p. 16). Indeed,
reframing truth as the person of Jesus Christ leads to reframing questions about life. Each chapter concludes
with important reframings that seek to enhance faith
and invite the reader to a deeper and richer spiritual
understanding and relationship with Christ.
In Chapter One, the authors juxtapose “Idea-truth”
and “Person-truth”. They show that Idea-truth has
its roots in the Greek (and subsequent Western)
philosophical tradition, whereas Person-truth has
its roots in ancient Hebrew scriptural conceptions.
They articulate and justify an understanding in which
Christ is the very embodiment, the very reality of
truth – a perspective announced throughout holy
scripture, both ancient and modern. They contrast

effrey L. Thayne and Edwin E. Gantt (2019) recently
published Who is Truth?: Reframing Our Questions
for a Richer Faith, a deep and penetrating book written in a very accessible style that articulates a most ancient, but revolutionary reconceptualization of truth.
Thayne and Gantt present a powerful concept and
use it to reframe common questions that Latter-day
Saints might have vis-a-vis the nature of God, truth,
suffering, and the purpose of life. What follows is a
synopsis of the book with an extension of the analysis
Thayne and Gantt offer in their book, one that I have
pondered at some length and have here taken the liberty to draft.
The foundational concept in Who is Truth is that
“truth is not a set of abstract ideas, but a living, breathing Person who loves us as His children.” Taking their
cue from Christ’s own declaration to be “the way, the
truth, and the life” ( John 14:6), as well as similar
scriptural statements, Thayne and Gantt argue that
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Pithily put, the deed is always more important than
the creed and the aim of worship is the Living Truth
rather than the dead law.
In Chapter Four, the authors illustrate that knowing God and believing Him is distinct from believing
in ideas about Him. They emphasize that a testimony
is about the experiences we have had with God, His
hand in our lives, His goodness, His saving grace and
His transforming love. They challenge the idea that
faith and knowledge are opposites and propose that
the true opposite of faith is disloyalty to a Person.
They conclude that we justify our faithfulness through
our experience with God. We remember our experiences and it is our history with God that grounds our
loyalty to Him.
In Chapter Five, the authors challenge our pandemic itch for absolutes and control. They argue that
Person-truth does not give us control and is risky.
In the Greek worldview, truth is reliable because it is
something that never changes. In the Hebrew worldview, Person-truth is reliable because God is good,
trustworthy, and faithful to His children. In this
way, safety in life is not grounded in reliable expectations of unchanging abstractions, but rather, safety is
grounded in the goodness of God. Goodness is crucial. In the Greek perspective, Idea-truth gives us control regardless of our morality because knowledge is
distinct from ethics. In other words, what one knows,
the knowledge one possesses is separable in important
ways from how one conducts oneself and how one is
for and with other people. Person-truth, in contrast,
relies on a relationship that depends on our moral
conduct and requires that we relinquish control and
let God prevail in our lives. While Idea-truth promises the power to exert our will on the world for good
or bad (recall the Shoah), Person-truth does nothing
of the sort. It is only when we strive to enact God’s
good will in humility that Person-truth shares His
power with us and can truly, fruitfully work through
us.
In Chapter Six, the authors explore the nature and
meaning of “knowing.” Most readers will be familiar
with the scientific method for discovering presumably self-existent natural law. By contrast, Thayne and
Gantt show that knowing Truth in the very person of
Christ comes not by replicable method but through

and discuss the two conceptions of truth as follows:
Idea-Truth				Person-Truth
Abstract		
Concrete and Particular
Universal				
Contextual
Unchangeable			
Moral Agent
Passive				
Active
Discoverable			
Must Be Revealed
In Chapter Two, the authors expand on the ancient roots of each of these conceptions of truth. In
the Greek conception, things that are unchangeable
trump things that change. In the Greek, abstract ideas
trump concrete realities. In the Greek, the gods were
bound by fate and the dictates of impersonal abstract
law. The authors propose that one major consequence
of the Apostasy was the replacement of a dynamic,
agentic, relational God with an abstract, unembodied, timeless, formless, and unchanging Being. In the
Greek, Aesop’s fables represent universal maxims. In
contrast, the Hebrew conception proposes that what
something does defines what it is. In the Hebrew,
Truth is experienced as a lived relationship. In the Hebrew, there is no search for Truth that is distinct from
the search for communion with a living, loving God.
In the Hebrew, God changes the world. In the Hebrew, right behavior is based on covenantal commitments. In the Hebrew, Jesus’ parables are narratives
to be lived and re-lived within changing contexts that
bring forth new and deeper meanings and possibilities.
In Chapter Three, the authors question whether we
should place our faith in Ideas or be faithful to a Person. If truth is a set of abstract ideas best captured in
logical propositions, then the essence of religion observance becomes a primarily a matter of adherence to
a set of doctrines and the animating question becomes
“what do I believe?” If Truth is a person, however, religion becomes a way of living in faithfulness to God
with whom one makes covenants and to whom one is
to be loyal. Religion is a way of life. The focus shifts
from a set of doctrines to our relationship with the
Truth made flesh. Person-truth leads prophets to sermonize less about orthodoxy and consensus and more
about inviting all to a covenant relationship with God.
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covenant. We come to know Truth in ways that are
sacred, personal, and ideographic. Through covenant,
we pledge ourselves to God and must do so to know
Him intimately.
In Chapter Seven, the authors powerfully challenge
the idea that societies inexorably progress to better
states. Idea-truth assumes that society is continually
progressing from antiquated ideas to newer, better
ideas and that knowledge is cumulative. From this sort
of thinking comes the scoff that to reject a newer idea
is be on the wrong side of history. Person-truth treats
societal progress very differently, however. In Persontruth our relationship with Truth is our relationship
with God and that relationship must be nurtured. Indeed, from this perspective it is easy to see that the
Book of Mormon is a thousand-year history of the
rise and fall of civilizations directly due to their relationship with God. The Nephite nations’ on-again/
off-again relationship with Person-truth showed that
progress is not a cumulative given and that knowledge and goodness can be lost. Rather than be on the
wrong side of history, the question is really whether
we are on the wrong or right side of God. We progress
when we are aligned with Person-truth.
In Chapter Eight, the Thayne and Gantt explore
the meaning and nature of the concept of “authority.” Idea-truth establishes authority based on degrees
granted by accredited institutions based on knowledge
obtained through study grounded by a publicly replicable curriculum that depends heavily on converging rational or scientific consensus. Ironically, even as
Idea-truth encourages rejecting appeals to authority
as a logical fallacy, at the same time it extols the virtues
of scholarly dialogues that actually rely on appeals to
authority through minimal peer review, especially in
the social sciences where replication is sorely lacking.
Few scholars replicate the work of others but accept
conclusions based on the authority of the peer-review
process. In contrast, Person-truth does not depend on
public scrutiny, objectivity, or replicability to establish
itself, to ensure its validity. Person-truth can authorize and commission spokespersons in a quiet, sacred
way – a way that Idea-truth, as an abstraction, or set
of rational principles, can never do. Christ’s servants
can contradict the consensus of the so-called “experts,”

and are often rejected, denigrated, and punished for
going against the grain of popular intellectual or
social consensus. But the question remains as to how
to determine whether someone is (or has) authority.
Thayne and Gantt propose that personal revelation
confirms the stewardship of the representatives teaching of Person-truth more than whether their abstract
ideas or rational theories are accepted as true or have
intellectual standing in a community of experts and
professionals. Person-truth allows contextual inspired
leadership rather than uniform consistency across all
contexts.
In Chapter Nine, the authors take on the true
enemy of Person-truth. If Truth is a person, then
what of Falsehood? In the perspective of Idea-truth,
falsehood is a matter of mind, ideation, and bad reasoning. In Person-truth, however, not only is Truth a
Person but Falsehood is as well. Our science does not
deal with the personhood of Falsehood. Such things
are treated as superstition and bugaboo. The book’s
authors propose that our great task is not to sort between true and false ideas but to learn to discern the
voice of Truth and the disguises of Falsehood, the
one who is the enemy of Truth. The question is not
what to believe, but in whom to trust, whom to follow.
The person of Falsehood is an active destroyer. While
Falsehood can ensnare us with falsity, escape comes
not by thinking our way out of the snare, but rather
by divine rescue.
In Chapter Ten, Thayne and Gantt endeavor to examine the concept of sin. According to the Idea-truth
perspective, moral truth is grounded in, or perhaps a
product of, a set of universal rules, axioms, or principles. Sin is therefore a violation of these abstract principles and laws, moral prescriptions that not only do
not depend on context but which also require sophisticated rational capacities to identify and implement
correctly. In contrast, the Person-truth perspective
suggests that sin has less to do with complying with
universal moral principles, and the ethical codes that
seek to articulate them, and more to do with our loyalty to our covenants and relational stance toward
God and our fellow beings as informed in particular
contexts and situations. Everything becomes personal.
It is not because we violate impersonal law that we
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have been sinful and feel guilt. Rather, it is because
we have violated His laws, betrayed our relationship
with the Truth, and broken faith with Him. We have
wronged a Person who loves us, and in whose very real
and very concrete presence we will feel true sorrow for
disloyalty.
In Chapter Eleven, following this reconsideration of
the meaning of sin, the authors then offer a reconceptualization of the nature of the Atonement of Jesus
Christ. Idea-truth leads us to believe that violations of
abstract, self-existent moral laws require a penalty for
sin. In that view, Christ vicariously suffered the punishments required by impersonal, universal moral law.
Such a conception relies on the assumption that the
fundamental reality of the universe is found in the existence of certain abstract, unchanging laws that even
God must abide and to which He must ultimately be
held to account. In the perspective of Person-truth,
however, the Atonement of Jesus Christ becomes an
effort to reconcile us to God after we have been disloyal to Him. Christ’s task is to repair our relationship
with God rather than to appease the demands of some
unembodied, impersonal and abstract concept of justice. Christ condescends to suffer with us as we mourn
and turn again to God. Most notably, the Atonement
is seen as an on-going, personal process rather than a
single event of the past that occurred in Gethsemane
or on Golgotha that infinitely appeased the demands
of justice. It is, rather, a patient continual invitation to
become at-one with God in the immediate and unfolding context of our lives.
In Chapter Twelve, Thayne and Gantt return again
to the world of science and reason. They explain that
Person-truth and science are not in fact in conflict.
The resolution to the putative conflict between them
is to disavow causal statements arising from a form
of scientific method rooted (whether explicitly or covertly) in naturalism. Humility is required to move
down the hierarchy of explanatory power from claims
of causation to hopeful prediction, knowing always
that some forms of uncertainty are better than others but never certain. Perhaps scientists could even
humbly accept that scientific inquiry can only describe
patterns that recur. That is, although we can observe
regularities in nature, nothing requires that we believe
our descriptions to be descriptions of universal or immutable laws of nature. While God may be a God of

order, nothing demands that His order cannot change.
The Person-truth conception then asks us to trust
His order, not because He is unchanging or bound by
transcendent abstract law, but because whatever order
he decrees in context is born of love and His desire for
our growth and development.
At the conclusion of their book, Gantt and Thayne
provide two very informative appendices; one that
more fully examines Greek and Hebrew thought, and
one that responds to frequently asked questions, such
as: Isn’t God subject to natural Law? What of Justice
and Mercy in the Book of Mormon? Doesn’t the Book
of Mormon describe God as unchangeable? Don’t the
scriptures describe God’s commandments as irrevocable?
Don’t Modern prophets talk about moral law using Greek
ideas? Does the Person-view of truth lead to moral relativism? Their answers to these and similar questions are
both cogent and enlightening.
Reading this book, and considering the analyses
in each of its chapters, left me pondering the nature
of punishment and suffering. What follows is my attempt to extend the work of Thayne and Gantt by examining the nature of punishment and suffering from
the Person-truth view they articulate. I do not know
if my extension is accurate and consistent with their
conception, but the guiding principle is that whatever
God does in our lives, it is personal, motivated by love
for us, and individually sculpted to enhance our development. Trusting in the Lord as Truth changes how
we interpret our life’s experiences. Following Thayne
and Gantt’s argument, I began to see how scriptural
statements of so-called punishment were ideographic,
intensely personal, and that God openly accepted personal accountability for his response to our perfidy in
our relationship with Him as well as personally supporting us in our trials.
It seems that in the Greek view of Idea-truth, punishment is the result of violating disembodied selfexistent laws. Suffering occasioned by sin is, in this
view, often characterized as analogous to the law of
gravity and sin is said to be akin to jumping out of
an airplane without a parachute. There is nothing personal about the suffering occasioned by sinful behavior.
Actions simply have consequences, and, thus, under
this conception, people simply suffer the impersonal
consequences of their choices. But suffering is not
necessarily the consequence of sin, although many of
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our clients often wonder what in the world that they
did wrong to endure the suffering imposed on them.
They ask “Haven’t I kept the commandments? Why
is this happening to me?”. This is a variation on the
question asked of Jesus “And as Jesus passed by, he saw
a man which was blind from birth. And his disciples
asked him, saying, Master, who did sin, this man, or
his parents, that he was born blind? Jesus answered,
Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents: but
that the works of God should be made manifest in
him.” ( John 9:1-3 King James Version)
Jesus disavowed that suffering was the inescapable,
impersonal result of sin. Our clients may have been
faithful, and yet their suffering may not be the consequence of sin. Predation, illness, disability, and accidents are not the effects of sin, but they seem to be the
conditions of a fallen world in which entropy reigns
and Falsehood is allowed to roam the earth. In the
case of the man born blind, Jesus then metaphorically
showed that he was the Creator of the earth who was
sent from God to heal the fallen world. He used his
own bodily fluid (spittle) and mixed it with the dust
of the earth (clay) and sent the man to the place called
Siloam (lit., “sent forth”) to be healed.
In a similar way, he dealt with the woman taken in
adultery in such a way as to testify that he was the
pre-mortal Jehovah now sent to save the fallen. As he
waited for her accusers to disperse, he wrote on the
ground with his finger. This event happened on the
temple grounds and the floor was made of hewn stone.
As Jehovah had used his finger to write on the stone
tablets that Moses had hewn, again, he wrote with
his finger on the stone floor of the temple. I wonder
whether what he wrote on the floor of the temple was
simply the decalogue. Anyone watching would have
recognized the characters. It was a powerful testimony
that he is God. Jesus said that he did not condemn her
but pled with her to go and sin no more. In her case, he
showed that he was the Savior who was sent to make
us “at-one” with God as we go and sin no more. He was
not helpless in the face of natural law and the consequences of her sin. He actively intervened to restore
her relationship with God. And, unfortunately, the
man who was certainly caught in the very act of adultery with her was hypocritically not brought before
Jesus by the indignant accusers and apparently did not

receive the same merciful reunion with God ( John 8:
3-11 King James Version).
As I read the scriptures, I see the concept of Persontruth much more powerfully invoked than the concept
of Idea-truth and disembodied natural law. When we
read of the Lord executing vengeance, we tend to think
of it as metaphor, but in the Person-view of truth, it
seems to be more literal. I think that we tend to believe
that we have become so sophisticated in our modern
world that we no longer believe in such an enchanted
view of the universe as the ancients did, a cosmos in
which some god renders punishment for sin. If the
Lord uses a civil war to scourge the nation for its sins,
we tend to ascribe the war to other socio-political
forces. But the Lord does not seem to be talking in
metaphor. It seems, at least to me, to be quite personal.
He renders the punishment himself. He is accountable for rendering judgment and punishment and
atonement. Both the punishment and the atonement
are personal. And, most importantly, I see God taking
personal responsibility for punishment and suffering.
Even Christ described his suffering as a personal
experience with his Father rather than a moment in
time in which all the impersonal disembodied consequences of our sins were heaped upon him. Rather,
as we read in the 76th Section of the Doctrine and
Covenants: “When he shall deliver up the kingdom,
and present it unto the Father, spotless, saying: I have
overcome and have trodden the wine-press alone, even
the wine-press of the fierceness of the wrath of Almighty God”(107). And the angels understand this
personal process as well. “And again, another angel
shall sound his trump, which is the seventh angel, saying: It is finished; it is finished! The Lamb of God
hath overcome and trodden the wine-press alone, even
the wine-press of the fierceness of the wrath of Almighty God” (D&C 88:106).
And Christ avers that our suffering for sin is personally imposed by him.
Therefore I command you to repent—repent, lest I
smite you by the rod of my mouth, and by my wrath,
and by my anger, and your sufferings be sore—how
sore you know not, how exquisite you know not, yea,
how hard to bear you know not. For behold, I, God,
have suffered these things for all, that they might not
suffer if they would repent; but if they would not
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repent they must suffer even as I; which suffering
caused myself, even God, the greatest of all, to tremble because of pain, and to bleed at every pore, and to
suffer both body and spirit—and would that I might
not drink the bitter cup, and shrink—Nevertheless,
glory be to the Father, and I partook and finished my
preparations unto the children of men. Wherefore, I
command you again to repent, lest I humble you with
my almighty power; and that you confess your sins, lest
you suffer these punishments of which I have spoken,
of which in the smallest, yea, even in the least degree
you have tasted at the time I withdrew my Spirit.
(D&C 19:15-20)

everlasting benefit. To get you from where you are to
where He wants you to be requires a lot of stretching,
and that generally entails discomfort and pain.
When you face adversity, you can be led to ask many
questions. Some serve a useful purpose; others do not.
To ask, Why does this have to happen to me? Why do
I have to suffer this, now? What have I done to cause
this? will lead you into blind alleys. It really does no
good to ask questions that reflect opposition to the
will of God. Rather ask, What am I to do? What am
I to learn from this experience? What am I to change?
Whom am I to help? How can I remember my many
blessings in times of trial? Willing sacrifice of deeply
held personal desires in favor of the will of God is very
hard to do. Yet, when you pray with real conviction,
“Please let me know Thy will” and “May Thy will be
done,” you are in the strongest position to receive the
maximum help from your loving Father.

Nowhere in that statement do we see that the consequences for sin are like jumping out of an airplane
without a parachute or the inexorable consequences
of the operations of eternally disinterested natural law.
To the contrary, Christ is the actor who takes personal
responsibility for smiting us and humbling us and saving us.
It can be conceived that there are three basic sources
of suffering: consequences of sin (smiting), consequences of the Fall (entropy), or sculpted trials. But,
upon reflection, Christ’s mercy is the solution to each
of these sources of suffering. He atones for sin. He
controls the wind and the waves, heals the sick, and
even conquers death, the ultimate expression of entropy in a fallen world. And, when our pleas for deliverance from the effects of this fallen world are not
met with our desired outcome, he sustains us in our
sculpted trials as we let God prevail in our lives.
Elder Richard G. Scott (1995) provided a reframing
that dovetails nicely with Thayne and Gantt’s chapters. After identifying the need for repentance and
trust in Christ’s mercy to resolve suffering, he said:

This life is an experience in profound trust—trust in
Jesus Christ, trust in His teachings, trust in our capacity as led by the Holy Spirit to obey those teachings
for happiness now and for a purposeful, supremely
happy eternal existence. To trust means to obey willingly without knowing the end from the beginning
(see Proverbs 3: 5-7). To produce fruit, your trust in
the Lord must be more powerful and enduring than
your confidence in your own personal feelings and experience. (Ensign, November 1995)

Elder Scott’s reframing here only makes sense –
indeed, it is only really possible – under the rubric of
a Person-truth perspective. Each of the sources of suffering are understood and we are sustained in a personal process with He who is Truth.
I teach a course focused on spiritual interventions
in psychotherapy in our doctoral program in counseling psychology. As I have pondered and developed this
course, I have needed to make it effective for all constituents, believers and non-believers of all traditions.
In the end, however, I do share my strong opinion
that all development and healing come by power of
the Atonement of Jesus Christ, whether we know it or
not. The task for believing therapists is to become sensitized to the presence of God in the therapy process.
It is not necessary to proselytize or testify, at least in
the usual sense of those terms, but rather to be sensitive to the divine presence. As an example, I was working with a family after an ugly trauma, a sister-in-law

Now may I share some suggestions with you who face
the second source of adversity, the testing that a wise
Heavenly Father determines is needed even when you
are living a worthy, righteous life and are obedient to
His commandments.
Just when all seems to be going right, challenges often
come in multiple doses applied simultaneously. When
those trials are not consequences of your disobedience,
they are evidence that the Lord feels you are prepared
to grow more (see Proverbs 3:11-12). He therefore
gives you experiences that stimulate growth, understanding, and compassion which polish you for your
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made a profoundly supportive statement. I immediately felt the presence of Deity in the room. Without
using culturally laden language, I asked the family
whether they felt it. As the youngest child nodded in
affirmation, I asked, “Do you know what that feeling
is?” She did not. I told the family that what they were
feeling was truth and love. They all acknowledged the
feeling and the content. It was a profoundly tender
and healing moment in the session. Those feelings
that accompany the presence of love and truth are not
the effect of disinterested impersonal natural law. It
is far more powerful to conceive of those healing moments as being in the presence of a real, living, loving
person who is Truth.
How does one become sensitized to the presence of
Person-truth in the therapy room? In the course that
I teach we explore five components: Know Thyself,
Know Thy God, Know Thy Client, Know Thy Craft,
and Think About it Already. In each domain we write
and reflect on and share our reflections. We write our
history with God. We try to articulate our conception
of God. Some students have very direct contact with
the Infinite. Some take great strength through the
scriptures. Some are softened by music, and some by
trials in which they felt divine support. While hearing our colleagues’ histories and conceptions of God,
it becomes clear that our clients also have their own
histories and conceptions of God. The varieties of our
colleagues’ religious and spiritual experiences become
immediately evident and teach us of the sensitivity
needed to understand and accept our clients’ experiences.
Although I believe that Christ is the source of all
development and healing, I do not have to impose
that belief. The five components in the course work
as well for believers as they do for atheists. Suspended
belief or non-belief is an expression of one’s history
with the idea of God. That is accepted in students as
much as it should be in clients. Given those foundations, we then explore how to respond with open eyes
and hearts to the varieties of spiritual experiences
or non-experiences. And, finally, the process is never
finished. We must think about it for the rest of our
careers. In light of Thayne and Gantt’s articulation
of the Person-truth view, it becomes clearer that there
is no technique for spiritual interventions in psychotherapy. Rather, what is required is a particular

mindset. It has seemed to me that Thayne and Gantt’s
ancient, but revolutionary, conception of truth as a
person, is a powerful mindset. Those of us who prefer
to think in terms of evidence-based practice, something which harks back to Idea-truth, are also apt to
think in terms of effective technique. My own doctoral
training emphasized that we were “behavioral scientists” more than psychologists. I have questioned my
own conception of truth. Historically, I have wrestled
with the tension between modern and post-modern
views of truth. In the book Turning Freud Upside
Down (2005), I tried to dovetail discovered, self-existent truth (modern) and constructed truth (postmodern). I thought that by invoking Georg Cantor’s
diagonality theorem and model of transfinity, I could
make both conceptions work harmoniously in a way
that allowed for God to have infinite knowledge at the
same time that he had a frontier. I still like the idea of
nested ecologies of law. But in neither case, was I considering that truth was a person. Thayne and Gantt’s
Person-truth is an ancient but revolutionary concept
which is neither modern nor post-modern.
What does the world look like if truth is a person? How does the universe function if truth is a
person? Thayne and Gantt’s book opens up an entirely new way to consider such questions. I can
hardly wrap my head around it, but it feels warm, immediate and deeply personal when I do. I see it replete
in the scriptures and everything has become personal
between me and Truth.
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